Turkey’s Middle Eastern pendulum under contesting geopolitical mentalities and representations (1923-2010) by Sahin, Ozcan
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This work is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights and 
duplication or sale of all or part is not permitted, except that material may be 
duplicated by you for research, private study, criticism/review or educational 
purposes. Electronic or print copies are for your own personal, non-
commercial use and shall not be passed to any other individual. No quotation 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. For any other use, or to 
quote extensively from the work, permission must be obtained from the 
copyright holder/s. 
 
1 
 
 
 
  
Turkey’s Middle Eastern pendulum                                    
under contesting geopolitical mentalities and 
representations 
(1923-2010) 
 
by Özcan Şahin 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Politics and 
International Relations 
 
 
June 2016 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
This project was initially born out of a curiosity to investigate why Turkey in the 2000s so 
fervently reclaimed itself in Middle Eastern politics. Such curiosity was further buttressed by 
additional questions like 'why now?', 'is this the first time?', 'has Turkey ever indicated a 
similar interest in the region?' and 'are there common patterns with cross government, cross 
time and cross leadership explanatory power?' Thus seeking answers in a broadened 
perspective, a most pertinent challenge was to develop a heuristic model.  
 
This effort brought Turkish „state culture' to the forefront. Earlier scholarly work had already 
provided hindsight with regards to 'strategic culture' through a security based understanding. 
But this time Turkish leaders' expressly geography based reasoning required further scrutiny 
by analysing contending geopolitical discourses from the early days of Turkey until the 
present day.  
 
This is how this research came across geopolitics in critical scholarship. As a result, the 
novel perspective to analyse as to how Turkey behaves in the Middle East is centred on the 
premise of 'geopolitical culture'. It covers many aspects of discursive geography in which 
perception and representation with historical ad continuum remain two key themes.  
 
The analyses in this study are therefore socially and historically contextual, and are not 
singlehandedly restricted to the views of individual Turkish leaders. The two most prominent 
traditions, i.e. Kemalism and Conservatism, keep producing rediscovered discourses on the 
global political space, Turkey‟s geography, and sense of geo-cultural belonging. What 
remains beneath are two distinct, competing and highly irreconcilable geopolitical mentalities 
to impact foreign policy in an exercise highly imbued with domestic power relations. 
 
This is to hint at the freshness of the theoretical perspective with a particular emphasis on 
geographical influences on Turkish foreign policy through the prism of the Middle East.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Analysing Turkish foreign policy is never an easy task. A multitude of factors and actors are 
at play in a context of ever dynamic interaction. Under these circumstances, how national 
interest is invoked in the face of external stimuli is always a complex phenomenon. In 
formulating answers to this broad question; examining prevalent mentalities, perceptions and 
modes of representation held by influential actors in Turkish society is a necessity since 
foreign policy is ultimately based on ideas, familiar assumptions and dispositions about the 
world, one's own self, and others which is grounded on geographical situatedness. Such an 
exercise is deeply related to how Turkey‘s global positioning is construed and/or constructed 
in relation to identity/policy formation.  
 
In fact, every major piece on Turkish foreign policy starts with a reference to Turkey‘s unique 
geographical location. That Turkey is located between Europe and Asia hosting key sea 
lines, major transportation and energy links across the Middle East, the Balkans, and 
Caucasia appears quite frequently in academic literature. Surrounded by seas at three 
corners (the Black Sea, the Aegean and the Mediterranean), the geographical, cultural and 
civilizational connections enjoyed with the Muslim world en route Europe accompany claims 
about Turkey‘s exceptional (mostly strategic) geographical situatedness. 
 
As Kalaycıoğlu notes, such a location often elicits different depictions for the political or 
strategic location of the country.1A country of an overwhelming Muslim majority located at the 
intersection of two continents with a secular system in a traditionally conservative polity 
whose face is turned towards the West in its quest for modernization but whose roots and 
past are located in the East were elements of any attempt to understand Turkey and its 
foreign policy.For some, Turkey is squarely a western and European country. For others, it 
constitutes an extension of the Muslim world. The terms used to describe Turkey range from 
                                                          
1KALAYCIOĞLU, E. (2005). Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. p. 3. 
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a ―status quo power‖ to a ―medium power‖, from a loyal ―flank‖ to ―peripheral‖ country and, 
after the Cold War, a ―bridge‖ or a ―crossroads‖.  
 
These are all discursive spatial formations that act as tools of physical as well as 
cultural/civilizational boundary drawing in line with the eastern and western characteristics of 
Turkey in different periods. Perceptions of geography, identity, security, national interest and 
foreign policy are thus limitlessly intermingled in such discursive practices. Although these 
depictions are not necessarily impartial, objective or neutral, they ultimately help inform one‘s 
understanding of Turkey‘s foreign policy entanglements.  
 
What indeed is common in these perspectives is the rather unwitting use of ―geopolitics‖. Put 
differently, mentally defining Turkey‘s place in the world (Western vs. Eastern, European vs. 
Middle Eastern, Muslim vs. Christian, developed vs. underdeveloped, modern vs. traditional, 
etc.) through which its foreign policy flows was a geopolitical exercise in itself. Surprisingly 
geopolitical inquiry as a holistic approach on Turkish foreign policy arrived rather late in 
academia.   
 
Very little is written about how the Turkish elite and policy makers themselves perceive the 
world and their country‘s global location/surroundings and how this translates into external 
action. Most analyses are conformist and treat conceptions about Turkey from a single 
perspective, i.e. that of the modernist Kemalist elite. They singlehandedly emphasize 
Ankara‘s robust journey toward the west (Europe) and unquestionably index Turkish foreign 
policy to its strong western orientation. Pointing to such overwhelming continuity, Robins 
authoritatively argued that before more recent times ―the study of Turkish foreign policy did 
not exist‖.2 This is simplistic and incomplete as Turkish society and the ruling elite do not 
                                                          
2ROBINS, P. (2006). The BRISMES Lecture: A Double Gravity State: Turkish Foreign Policy Reconsidered, British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 33 (2). p.199. 
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entail Kemalists or proto-Kemalists alone. Conservatives, with their nationalist and pious 
touch, constitute an equally viable traditionthat dominated the political scene in Turkey on 
many occasions since 1950.  
 
A wider perspective needs to take into consideration the modern history of Turkey which 
bears witness to two distinct mentalities about Turkey‘s geopolitical standing in the world and 
its surroundings. Over its ninety years of existence, different and to a large extent rivalling 
pictures of Turkey‘s place, identity and neighbourhood produced by each tradition competed 
for dominance. As both traditions impacted in different ways the cognitive map of various 
Turkish policy-makers, a better recount on Turkish foreign policy needs to reflect how this 
socio-historical struggle translates into discourses and policy outcomes.  
 
This thesis is an attempt to provide one. It will illustrate geographical influences on Turkish 
foreign policy. In so doing, it will draw on the theoretical underpinnings of geopolitics, a sub-
discipline in international relations. Taking the simplest of definitions, geopolitics will be used 
in this study to mean geographical influences of power relations in international politics. As 
such, a dynamic approach to geopolitics rather than a static and deterministic one will be 
preferred. It will be consulted as a critical discipline which considers socially constructed 
notions about world politics, a state‘s perceived ―geopolitical self‖ by its influential social 
actors, and its role and mission perceptionsin global affairs. In this context, spatial 
perceptions of danger and security, drawing (mental/physical) boundaries and hence foreign 
policy priorities will be taken as strong referents in explaining state behaviour. Geopolitics will 
also be taken to reflect the domestic constellation of power and the operation of foreign 
policy-making mechanisms in translating such notions into practice.  
 
The following therefore is not a simple recount of the physical characteristics of Turkey‘s 
geographical situatedness and how this reflects onto foreign policy choices. In other words, 
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this is not research about ―what Turkey‘s geography is‖ but rather ―what it means or stands 
for‖ in Turkish culture.  
 
To understand Turkey and its foreign policy, one has to begin with ―seeings‖. That is so if one 
acknowledges the transformative capacity of human-beings over the world and does not 
subscribe to the view that ―the structure/system‖ has a priori ontological existence over 
human action. On Turkey‘s part, the ways of seeing are hardly ever simple or objective 
regardless of the subject of that glance. It is more often than not culturally and politically 
motivated. For example, to simply regard Turkey as western or Middle Eastern is a politically 
motivated act in itself. The political ways of seeing, constructing and representing by external 
actors are equally crucial.  
 
Domestically, Turkey‘s geographical embeddedness is understood differently by two broad 
groups, Kemalists (republicans) vs. Conservatives. At the outset, it must be acknowledged 
that these two traditions are not necessarily monolithic or fixed. There are variants in each 
strand. They endlessly try to transform themselves in response to contemporary challenges. 
But such a dual categorization helps address dominant geopolitical understandings, 
reasonings, trends, modes of representation and options for foreign policy practice in each 
tradition. 
 
This exercise is pertinent in understanding Turkey and its foreign policy since different 
imaginations about one‘s own self and those around it ultimately produce different 
understandings and policy outcomes. As noted by Kösebalan, ―shifting imaginations denote 
shifting security (and national interest) perceptions and identity, that is, the perceptions about 
who we are and who our friends, rivals, and enemies are‖.3 Therefore, each mentality and 
imagination brings about different sets of foreign policy possibilities, options and priorities. 
                                                          
3KOSEBALABAN, H. (2011). Turkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and Globalization. New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan. p.xi. 
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The fact that holders of such imaginations usually act on different impulses, reflexes and 
motivations makes a big difference in foreign policy. For Turkey, this helps explain ups and 
downs as well as mood swings back and forth on the Middle Eastern pendulum.   
 
To coherently address such complex dynamics, an integrated heuristic conceptual 
framework needs to be developed with reference to geopolitical thought, which is a major 
task undertaken in this study.  
 
In this context, Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical background and analytical tools offered 
in geopolitics. As such, theoretical underpinnings of classical geopolitics are elaborated first 
with reference to the writings of its prominent scholars. This part of the conceptual framework 
relies heavily on the realist/rationalist perspective. The second part is devoted to critical 
geopolitics. It draws heavily on the constructivist and post-structuralist approach. The 
purpose is to underscore the importance of ideational factors as expressed in discourses in 
the formulation of practical geopolitical reasoning, i.e. foreign policy. This is a relevant 
concern in the case of Turkey because it bears a heavy influence in shaping foreign policy 
discourses, mentalities and action. Thus, analytical tools such as geopolitical culture, 
geopolitical traditions, geopolitical discourses, geopolitical imaginations/imaginative 
geographies, and geopolitical visions/codes are introduced. This chapter shows how 
discourses of geography, security, danger, identity, power and foreign policy relate to and 
influence each other.  
 
In light of this background, Chapter 2 addresses the ideational foundations of Turkish foreign 
policy by exploring Turkish geopolitical culture. The discussion includes but is not limited to 
the way geographies are given meaning in the cognitive map of Turkey‘s elite. Such would 
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be what Gerard Toal calls geographic imaginations.4 In this vein, an analysis of how two 
contending geopolitical traditions (Kemalist vs. Conservative) perceive the world, Turkey‘s 
geographical locatedness, its geo-cultural belonging, surroundings (the Middle East in 
particular), national mission and borders as well as the principle tools Turkey has at its 
disposal in envisaging two contesting visions for regional policy will be provided. It will be 
indicated in this context how separate geographical imaginations developed by each tradition 
represent the crystallization of two distinct mentalities about the global position of Turkey and 
its neighbourhood.  
 
Chapter 3 is about domestic constellation of power in Turkey. This will provide a historical 
and social background for the thesis. It will also constitute the link between ideational 
foundations and foreign policy practice. Using the quadripartite analytical framework 
developed by Michael Mann, this chapter illustrates how geographical imaginations ultimately 
translate into state behaviour through social networks of power. Thus aspects of Turkish 
geopolitical culture that highlight the origins and evolution of sui generis interaction among 
social sources of power are discussed. An overview of the organization of foreign policy 
bureaucracy and the process of foreign policy making in Turkey accompanies this exercise. 
 
The Middle East is selected as the case study to support the thesis. This neighbouring region 
is one of the most enduring for Turkey whose political map remained largely in shape over 
ninety years. Besides it provides a litmus test for practical reflections of Turkey‘s geopolitical 
culture. The rest of the thesis therefore will provide a systematic analysis of Turkey‗s Middle 
Eastern policy. The focus will be on how members of two major geopolitical traditions, for 
real or imaginatively, construed their country‘s spatial situatedness and neighbourhood, and 
how such interpretations impacted perceptions of national interest, priorities and formulation 
                                                          
4  TOAL, G.O. (2003). Geopolitical Structures and Geopolitical Cultures Towards Conceptual Clarity. in, ed. 
TCHANTOURIDZE, L. , Geopolitical Perspectives on World Politics, Bison Paper 4, Winnipeg : Centre for Defence and 
Security Studies.  
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of Turkish foreign policy. It is also possible to trace practical ramifications of identity debates 
and domestic power struggles in Turkey as well as how reactions by external actors are 
factored in for foreign policy action. The practice also stands testimony to waves of activism 
and retreat in Turkey‘s engagement with the Middle East under Kemalist and Conservative 
influences.  
 
The first part of the case study covers 1923-1983. Chapter 4 lays the groundwork for 
highlighting the nuances within the period as to why Ankara‘s dealings with the region cannot 
be treated within a straitjacket notion of Kemalist westernism. This will be exemplified by 
practice particularly in the 1950s where conservative figures began to make a more visible 
imprint on regional policy. It will also be demonstrated why Turkey largely subscribed to 
westernist consensus during the period and how this impacted Middle Eastern policy.   
 
Chapter 5 covers the interval from 1983 to 2010. The chapter revolves around practical 
reasonings developed within long-lasting geopolitical mentalities by various political figures 
who acted as intellectual warehouses in informing Turkish foreign policy. Covering roughly a 
timespan of three decades, the impact conservative politicians went after in altering some 
key tenets of republican dispositions in external affairs and each time how their Kemalist 
opponents responded is underlined throughout the chapter. The story on what unfolds after 
2010 is yet to be observed, studied, and later on analytically told.     
 
Through an analysis on Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East in a relatively broad 
interval, this study will make a contribution to better understand the relationship between 
space-based geographical reasoning, national interest, identity formation and foreign policy. 
This thesis will enrich and broaden earlier geopolitical studies on Turkish foreign policy by 
adopting a more systematic heuristic approach to Turkey‘s socio-political development and 
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geopolitical culture. 5  Since there is more than one way of giving meaning to Turkey‘s 
geographical location, contesting notions of geographical imaginations at the domestic level 
around Turkey‘s place, identity and neighbourhood will be consulted in conjunction with 
similar notions externally conferred upon Turkey as referents in explaining the mood swings 
in Ankara‘s regional policy. A systematic examination of such a variety of interrelated 
dynamics will provide a better understanding of Turkey‘s geopolitical culture and its foreign 
policy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5Et. al. BİLGİN, P. (2012). Turkey’s Geopolitics Dogma in GUZZINI, S. The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?: Social 
Mechanisms and Foreign Policy İdentity Crises. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. p. 151-173; BILGIN, P., & 
BILGIÇ, A. (2011). Turkey's "New" Foreign Policy toward Eurasia. Eurasian Geography and Economics. 52, 173-195; 
YESILTAS, M. (2013). The Transformation of the Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign Policy. Turkish Studies. 14, p. 
664. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This section outlines the research design employed in the dissertation. It will first identify the 
research question(s) and why a case study approach is preferred. As such, the rationale for 
selecting Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East as the primary case study is explained. A 
justification for the methodology employed and range of sources used will follow.  
 
RESEARCH QUESTION AND STRATEGY: 
 
It is a rather common trait to see a general interest in foreign policy translates into academic 
inquiry. This is all the more pertinent if one finds himself/herself in the making of a particular 
aspect of that policy. For a coherently argumentative analysis, the difficulty of transferring 
such an interest in Turkish foreign policy into academic research lies in drawing the limits of 
the investigation agenda. A central question is thus critical in setting the boundaries of 
research. In this study, how Turkey‘s geographical stiuatedness is perceived, imagined 
and/or constructed in a culturally enframed surrounding in a way to condition foreign policy 
behaviour is the central research question. In other words, how and why Turkey‘s spatial 
situatedness is historically construed/constructed to restrict or enable certain forms of 
external action is the key theme. A supplementary question is why Ankara indicates 
periodical acts of engagement and retreat in its Middle Eastern dealings.  
 
Three broad questions therefore define the scope of this study. These are how do Turkish 
elites picture global affairs and how do they mentally construct meta-spaces, i.e. the East 
and the West (what geopolitical imagination they ascribe to) in understanding the world? 
How do they see Turkey‘s geographical, cultural and ideational attachment and belonging 
(what geographical imaginations they adhere to)? Hence what identity do they stipulate for 
Turkey? Consequently, why and how do they act ambivalently or enthusiastically in dealing 
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with the Middle East (second tier geographical imaginations in constructing simplified 
versions of regions or clusters of countries)?  
 
Seeking answers to these questions, this research aims to manifest the complex links 
between different notions around Turkey‘s geographical/geo-cultural stiuatedness and how 
these reflect on foreign policy choices in the Middle East. Placing the analysis in a socio-
historical context helps better understand, explain and analyse waves of active engagement 
and distancing Turkey indicates in this region.  
 
Scholarly writing on foreign policy requires locating the study within an academic discipline. 
As noted earlier, this study relies on the theoretical underpinnings of geopolitics in its 
contemporary (critical) strand. In exploring answers to the research questions, the main 
hypothesis tested is that among the variety of factors that are influential in understanding, 
explaining and analysing Turkish foreign policy, geopolitical considerations (geographical 
and geo-cultural) loom uniquely large. That does not curtail the necessity to relate such 
considerations with other variables in Ankara‘s external dealings. But by attempting to 
explore this dimension, the main purpose of the research is to make a contribution to the 
literature by exposing how space-based reasoning and geographical influences inform 
Turkey‘s foreign policy from the optic of the Middle East.  
 
SELECTION OF THE CASE STUDY: 
 
A case study approach, a favoured strategy when ―how‖ and ―why‖ questions are being 
posed and when the research deals with complex and ambiguous phenomena, which contain 
a large number of variables and relationships and are difficult to overview and predict,6 is 
preferred in this study. Such an approach is explanatory in seeking answers to the research 
                                                          
6 GUMMESSON, E. (2007). Case Study Research, in Gustavsson, B., ed,.The Principles of Knowledge Creation 
Methods, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar)  
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question and testing the hypotheses about a general phenomenon like Turkey‘s external 
behaviour in the Middle East. That the research agenda relates to a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context especially when the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident 7  is a further reason to use this 
approach.   
 
Turkish foreign policy is not easy to explain and understand since a large number of 
variables are at play. As such, the existence of diverse social and political groups and their 
perception of Turkey‘s geographical locatedness and national interest, history, and identity 
are all (with differing degrees) influential. That‘s is why Turkey offers an intriguing case to 
study competing notions and storylines about a place where foreign  policy sometimes 
becomes not only a subject but also an instrument of spatial-cultural identity construction. 
Additionally, one cannot offer a full account of Turkey‘s foreign policy without considering the 
context in which it is made. The context therefore relates to how the foreign policy 
bureaucracy anddecision-making mechanism work. But any attempt would be incomplete 
unless it addresses the ever evolving power relations among different societal actors in 
Turkey which are closely linked to public policy decision-making. Given these considerations, 
a case study approach is a good fit for the purposes of this research.  
 
A single case study approach is adopted in this study. Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East 
will be the main focus of analysis. This region is selected basically for three reasons. First, it 
is the most enduring neighbourhood whose shape remained largely intact since modern 
Turkey‘s inception. Second, Turkey‘s somewhat troublesome relationship with the Middle 
East indicates starkly acts of non-involvement, distancing, engagement, retreat and isolation 
usually followed one after the other. The region is therefore a core feature of Turkish foreign 
policy. Third, the Middle East is a permanent hotbed of contention for different social groups 
in Turkey where one can trace foreign policy ramifications of contesting understandings on 
                                                          
7YIN, R. K. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, Calif, Sage Publications. p.13. 
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Turkey‘s geopolitical placement, its identity, culture, history and notions on how to 
construe/represent this oriental region.  
 
To give the preferred case study more traction, a broad timespan covering nearly nine 
decades (1923-2010) will be consulted. Such a choice will allow for a thorough exploration of 
the subject matter. It will thus lend room to combine different methods to illuminate a 
complex topic like Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East.   
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/CHOICE OF SOURCES  
 
As noted by Allison, academic analysis employs description, explanation, prediction, 
evaluation, and recommendation as related, but logically separable methods to understand 
the problems of foreign affairs. 8  Understanding the dynamics involved in the making of 
Turkish foreign policy is thus important not only for a descriptive but also an explanatory 
analysis to make educated predictions towards the future.  
 
Since this dissertation aims to build a heuristic model to understand and explain Turkish 
foreign policy, a major challenge is to indicate causal relations between theoretical 
discussion and foreign policy practice. It is not always possible to circumvent the problems 
relating to this challenge by employing merely one method of investigation. To the contrary, a 
researcher is expected to be flexible with regards to methods s/he uses because it is 
extremely difficult to formulate a research problem so that s/he can find all the answers with 
resort to a single method. In this context, triangulation defined as ―approaches that use 
multiple observers, theoretical perspectives, sources of data and methodologies‖ 9  is an 
approach of extreme value. Triangulation implies that findings from one method need to be 
                                                          
8ALLISON, G. T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The American Political Science Review. 63. 
p.698-718.   
9 DENZIN, N. K. (1978). The Research Act: A Theoretical İntroduction to Sociological Methods . New York: Praeger. 
p.283. 
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cross-checked and cross referenced with those gathered through others. Confidence in the 
validity of research findings is hence significantly improved. It will also be much more reliably 
ensured that fair and accurate judgments can be made about research findings.  
 
The methods employed in this research are mainly qualitative analysis supplemented by 
personal perspectives based on professional experience and insights as well as process 
tracing with resort to primary and secondary source materials. None of the methods is 
superior but rather complementary to each other and provide for enriched empirical accuracy 
and analytical cohesiveness. 
 
Two major methodological tools are employed in this research; textual analysis at large and 
discourse analysis in particular. As noted by McKie, textual analysis is a methodology to 
gather information about how human beings make sense of who they are, and of how they fit 
into the world in which they live in.10 It is a well-suited strategy when studying nation state 
behaviour which is the outcome of an inter-dynamic process where decision-makers try to 
make sense of a complex world and of themselves in devising polices. To understand and 
explain how such decisions are made, researchers need to interpret texts (speech acts, 
books, magazines, etc.).   
 
In this respect, discourse analysis is a sub-branch in textual analysis that focuses on 
language. It is a key research tool since it is through language that reality (in this case 
geography) is constructed, represented and ultimately given meaning. Following post-
structuralist linguistic philosophy, language/discourse therefore serves as a machine that 
generates, and as a result constitutes/constructs world politics. 11  Furthermore, following 
Campbell‘s line of reasoning practices in foreign policy discourse are also instrumental in the 
                                                          
10MCKEE, A. (2003). Textual Analysis A Beginner's Guide. London, Sage Publications. p.1 
11 JØRGENSEN, M., & PHILLIPS, L. (2002). Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. London, Sage Publications. p.9.  
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formation of geopolitical identities. The same is true for inter-state relations.12 It is also the 
main tool to expose Foucaultian power-knowledge nexus which stipulate that discourses try 
to discipline and exert control over society.13 But the purpose of discursive strategy is not to 
read behind the discourse or discover the reality behind it. The purpose of discursive 
research is to work with what has actually been said or written, exploring patterns in and 
across the statements and identifying the social consequences of different discursive 
representations of reality.14 The important point here is the link between the text and its 
context as meanings shift between social and political settings.15 
 
As a research theory and method, discourse analysis is significant for the purposes of this 
study when it comes to identifying prevalent modes of representation as well as exposing 
power laden relations, all of which take place in geography/space based discourses 
produced by elites as guidelines for foreign policy action. The underlying power relations 
embedded in these representations and common sense assumptions in geopolitical culture 
that uphold them will thus be better exposed.16 Besides, through discourse analysis, it will be 
shown how certain geopolitical discourses (in the form of storylines, scripts and narratives) 
help shape competing identities and justify certain choices in attaining foreign policy goals.  
 
With a view to provide a better reflection of the context under which discursive practices are 
performed and the decision-making mechanism works, process-tracing is employed as an 
additional analytical tool of investigation. By definition, this procedure is grounded on the 
unfolding events or situations over time which help draw descriptive and causal inferences 
                                                          
12Ibid. 
13AALTO, P. (2003). Constructing post-Soviet geopolitics in Estonia. London, Frank Cass. p.63. 
14 JØRGENSEN, M., & PHILLIPS, L. p.20 
15 WETHERELL, M., 2001, 'Debates in Discourse Research' in WETHERELL. M., TAYLOR, S. and YATES, S. 
(eds.). Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader. London, Sage. p.389. 
16DALBY, S. (1991). Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Difference, and Dissent. Society and Space. p.261-283. 
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from diagnostic pieces of evidence.17 Process tracing is thus an essential form of inquiry 
within case study, which evaluates hypotheses about the causes of a specific outcome in a 
particular case.18 Since this research follows a chronology of events in illuminating the causal 
relations between geopolitical considerations and foreign policy outcomes in Turkey‘s 
relations with the Middle East, process tracing is a method of great value for hypotheses 
testing and cross-referencing.   
 
In this context, a considerable amount of primary sources used in this research are 
discursive acts performed by the prominent Turkish political leaders/elite, intellectuals, 
scholars and military brass. These are the most powerful actors in shaping the overall 
geopolitical discourse in Turkey. The aim is to allow for deeper analysis which helps uncover 
the underlying motivations and objectives of decision-makers. Books, compilations and 
online resources are consulted to trace such discursive acts. The relevant websites of 
government branches, internet and newspapers are also examined. When newspapers and 
internet are used as primary data, due diligence is paid to reflect exact quotes. Additionally 
political party and government programmes, speeches, official statements, policy papers, 
and brief notes are also used where applicable.  
 
Choosing a single data set runs the risk of bias since it is possible for the researcher to 
select data that is more convenient in testing his/her hypothesis. To avoid this, data used in 
this research is collected through a variety of English and Turkish sources including 
secondary and archival data. Materials such as works of former foreign policy makers, 
newspaper databases and Turkish, American and British journals are also employed. A 
broad survey of books, journal articles, and monographs by think tanks, academics and 
newspapers is also provided.  
                                                          
17COLLIER, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. PS: Political Science & Politics.44.p. 824. 
18JAMES MAHONEY. (2012). The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences.Sociological Methods & 
Research. 41 p.571.  
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In a nutshell, foreign policy discourses and representations in Turkey in the form of primary 
and secondary material are part of the sources used. The aim is to provide an elaborate and 
rich input for qualitative analysis. No effort has been spared throughout this research to avoid 
post-facto reasoning, i.e. not to simply reconstruct the past from today‘s perspective. The 
sources are therefore carefully reviewed and crosschecked. A large amount of evidence is 
taken into consideration to present a credible account of the research. 
 
Another set of primary sources used in this study which adds to the strength of research is 
based on my personal experience of being a member of the Turkish Foreign Service for 14 
years. The unique chance of having worked on the Middle Eastern dossier for almost ten 
uninterrupted years as a diplomat in Turkish Embassies in Baghdad and London and the 
Office of Turkish President forms the basis of that experience. One needs to be vigilant that 
professional involvement in foreign policy can be simultaneously an asset and weakness. On 
the one hand, it provides an ability to craft well-informed analyses based on personal in-
depth knowledge and insights. On the other hand, it poses a challenge of reconciling the 
prevalent practical policy making habit of ignoring the theoretical underpinnings of foreign 
policy with an attempt to write coherently about foreign policy within the remits of an 
academic conceptual framework. Every attempt will be made throughout this research to 
overcome this challenge while not shying away from making use of personal insights and 
observations. 
 
A key decision in structuring this thesis was whether to prefer a chronological or topical 
order. Since the research relies on a case study that aims to understand and analyse how 
the state of affairs between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours is brought about, a 
blend of both suits well. As such, Chapter 2 intends to indicate the causal links between the 
theoretical debates introduced in Chapter 1 and how they frame the mindset of key decision-
makers in Turkey. This is why it has been topically organized to allow for a comparison 
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between the two dominant geopolitical mentalities in Turkey. Chapter 3 is also structured 
around key topics of power relations and foreign policy apparatus while not losing touch with 
chronological inquiry. Chapters 4 and 5 are about the specific case study.  They are based 
on chronological order in indicating the influence of factors and dynamics introduced in 
previous chapters.  
 
The critical literature review in this research is used to first pinpoint the overwhelming 
tendency to fix Turkish foreign policy in general and Ankara‘s relations with the Middle East 
to a search for greater security. Constructivist theorizing on Turkish foreign policy is also 
highlighted with a view to indicate a second trend of analysis based on identity. The literature 
review will also be instrumental to identify the relevant geopolitical factors which are rather 
recently included in Turkish foreign policy analysis and most importantly to detect gaps 
where original research is needed.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is broad scholarly consensus lately that a new dynamism in Turkish foreign policy has 
surfaced in the 2000s. 19  As the argument goes, a country which traditionally adopted 
integrating with the West atop its foreign policy agenda and largely neglected the rest of its 
immediate neighbourhood began to pursue a visibly more active foreign policy. In the same 
line, this new activism indicated itself most starkly towards the Middle East both through 
improved bilateral relations and increased mediation/facilitation efforts. These studies usually 
pointed out that the Middle East was a region traditionally approached with extreme caution 
and reluctance by Turkish policy makers.20 But this time under the AK Party (Adalet ve 
Kalkınma Partisi - Justice and Development Party), the Middle East constituted the nexus 
through which the new activism in Turkish foreign policy revealed itself. It was therefore 
generalized that Turkish foreign policy behaviour with regards to the Middle East under AK 
Party government was unprecedentedly active, assertive and dynamic.   
 
One crucial shortcoming undermines such claims. They offer a rather simplistic snapshot 
view elaborating on a rather short period of time. A broader overview indicates that there is 
not one but five intervals when Ankara displayed acts of engagement with and retreat from 
Middle Eastern politics. It was under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that the first wave of somewhat 
ambivalent Middle Eastern activism started. By the mid-1930‘s, Turkey on the one hand 
                                                          
19  See et. al,ÔNIS, Z. (2009). “The New Wave of Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey: Drifting Away From 
Europeanization?”, Copenhagen, DIIS. ;KIRIŞCI, K. (2006). “Turkey's Foreign Policy in Turbulent Times”.  Paris, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies. ; HALE, W. (2009). “Turkey and the Middle East in the ‘New Era’.  Insight 
Turkey, Vol 11: 3 ; ROBINS, P. (2007). “Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: Between a Post-Islamist Government and A 
Kemalist State”,  International Affairs. 83, 289-304; OGUZLU, T. (2008). “Middle Easternization of Turkey's Foreign 
Policy: Does Turkey Dissociate from the West?”  Turkish Studies. 9, 3-20. ; Sir LOGAN, D. (September 11, 2008). 
“Turkey and the Middle East in a Changing Context”.  paper presented at in Conference by SETA titled Middle East in A 
Changing Context. 
20 LINDEN, RONALD H. (2012). Turkey and Its Neighbours: Foreign Relations in Transition, (London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers), p. 2.  
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championed the establishment of the Saidabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan while on 
the other hand employed active diplomacy to resolve the status of Mosul-Kirkuk and 
Alexandretta (Hatay). The second wave of rigorous Middle Eastern engagement came under 
the Democrat Party in the 1950s. PM Menderes embarked on an ambitious agenda to form a 
Middle Eastern alliance (Baghdad Pact) to enhance Turkey‘s prestige and stature. Turgut 
Ozal‘s reign in power in the 1980s marked the third wave of Turkish Middle Eastern activism. 
During the period, Turkey incrementally returned to the centre stage of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference (OIC), initiated establishment of the Economic Cooperation Organization 
(ECO), focused on increasing regional trade, pursued an agenda of security cooperation with 
neighbouring countries and actively supported the American role in the First Gulf War. The 
fourth line of somewhat voluntary activism was displayed under different coalition 
governments during the 1990s when the Middle East fared quite high in Ankara‘s foreign 
policy agenda. At different intervals during the period, Turkey not only improved relations 
with Israel significantly but also engaged heavily with Middle Eastern Muslim countries. 
Finally, the fifth wave of activism is displayed under AKP government in the 2000s which 
stirred a lively debate about an orientation shift in Turkish foreign policy.  
 
What is common in all these intervals is that Turkey almost invariably experienced mood 
swings in its regional dealings. Moving back and forth on the Middle Eastern pendulum, each 
wave of Turkish activism was followed by a state of retreat, distancing and isolation as if 
Ankara was regrouping for the next phase. This is an interesting observation that begs an 
elaborate scrutinization. In line with the introduction offered so far, a discussion of Turkish 
geopolitical culture is a good fit to understand and offer an explanation to this phenomenon.  
 
However, let alone this particular aspect, there are only a few works in the literature that 
touch specifically on the Middle Eastern connection of Turkish foreign policy. As noted by 
Philip Robins, ―there is not as many comprehensive works, as there should be, in the 
academic literature that exclusively deals with Turkey‘s foreign policy behaviour in Middle 
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East.‖21 Most studies tend to deal with the Middle East inter alia a number of dealings with 
other regions. The ones taking the Middle East as their main focus of analysis are rather 
limited in number and are mostly confined to short articles.  
 
This part of the dissertation aims to critically review the current literature on Turkish foreign 
policy, and where available, with regards to the Middle East. The literature available offers 
insights basically under four lines of argumentation, namely security (realist), identity 
(constructivist), political economy (liberal) and Europeanization/globalization (norm-based). 
All claim to explain the vibrancy and dynamism in the style, tone and substance of Turkish 
foreign policy, at times it is displayed, exclusively through their own prism yet failing to 
coherently address acts of withdrawal and states of aloofness. It would therefore be useful to 
explore the main arguments in each strand.   
 
Security based explanations tend to prioritize the importance of international and regional 
balance of power to explain Turkish foreign policy behaviour. Adhering to the 
realist/rationalist perspective, the proponents of this school reduce Turkey to a passive object 
in the international system and a bit player (middle power) in a global game.22 The ultimate 
goal of Turkish foreign policy is portrayed as a search for greater security and survival in an 
anarchic world. This strand particularly focuses on the shape of the international system 
(bipolarity, multipolarity/unipolarity) in imposing security constraints on Turkey.23 Secondly, 
regional balance of power as reflective of the shape of the international system is also a 
strong referent in explaining Turkish foreign policy. For this school, Turkey‘s waves of 
                                                          
21 Despite not covering the time period this research aims to shed some light onto, one needs to acknowledge the 
comprehensive work by Philip Robins as the first study dealing with Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, for an 
elaborate analysis see ROBINS, P. (1991). Turkey and the Middle East. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press.   
22Et. al. ROBINS, P. (2003). Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War. Seattle, Wash, University of 
Washington Press.; HALE, W. M. (2013). Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774. 3rd Edition, New York, NY : Routledge.;  
ORAN, B., AKDEVELIOĞLU, A., & AKŞIN, M. (2010). Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with 
Documents. Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press; ROBINS, P. (2003). Suits and Uniforms.  
23 LARRABEE, S. (2007). “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East”.  Foreign Affairs 86:4, p. 103-114.  
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activism in the Middle East correspond either to conformity with the bigger balance of power 
(between the US and others) and/or a power vacuum in the region.24Turkey, in this line of 
reasoning, appears acting as either a practitioner of the agenda of bigger powers or filling in 
regional power vacuums. In a nutshell, Turkey, in search for greater security in a zero-sum 
global game is pictured as simply adapting itself to the shape of the international and 
regional security environment.25 
 
Identity based explanations emphasize the ongoing sub-national politico-cultural identity 
clashes within Turkish society. On rather simplistic terms, Turkish society is pictured as 
comprising of a westernizing Kemalist elite and its Islamist reactionary forces, both of which 
are with varying degrees coloured with nationalism and liberalism, in harbouring different 
sets of foreign policy agendas.26 As the argument goes, Kemalist westernism is the norm not 
only setting the direction of Turkish foreign policy and but also a strong referent in explaining 
Ankara‘s rather ambivalence and reluctance in engaging with Middle Eastern politics.  
 
Political economy insights claimthat, in more recent times, the reason why Turkey 
engages with countries in the Middle East is that the domestic economic agents demand new 
markets, trade and investment opportunities and unhindered flow of energy resources. In this 
understanding, Turkey is conceptualized as a trading state.27 It is therefore argued that the 
                                                          
24 ALTUNIŞIK, M.B. (May 2010). “Turkey’s Changing Middle East Policy”  in UNISCI Discussion Paper 23, p149-163. 
25ALTUNIŞIK, M. B., & MARTIN, L. G. (2011). Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP. 
Turkish Studies. 12, p. 569-587.  
26Et. al. BOZDAĞLIOĞLU, Y. (2003). Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach. New York, 
Routledge;KOSEBALABAN, H. (2011). Turkish Foreign Policy; GULSEVEN, E. (2010). Identity Security and Turkish 
Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period: Relations with the EU, Greece and the Middle East. Brunel 
University;UZER, U. (2011). Identity and Turkish foreign policy the Kemalist influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus. 
London, I.B. Tauris; ROBINS, P. (2006). The BRISMES Lecture: A Double Gravity State;  BOZDAĞLIOĞLU, Y. (2008).  
“Modernity, Identity and Turkey´s Foreign Policy”,Insight Turkey , 10 ,1 ,55-75. 
27 Et. al.KIRIŞÇI, K. (2009). “Transformation of Turkish Foreign 
Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives on Turkey, No.40, p 29-57, KUTLAY M. (2011). “Economy as 
the Practical Hand' of New Turkish foreign policy': A Political Economy Explanation.”  Insight Turkey. 13, p.67-88, ATLI 
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rise of a new Anatolian bourgeoisie whose economic interests lie in improved relations with 
the Middle East is a major factor to consider to understand Ankara‘s acts of regional 
engagement.28 As Turkey trades and invests more in the Middle East, its foreign policy needs 
to emphasize creation of a regional environment conducive to business.  
 
There are also attempts at linking these insights with globalization and Europeanization.29 
Globalization is understood as a process in which intense relationships and 
interdependencies across different cultures, peoples, countries and economies are facilitated 
by advances in information technologies and increased capital and investment flows.30 The 
argument here is by increasingly subscribing to western values of libertarian democracy, rule 
of law and free market, Turkey is becoming more and more exposed to the influences of 
globalization whereby its foreign policy foregoes a substantial transformation. The European 
Union in this process serves as a strong agent of change for Turkey by serving as the main 
anchor for reform in transforming Turkish politics, economy, society and hence foreign policy. 
The EU thus alters the tone and style of Ankara‘s Middle Eastern dealings away from 
rationalist coercion and confrontation to liberal cooperation.  
 
One needs to critically assess to what extent such explanations catch the reality and explore 
whether a more holistic account could be provided by developing a comprehensive 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
A. (2011). Businessmen As Diplomats: The Role of Business Associations in Turkey's Foreign Economic Policy. Insight 
Turkey. 13, p.109-128, 
28 KUTLAY, M. (2011). Economy as the ‘Practical Hand’ of ‘New Turkish Foreign Policy’: A Political Economy 
Explanation. Insight Turkey. Vol.13. No.1 p. 67-88; TOK, E. (2008). Anatolian Cities and the New Spirit of Turkish 
Capitalism Turkish Policy Quarterly. Vol.7. No.4. p.81-89.; ATLI, A. (2011). Businessmen and Turkey’s Foreign Policy. 
International Policy and Leadership Institute. Policy Brief Series. October 2011; KİRİŞÇİ, K. & KAPTANOĞLU, N. 
(2011). The Politics of Trade and Turkish Foreign Policy. Middle Eastern Studies, 47:5, p.705-724. 
29Et. al. PARK, BILL. (2012). Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. London, 
Routledge, OKTAV, O. Z. (2011). Turkey in the 21st Century: Quest for a New Foreign Policy. Farnham, Surrey, 
Ashgate, ÖZCAN, M. (2008). Harmonizing Foreign Policy: Turkey, the EU and the Middle East. Burlington, VT, 
Ashgate.  
30  Definition offered in the website of World Health Organisation, available at  
http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story043/en/index.html (consulted on April 23, 2012) 
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conceptual framework. In light of the brief overview so far, the following seminal pieces are 
reviewed to first exemplify how Turkey, its foreign policy and its Middle Eastern dealings are 
conceptualized. The key purpose is to help identify questions relevant to the case study 
(Middle East), point out the scholarly gap in terms of a heuristic perspective and see through 
the opposing views. 
 
William Hale offers a rather comprehensive and authoritative summary of Turkey‘s foreign 
relations in his work titled Turkish Foreign Policy Since 1774. 31  As a confessed realist 
scholar, Hale classifies Turkey as a ―middle power‖ and scripts its foreign policy as dictated 
by the international system. Looking ―out‖ instead of ―in‖, his focus does not leave much room 
for domestic drivers of foreign policy. He prioritizes the imperatives of the international 
security environment over the choices made by individual agents within the state. For Hale, it 
is the system that forced the Turkish state to anchor its foreign policy to the west in the first 
place rather than the individual decision-makers‘ express desire to make Turkey western as  
he considers the west the only option available at the time. Such a deterministic approach 
makes him miss the impact of the debates in Turkey about its geopolitical identity, the 
meaning given to Turkey‘s geography and spaces around it as new roles and behaviours 
were appropriated for the new state. Therefore, he underestimates the role of domestic 
ideational dynamics which proved very influential in shaping Turkish foreign policy.  
 
―Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents‖32 edited by Baskın 
Oran is yet another study that provides an overall account of Turkey‘s external relations. The 
framework developed in this study subscribes Turkey‘s foreign policy behaviour to a mix of 
its culture, history and geography as well as to the developments in its domestic polity and 
dynamics in the international system. But overall, it is fixated on a rationalist approach as the 
                                                          
31HALE, W. M. (2013). Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774. 3rd Edition, New York, NY : Routledge. 
32ORAN, B., AKDEVELIOĞLU, A., & AKŞIN, M. (2010). Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with 
Documents. Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press. 
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author argues that the foremost objective of Turkey‘s foreign policy is security and survival in 
an anarchic world.33 Consequently this study strives to establish some degree of continuity in 
foreign policy behaviour throughout a large time span. To fit a model that has explanatory 
value at all phases, William Hale‘s ‗medium power‘ 34  concept is borrowed to describe 
Turkey‘s international standing. As such, Turkey is expected to behave in reaction to the 
developments in the international arena and its own impact on the global system is treated 
as marginal.35 In this context, Turkey can act autonomously as long as it is prepared to pay a 
price. Geopolitical analysis (in fact, the word ―geopolitics‖ is not used at all and references 
are made to ―Turkey‘s geostrategic location‖) is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Turkey however, as explained earlier, turned more ―daring‖ than ―cautious‖36 or ―ambivalent‖ 
in Middle Eastern politics at different intervals throughout its existence. Such changes cannot 
be ascribed to systemic factors alone since evidence suggests that other considerations 
were also at play. At the times it was displayed, Turkey‘s Middle Eastern activism was bold in 
defying traditional role conceptions expected of a ―middle power‖. Instead, such notions were 
mostly accompanied by a different conception of Turkey and/or the Middle Eastern region. 
Emboldened by the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, these were mostly facilitated by the 
domestically brewed interpretations that prioritized the advantages of Turkey‘s pivotal 
geopolitical location and a fresh interpretation as to what it means to have the geographies 
around Turkey. Although the wine remained the same in the sense that the space of and 
around Turkey did not change, the bottle through which the Turkish leaders perceived and 
presented these places substantially changed. This in turn fundamentally altered the ease 
and confidence with which Turkey began to handle its relations with the Middle East. 
Therefore, any analysis would be incomplete unless a thorough explanation is provided on 
                                                          
33Ibid, p. 11.  
34  Turkey is described as a ‘Strategic Medium Power’ in p. 9.  
35Ibid.  
36 This perspective established in a previous article by Malik Mufti is elaborated thoroughly in MUFTI, M. (2009). Daring 
and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea. Basingstoke [England], Palgrave Macmillan.  
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how old geographies are given new meanings in order to understand the sea changes in 
Turkey‘s Middle Eastern policy. 
 
Philip Robins‗ Suits and Uniforms provides crucial insights on the complex dynamics of 
Turkish foreign policy. His research is thematic rather than region-based. Reminiscent of the 
middle power thesis, he considers Turkey a status quo power, which chose a westernist 
orientation in external affairs since it provided clarity of goals and stability.37 The book is an 
excellent grasp of the key processes and players through which Turkish foreign policy is 
made. Robins identifies the political power holders (the government-PM, the President and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) and the security establishment (the military and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs-MFA) as the key stakeholders, the interaction amongst whom results in 
Turkey‘s individual policy positions. With an attempt to provide an integrated approach to 
analyse Turkish foreign policy, he also considers the interplay between the external and 
internal factors. To him, security-related, ideological, historical and economic factors are the 
ideational and material determinants of Turkish foreign policy.  
 
This research is in serious need of revision since the locus of attention in terms of foreign 
policy making has changed considerably over time. It does fail to capture how the operation 
of power, coercive and institutional as well as diffused and discursive, in Turkey has 
transformed over ninety years. This is a serious drawback since it has a direct reflection on 
the key processes of foreign policy making. Equally important is the need to revisit the three 
broad arguments that Robins makes, i.e. Turkey is a status quo power, its external relations 
are firmly westwards and there is more caution than daring in Turkish foreign policy.38 All of 
these arguments fall in plain contrast to the changes that took place in how Turkey handles 
its external relations in the Middle East over a broader timeframe.   
 
                                                          
37ROBINS, P. (2003). p.6. 
38Ibid, p. 6-7 
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On the other hand, theanalysis on the influence of Kemalist and conservative paradigms 
(Robins calls the latter Islamist) on Turkish foreign policy is inadequate. Particularly 
troublesome is the inaptness to locate conservatism in proper historical context in time and 
within the broader culture. To address that in an article published in the British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies three years later, 39  Robins highlights ―Turkey‘s Normative 
Geography‖ and ―Turkey‘s Elite Competition‖ upon which he concludes that Turkey is a 
double gravity state. According to him, Turkish foreign policy is motivated by two factors: a 
Middle Eastern identity and an EU membership goal. The former does not amount to a 
geopolitical analysis in itself but rather a sketch of what the Middle East and Europe stand for 
in terms of values and norms governing political conduct among states, the effects of which 
is claimed to lie at the core of Turkish foreign policy behaviour. Robins argues that thanks to 
competing sets of values (European and Middle Eastern), two-headedness is detectible in 
the actions of Turkish foreign policy elites. However, the author claims that Turkey‘s 
subscription to two sets of foreign policy norms does not necessarily hinder foreign policy 
effectiveness. Turkey is still able to produce uniform foreign policies. In this line of thought, 
he, in a further 2007 article40 examines Turkish foreign policy since 2002 and exemplifies that 
there is an ongoing tension lately between the Kemalist state and post-Islamist government. 
 
―Turkish Foreign Policy, Old Problems, New Parameters‖ edited by Mustafa Aydın is one of 
the recent compilations, which argues for a recent change in Turkish foreign policy.41The 
purpose of the volume is not only to reflect upon factors enabling policy change but also its 
repercussions. A shift in domestic civil-military balances, style and conduct of Turkey‘s new 
leaders and impact of different ethnic and religious groups are cited as domestic structural 
factors influencing foreign policy. A brief reference is made to Turkey‘s geopolitical location in 
Chapter 5 as a means of construing significance of the political tradition that Turkey‘s current 
                                                          
39 ROBINS, P. (2006). The BRISMES Lecture: A Double Gravity State: Turkish Foreign Policy Reconsidered.  
40ROBINS, P. (2007). Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a "Post-Islamist" Government and a Kemalist 
State. International Affairs. 83, p.289-304.  
41 AYDIN, MUSTAFA (edit 2010), Turkish Foreign Policy, Old Problems, New Parameters, Spain, UNISCI, p.6.  
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ruling party, AK Party, grew out of.42 Turkey‘s activist foreign policy stance vis-à-vis the 
Middle East is explained as a result of the Islamic roots of the AK Party, which claims to 
better understand the complexities in ex-Ottoman lands and its broader hinterland. The 
remainder of the argument emphasizes regional dynamics such as disunity among Arabs 
and failure of the American administration to create a regional order after the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003.43 
 
Graham Fuller‘s ―The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World‖ 
provides an elaborate geopolitical hindsight. Fuller perceives a gradual evolution of Turkey‘s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East over the course of thirty years. In his account, 
Turkey‘s move started in the economic arena (a shift to export oriented growth and allowing 
Islamic banking) roughly after the military coup in the early 1980s. Subsequent Turkish 
governments‘ foreign policy overtures in the Middle East, such as in the case of Syria and 
more visible participation in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) activities, are 
presented as hard evidence for this gradual move. Turkey‘s latest involvement in this region 
is seen as nothing but transcendence of this process to the strategic arena.44 For Fuller, 
―Turkey‘s growing vision of its geopolitical place in the world‖45 is presented as a major factor 
in paving the way for the proactive and dynamic policy line. Little articulation is provided, 
however, as to what this new vision entails. Thus, the multitude of structural factors in the 
areas of politics, economy and geopolitical culture are largely overlooked. More importantly, 
no attention is paid to the growing impact of geopolitical reasonings across Turkish policy 
makers.  
 
                                                          
42Ibid. p.140.   
43Ibid.p.220. 
44Ibid.p.39-47. 
45 FULLER, G. E. (2008). The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World. Washington, 
D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, p.8.  
36 
 
 
Bill Park‘s ―Modern Turkey: People, State and Foreign Policy in A Globalized World‖ captures 
the recent political, economic and social transformation in Turkey through the prism of 
globalization. There are two occasions in this volume where a brief geopolitical analysis is 
provided. In Chapter 3, the reasons for isolationism in regional affairs are sought in the 
mantra of Kemalism, which prioritizes security and adopts a ―zero-sum-approach‖ in external 
relations.46 Accordingly, this line of thought identifies Arabs of the Middle East with conflicts, 
backwardness, unintelligence and treachery. The second reference is made in Chapter 7 
whereby Park recognizes that Turkish foreign policy lately is ―in stark contrast to the wary, 
unimaginative and cautious approach that hitherto shaped Ankara‘s engagement‖.47 He also 
points out the difficulty of locating Turkey geopolitically.48  In this context, the fact that Turkey 
is part of a variety of regions all at the same time is given as part of a new understanding in 
re-conceptualizing Turkish foreign policy and hence driving its recent activism. The 
environment in which such an active stance is pursued is portrayed as one where ―power is 
being transferred from a Eurocentric to Asiacentric international system‖.49 Yet these factors 
are enlisted with a view to expose how open the Turkish political system, economy and 
society have become in the age of globalization. Thus, the main purpose is establishing the 
links between the process of globalization and how it impacts Turkish foreign policy.  
 
Only a small share of research in this area deals with the impact of geopolitics in its critical 
brand. The ones that do are all short academic articles lacking a comprehensive theoretical 
foundation, which somewhat weakens their argumentation. Besides, these are interval-
specific analyses looking at Turkey mainly throughout the 2000s. 
 
                                                          
46PARK, B. (2012). Modern Turkey: People, State, and Foreign Policy in a Globalized World. London, Routledge. 
p.43-44.  
47Ibid, p.107.  
48Ibid,  p. 103.  
49Ibid,  p. 110. 
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In this context, Bülent Aras and Rabia Karakaya Polat in an article published in 2007 apply 
critical geopolitics to Turkish foreign policy. 50  This article places Turkey‘s re-orientation 
towards the Middle East in the framework of the concept of geographical imagination. The 
authors cite the comprehensive transformation in the political, economic and national security 
realms, policy-making procedures and civil-military relations in Turkey as the main factors 
that paved the way to a new imagination. There are two criticisms that the article begs. First, 
it captures a brief period in analysing the ideational basis of Turkish foreign policy. Second, 
its ahistorical nature when it tries to explain the ideational basis of policy change, i.e. a new 
geographic imagination is also problematic. It fails to capture that the new geographers of the 
era simply have taken up some of the key themes already available in Turkey‘s geopolitical 
culture and rebranded them in practice. The same is true for Kenan Dağcı‘s article, ―Turkey‘s 
New Geopolitical Imagination and EU Membership‖51which employs a similar yet theoretically 
less sophisticated framework only this time with regardsto Turkey‘s EU integration process.  
 
Another article co-authored by Bülent Aras and Hakan Fidan associates with the same 
research agenda.52 The authors point to a culture of geopolitics which is about geographical 
representations, apprehensions and symbolizations that is socially constructed through 
historical experiences and interactions, as a factor to reckon with in the making of regional 
foreign policy. Yet the authors once again suffer from ahistoricity and uncontextuality in 
dealing with the emergence of a new geographical imagination as a driving force behind 
Turkish foreign policy.  
 
                                                          
50  ARAS, B., & KARAKAYA POLAT, R. (2007). Turkey and the Middle East: Frontiers of the New Geographic 
Imagination. Australian Journal of International Affairs. 61, p. 471-488. 
51 DAĞCI, K. (2007). Turkey’s New Geopolitical Imagination and EU Membership in Rethinking Turkey-EU Relations, ed. 
by DAGCI, K. & DAGCI, G. T. Münster: MV Wissenschaft, 2007, p. 39-46. 
52 ARAS, B. & FIDAN, H. (2009). Turkey and Eurasia: Frontiers of A New Geographic Imagination New Perspectives on 
Turkey, Vol. 40. p. 195-217. 
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Keeping the same optic, Ġbrahim Kalın bases his analysis on critical geopolitics, too.53 He 
uses the notion of ―geopolitical imagination‖, without much theoretical elaboration as to what 
it entails, to analyse Turkey‘s enhanced interest in Middle Eastern affairs. His is another 
article that takes systematic analysis at its core with an insistent focus on the nature of 
international balance of power. The only real theoretical novelty is branding this analysis 
under the concept of ―geopolitical imagination‖.  
 
Some of these articles suffer, with one degree or the other, from the following theoretical 
fallacy. Once an author bases his analysis on ―geopolitical imagination‖, an analytical tool 
borrowed from critical geopolitics scholarship, he, in fact, from a heuristic perspective is 
referring to ―geographical imagination‖. The latter term, as will be elaborated in further detail 
in the first chapter, is about placing a country globally in the mental geographical picture of its 
elite and people, i.e. earmarking a place for it in world affairs. It is also about giving political 
meaning to the geographies one sees a country‘s foreign policy directed at. A ―geopolitical 
imagination‖ on the other hand is about meta-geopolitical schemes in dividing the world (or 
as one might call it international political space) map into large spaces. The use of 
―geopolitical imagination‖ in these studies is out of proper theoretical context and hence 
inappropriate.     
 
Secondly, although the analyses offered in these articles are thought-provoking and novel, 
most fell short of situating imagined geographies, whether geographical or geopolitical, which 
are nothing but ideational analytical tools into proper social, cultural and historical context. 
Put differently, albeit recognizing the social and cultural embeddedness of imaginative 
spaces, these articles only focus on the practical foreign policy implications for a single 
group, political party or a few leading individuals within rather brief moments in time, a matter 
of decades at most. Thus, they leave aside the geo-cultural historical background and the 
                                                          
53KALIN I. (2009). Debating Turkey in the Middle East: The Dawn of A New Geopolitical Imagination? Insight 
Turkey. 11, p.83-96.  
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underlying social power relations that enable the constitution of these imageries in the first 
place, an equally crucial consideration that critical geopolitics scholarship needs to look into.   
 
Pınar Bilgin‘s ―Turkey‘s Geopolitics Dogma‖ is one of the latest pieces that goes beyond such 
fallacies in exposing the link between identity, geopolitics and foreign policy.54The author 
names the historical centrality of geopolitical assumptions and language to Turkey‘s security 
imagery of ―geopolitics dogma‖ through which she problematizes why and how different 
Turkish actors resorted to the same set of images and notions derived from classical 
geopolitical thought to justify exactly opposite policy positions. Cutting across popular, formal 
and practical strands of critical geopolitics, the article astutely manifests the abuse of 
geopolitical thought in Turkey by a variety of actors to enhance competing political agendas, 
particularly in foreign policy.  
 
One of the most illuminating geopolitical readings of Turkish foreign policy is provided in an 
article by Bilgin and Bilgiç in 2010.55 The authors do not only take geopolitical analysis in its 
appropriate social, cultural and historical context but also afford a comparison between the 
two rivalling geographical imaginations that so far guided Turkish foreign policy. The 
identification of elements of continuity and change in Turkey‘s external dealings with resort to 
these two imageries is also an excellent fit. However, they seem to mistake a mere foreign 
policy interest in a region, the Middle East, with the wider ideational scheme of a 
geographical imagination. They thereby force the limits of continuity in Turkey‘s behaviour in 
the Middle East from 1983 onwards despite apparent differences among the position of 
primary foreign policy actors whilst disregarding the historical backdrop upon which more 
recent geopolitical representations took place.   
 
                                                          
54 BİLGİN, P. (2012). Turkey’s Geopolitics Dogma in GUZZINI, S. The Return of Geopolitics in Europe?: Social 
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55 BILGIN, P., & BILGIÇ, A. (2011). Turkey's "New" Foreign Policy toward Eurasia. Eurasian Geography and Economics. 
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The use of imagined geographies/geographical imaginations in this new area of research on 
Turkish foreign policy is based on the strength of this analytical tool in shaping and 
legitimizing attitudes, dispositions, policies and practices.  But such uses disregard mostly, 
what Al Mahfedi calls, the relationship between national subjectivity and imagined 
geographies.56 They are conceptualized in such a way as if it is possible to work through 
imagined geographies as analytical constructs in disparate national contexts.57 This is where 
they fall erred and inadequate. Without the national context, such analyses are nothing 
beyond highly personalized leader specific accounts of certain episodes in Turkish foreign 
policy. Such an attitude runs counter to a central pillar of geopolitical study, that ‗geopolitics 
is a cultural and political practice beyond a manifest reality of world politics‘.58 Put differently, 
it is the cultural politics of place and space that matters. As Derek Gregory emphasizes 
‗culture involves the production, circulation, and legitimation of meanings through 
representations, practices, and performances that enter fully into the constitution of the 
world‘.59 A more appropriate account therefore must acknowledge the social and cultural 
embeddedness of actors who construct and use geopolitical knowledge in drawing the 
boundaries of possible, justified and legitimatein Turkish foreign policy. This requires a study 
of "the culture of geopolitics" which shapes the general contours of possibility and meaning 
as a concomitant factor in the production of grand strategy and external policy. The culture of 
geopolitics encompasses both academic and non-scholarly accounts of space and place 
which come in equal weight in the constitution of the assumptive worlds of decision-makers. 
The whole exercise drives from a state's spatial situatedness in its most concrete form (in the 
sense that there is a concrete geographical basis to it) and particular experiences/traumas in 
history. 
 
                                                          
56MOHAMED HAMOUD KASSIM AL-MAHFEDI. (2011). Edward Said’s “Imaginative Geography” and Geopolitical 
Mapping: Knowledge/Power Constellation and Landscaping Palestine. the Criterion. http://www.the-
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57Ibid. 
58Ibid. p.8. 
59GREGORY, D. (2004). The Colonial Present. Oxford. Blackwell Pub. p. 11. 
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CONTRIBUTION OF THIS WORK 
 
In light of the literature review thereof, a key challenge this study undertakes is to bring a 
novel perspective to understand and analyse Turkish foreign policy. This is inevitably linked 
to Turkey‘s culture, history, politics, economy, ideological polarization and social evolution. 
That is why this research is based on critical geopolitics which aims to uncover the power-
knowledge nexus employed in the production and use of geopolitical knowledge to guide 
grand strategies and foreign policy. As indicated so far, this perspective is rather 
inadequately applied to Turkish foreign policy.  
 
Having identified the scholarly gap in the literature, this research aims to enrich the 
discussion by elaborating in three broad dimensions. First, it will explore in more detail the 
intellectual debates available in Turkish geopolitical culture in ascribing Turkey a place, 
mission and role in international affairs. This part contributes by adding a more nuanced 
understanding with regards to the socio-cultural context of ideational bases of the two 
competing geographical imaginations as well as the traditions that enframe them. Secondly, 
it will expose how these imaginations relate to the geographies (Middle East in particular) 
around Turkey. This is a crucial concern since the way places in Turkey‘s vicinity are scripted 
has a conditioning impact on the courses of action available for policy makers. Thirdly, by 
offering an analysis of domestic power dynamics in Turkey this research hopes to address 
the permanent ―how‖ question in any research.  
 
Adopting such a research agenda allows room for in-depth analysis of Turkish foreign policy 
that emphasizes;  
 the unhindered and ever lingering influence of space-based reasoning in informing 
foreign policy that goes back to the early years of state, nation and identity formation; 
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 and as such, how the world per se is divided, labelled and identified as composed of 
two (perceivably) irreconcilable political, cultural and civilizational spaces, the West 
vs. the East, through which the orientation of Turkey and its foreign policy is sought; 
 in this context, the way different societal actors took up the challenge of ascribing a 
new position to Turkey in global affairs, i.e. how the two longest lasting traditions, 
Kemalism vs. Conservatism, propagated competing storylines about the West and the 
East, the place of Turkey in between, and what meaning the geographies around 
Turkey should hold; 
 how imagined geographies about foreign places around Turkey‘s vicinity and 
geographical imaginations about Turkey itself are developed as guides for external 
action; 
 the way in which not only these discursive formations are used as a means of 
shaping foreign policy but also exercising diffused power; 
 the impact of and evolution in the interaction among a myriad of social networks of 
power (a mix of political, military, economic and ideological power) in constituting one 
or the other geopolitical tradition and translating their imagination into practice; 
 identification of and transformation over time in the key processes and mechanisms 
of foreign policy making in Turkey.  
 
Thanks to the breadth and multiplicity of the topics covered, this study hopes to provide a 
multifaceted, multi-causal, historically and culturally contextual and dynamic analysis of 
Turkish foreign policy in a holistic manner through both a topical and chronological order. As 
such, this research aims to break away from perspectives fixated on security and structural 
(systemic) dynamics. Instead it draws scholarly attention to domestic factors since they are, 
more often than not, insufficiently and unsystematically addressed in the literature.      
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The research is principally placed within the area of international relations with a specific 
focus on foreign policy. Therefore, the major contribution it seeks is on public (foreign) policy. 
Due to the nature of the broader research topic, it can also be located at the intersection with 
the discipline of political science. This is because foreign and domestic policy is closely 
knitted as the theoretical model developed in the study stipulates. In this vein, understanding 
Turkish foreign policy requires no less than an effort to understand the evolution of Turkish 
politics and society. Peculiarities of Turkey‘s geography, history and culture and the way they 
are given meaning to, are very much pertinent for studying Turkish politics and foreign policy. 
This is why it is possible to classify this research as belonging to Area Studies (within Turkish 
Studies) as well.    
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CHAPTER 1- CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Snyder and Walt stipulate that three criteria are important in assessing the scientific value of 
research; precision and logical consistency, creativity/originality, and empirical validity.60 This 
chapter aims to develop an integrated conceptual framework that can meet such criteria and 
provide the analytical tools to examine Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. As argued 
by Hilsman, conceptual models are best regarded not as simply ―true‖ or ―false‖ but as 
differentially useful depending on the circumstances.61 In this context, this work aims to make 
a contribution by devising a conceptual framework based on critical geopolitics and applying 
its theoretical underpinnings to the specific case study. The goal is to provide a heuristic 
explanation for Turkey‘s waves of activism in and withdrawal from Middle Eastern politics. 
 
Adopting critical geopolitics as the backbone of the conceptual framework in Turkish foreign 
policy is justified because as noted by Stone, ―in terms of theoretical models Turkey's 
external relations are invariably wrapped within a traditional geopolitical (balance of power) 
analysis or couched within realist rhetoric of Turkey's national interests at the expense of 
alternative models--e.g. constructivism.‖62 Critical geopolitics not only offers rich insights by 
pointing to the constructivist elements impacting policy preferences but also emancipates the 
Turkish foreign policy research agenda from external structural imperatives.   
 
Choosing this framework is also justified from an academic point of view since ―the 
overwhelming body of work in critical geopolitics has focused on contemporary US and 
                                                          
60 SNYDER, G. (2000) Book Review: In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics by Robert 
Powell. Political Science Quarterly, Vol.115. p.132-134., WALT, S. (1999), A Model Disagreement, International 
Security, Vol:24, No:2. p.115-130.  
61HILSMAN, R. (1987). The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and 
Bureaucratic Politics. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall. p.43.  
62 STONE, L. (2007). Researching Turkey: Activities, Trajectories and Reconfigurations, Insight Turkey, Vol.9, No:1.p.7-
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European colonial powers as if they were the sole active forces in world politics‖63. Adding 
Turkey as an empirical case through the lens of its Middle Eastern policy, will no doubt 
enlarge the scope of scholarly debate and allow for an enriched understanding. 
 
I. GEOPOLITICS 
 
   ―We all must learn geography in order to learn history.‖ 
                  (Walter A. McDougall)64 
 
As an intellectual tradition and an expression of state interest and identity65, geopolitics helps 
people visualize the world in certain ways through maps, atlases, ideas, representations and 
connotations. Depictions such as the West, the Middle East or the Third World are not 
merely geographical names but representations by which political meanings are attributed to 
different parts of the world. It is through geopolitics that places are labelled and identified into 
smaller units and made politically meaningful. It is the process through which the Planet 
Earth is translated into the (Political) World. It should be borne in mind that such descriptions 
are not fixed but are in constant production and reproduction. In addition to influencing daily 
lives, geopolitics very much informs official discourses in foreign policy, power relations and 
identity.  
 
Geopolitics can be traced back to the universities, geographical institutes, and centres of 
learning in rivalling empires of the late 19th century.66It was originally crafted as a strategic 
means of making advances in imperial rivalry. Geographers of this era laid the foundations of 
                                                          
63 AGNEW J. (2010). Emerging China and Critical Geopolitics: Between World Politics and Chinese 
Particularity.  Eurasian Geography and Economics. 51, 569-582. 
64 MCDOUGALL, W. A. (2003). Why Geography Matters but is So Little Learned? Orbis. 47, p.217.  
65 GUZZINI, S. (2003). ‘Self-Fulfilling Geopolitics' Or the Social Production of Foreign Policy Expertise in Europe, DIIS 
Working Paper :23, p. 17. 
66 TOAL, G. (1996). Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press. p.21. 
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geopolitics by emphasizing the conditioning influence of physical geography on foreign 
policy. As a term and discourse, geopolitics is rooted in the relationship between geography 
(space) and politics (power). As such states and interstate relations are prerogative for this 
discipline.  
 
One also needs to bear in mind the slight difference between political geography and 
geopolitics. The former maintains that ―understanding geography is fundamental to 
understanding politics‖.67 Geopolitics on the other hand looks at this relationship the other 
way around. It is concerned with ―geographic influences on power relationships in 
international relations‖68 or ―spatial study and practice of international relations‖.69 To make a 
comparison; ―geopolitics is concerned with the spatial requirements of a state while political 
geography examines only its spatial conditions―.70That being noted, it is obvious that the two 
approaches are quite close to each other.  
 
In affording a definition to geopolitics, a term coined by Swedish scholar Rudolf Kjellen in 
1899, Saul Cohen offers the following.  
 
―The analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and 
perspectives and, on the other hand, political processes. The settings are composed 
of geographical features and patterns and the multi-layered regions that they form. 
The political processes include forces that operate at the international level and on 
those on the domestic scene that influence international behaviour. Both geographical 
                                                          
67 JONES, M., JONES, R., & WOODS, M. (2004). An Introduction to Political Geography: Space, Place and Politics. 
London, Routledge, p.170.  
68 “GEOPOLITICS”, Encyclopedia Britannica Online, (consulted on March 20, 2012)  
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69 GRAY, C. S., Inescapable Geography in GRAY, C. S., & SLOAN, G. R. (1999). Geopolitics, Geography, and 
Strategy. London, Frank Cass.  
70 GOODALL, Dictionary of Human Geography, p.191. 
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settings and political processes are dynamic, and each influences and is influenced 
by the other. Geopolitics addresses the consequences of this interaction."71 
 
This approach to geopolitics, which is today dubbed classical (orthodox) geopolitics is about 
translating space into politics (interstate power relations). Another definition offered by Toal, 
stipulates that ―geopolitics is discourse about world politics, with a particular emphasis on 
state competition and the geographical dimensions of power‖.72 It is in fact how geographies 
of the world are made politically meaningful within a culture of geopolitics and through an 
ever going process of competition and struggle for power. In other words, geopolitics is an 
attempt to see ―the political world‖ and one‘s place in it. A foremost requirement is to 
―visualize a map of the world and place one‘s feet squarely in history and geography while at 
the same time keeping one‘s eyes upon a speculative future.‖73 
 
Classical geopolitics scholars and its practitioners of statecraft seek ―a God‘s eye view of the 
world‖.74Some go further in asserting that what they see is scientifically objective. However, 
scholars of this strand mostly have certain biases and thus do generate, wittingly or 
unwittingly, theories that serve their particular agendas. Geopolitics therefore almost always 
comes with apolitical agenda and a national bias. The novelty of the discipline lies in 
acknowledging its subjectivity and trying to critically assess why and how certain meanings 
are attributed to the understanding of the world in justifying policy positions.    
 
Geopolitics is historically very much informed by the realist school of thought in seeing the 
world composed of a struggle between competing states with reference to geography. It does 
also take into consideration constructivist elements. The ―political world‖ today is not simply 
                                                          
71 COHEN, S. B. (2003). Geopolitics of the World System. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p.12. 
72 TOAL, G., DALBY, S., & ROUTLEDGE, P. (2006). p.1.  
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48 
 
 
out there to observe just like in physics. To the contrary, it is made known through the 
socially constructed processes in one‘s home country and the geopolitical representations in 
other countries that are interacted with, which are reflected onto geopolitical discourses. As 
noted by Dijkink, geography only acquires meaning through historical events and through a 
way of life that geographical determinists alone have tried to explain directly on the basis of 
the physical environment. 75  Therefore, as Flint puts it, the goals of geopolitics in 
understanding, analysing and being able to critique world politics and (state behaviour) 
require us to work with more than one definition.76 
 
II. CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS 
 
Underlying Characteristics  
 
There is a tendency in the literature to attribute the roots of geopolitical scholarship to the 
rise of European imperialism. The theory and practice of classical geopolitics is thereby 
closely linked to 19th century Germany. In fact, the period between the end of the 19th century 
and the end of World War II can be considered the ‗high time‘ of geopolitics since it had a 
strong imprint on international relations.  
 
An underlying feature of this school of geopolitics is that ―the influence of geographic 
environment over the actions of men is thought to represent a natural rather than a historic 
relationship‖. 77  As such, ―it is concerned with the implications for power politics of the 
geographical attributes of states, and of their spatial locations…In the abstract, geopolitics 
traditionally indicates the links and causal relationships between political power and 
geographic space; in concrete terms it is often seen as a body of thought assaying specific 
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strategic prescriptions based on the relative importance of land power and sea power in 
world history....The geopolitical tradition had some consistent concerns, like the geopolitical 
correlates of power in world politics, the identification of international core areas, and the 
relationships between naval and terrestrial capabilities.‖78 
 
Therefore, classical geopolitical reasoning underscores the importance of physical-
geographical determinants such as proximity to oceans and continental landmass in driving 
policy. Thus, being a sea or land power is treated as an important factor in determining 
international relations and one‘s own policy choices. In classical geopolitics, policy 
prescriptions are believed to flow from the geographical position of a country, the relative 
location with regard to other powers, the lines of transport to important resources, the 
distribution of the population over the territory, etc., as argued by Dijkink.79 In the words of 
Gray, classical geopolitical thinking ―defines the players (which are territorially organized 
states or those aspiring to become), frequently defines the stakes for which the players 
contend, and always defines the terms in which they measure their security relative to 
others‖.80 It is therefore safe to argue that classical geopolitics is deterministic in the sense 
that it assumes that geography pre-frames (world) politics, and hence external action.  
 
Classical Geopolitics and Foreign Policy 
 
In light of these considerations, a brief overview of classical geopolitics through the writings 
by some of its prominent scholars will be elaborated hereafter. Such an exercise is 
necessary because classical geopolitics despite its claims of being ―objective‖ and providing 
―a God‘s eye graze‖81 on topography and political human interactions upon it, serves as the 
basis on which critical inquiry into geopolitical reasoning takes place. The main concern here 
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79 DIJKINK, G. (1998): Geopolitical Codes and Popular Representations, GeoJournal 46. Vol.4. p.295. 
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is to indicate the relationship between classical geopolitical thinking and foreign policy 
behaviour.  
 
Rudolf Kjellen, the forefather of the term ―geopolitics‖, elaborated on the political processes 
that a state engages in order to be powerful. Of the major hallmarks of demopolitik (politics of 
demography), sociopolitik (politics of sociology), ecopolitik (economy), Kratapolitik (politics of 
government and constitution) and geopolitik, Kjellen attached utmost importance to the latter. 
He used the term to describe the location, form, surface and physical characteristics of the 
territory of a state and the study of these characteristics. For him, geopolitics was not 
legalistic or idealistic but rather realistic. He adopted the organic theory of state in stipulating 
that ―more vigorous and advanced cultures have the right to expand its ‗domain‘ and control 
more territory.‖ 82  It was again Kjellen who interpreted autarky, i.e. self-sufficiency, as a 
source of state power which guided mercantilist policies until the end of World War II.  
 
Friedrich Ratzel, aGerman geographer well known for his work titled ―Politische Geographie‖ 
(1897) and the paper on ―Laws on the Spatial Growth of States‖ (1896), bases his analysis 
too on an ‗organic theory of state‘. He argues that states, just like any living organism, need 
to grow to absorb less successful and smaller states. In his account, expansion and political 
growth is considered healthy as it adds to a state‘s strength.83 Borrowing Darwin‘s survival of 
the fittest thesis, Ratzel foresees survival of the most civilized and developed states in the 
system.84 In his understanding, a country and its people are closely linked to its land (space) 
without which it is neither possible to talk about a country nor its people.  
 
The biggest part of Ratzel‘s legacy in this regard lies in the concept of lebensraum (living 
space). He seems to adhere to realist and rationalist perspective in seeing international 
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politics as a constant struggle for survival in which the state was required to adapt itself to 
environmental conditions.85 The choices he foresaw were rather simple; a state must either 
grow or die just like any organism. Thus, Ratzel treated German people as an organism in 
desperate need for a living space. In his mind, it was the ultimate destiny of Germany to 
expand because it simply served a geographical organic need. Therefore, Ratzel called this 
a policy objective for the primacy of the German state.86 His ideas were later taken by Adolf 
Hitler and his Nazi accomplices.  
 
One of the most well-known figures in classical geopolitics is Sir John Mackinder. He indeed 
developed geopolitics as a separate field of study and called for ―educating the citizens of the 
worldwide (British) Empire (how) to visualize distant geographical conditions.‖87 Mackinder‘s 
utmost desire was to develop a theory to maintain Britain‘s imperial supremacy against rising 
continental powers like Germany and Russia. In today‘s terminology, Mackinder used 
geopolitics interchangeably with geo-strategy.  
 
His address on ―The Geographical Pivot of History‖ whereby Mackinder hinted on his famous 
Heartland theory is important in the evolution of geopolitical thought. Beginning his analysis 
with an authoritarian claim that ―geography as a science of discovery and exploration is 
over‖,88 Mackinder combines history, geography and politics in order to promote a way of 
seeing the world in its totality. 89  He was more interested in relative gains rather than 
acquiring new territories90 because in the post-Colombian epoch virtually no part of the world 
remained unexplored. 
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Mackinder saw the era of sea-powers coming to an end and with the advent of railroad 
transport, he stipulated that controlling an area of the world which he called Heartland was 
crucial in terms of global distribution of power and resources. In his mind, the Heartland 
which pretty much covered today‘s Eastern Europe and the landmass under Russian control 
in Euro-Asia held the key to global supremacy. He then divided the world into the ―pivot area, 
(Heartland), the inner crescent and the outer crescent‖. Thus came his famous dictum that 
―who rules East Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the 
World-Island, who rules the World-Island commands the world‖.91In his eyes, the doomsday 
scenario for Europe would be an alliance between Russia, the pivotal land power and 
Germany, an emergent sea power. Thus, he propagated that a buffer zone, ―a tier of 
independent states between these two countries―92, must be established. This idea indeed 
came to practical fruition during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.      
 
The significance of Mackinder‘s work lies, in the words of Toal, at ―its God‘s eye global view, 
its division of the globe into vast swaths of territory and its sweeping story of geography‘s 
conditioning influence on the course of history and politics‖.93 It was after all Sir Mackinder 
who laid the foundations of modern day geopolitical imagination and visualization by 
establishing an image of the World as a whole in terms of time, space and development.  
 
Major General and Prof. Dr. Karl Haushofer brought geopolitics to its zenith in continental 
Europe. He embraced Ratzel‘s organic state theory and argued that a state had the right to 
wage just wars to enhance its lebensraum. He called for expanding a state‘s territories to 
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include people from similar and related cultures (pan-regionalism).94 An emphasis on autarky 
was also another strong suit in Haushofer‘s theory.95 The real refinement he brought into 
geopolitical reasoning was on borders as living organisms. Unlike the conventional 
understanding, he argued that all borders were dynamic and ever changing as a state 
searches for its lebensraum, autarky and pan-regionalism.96 To him, Mackinder‘s Heartland 
would provide Germany all it needed in this respect. The landmass of Eurasia-Africa which 
was the largest, most populous, and richest of its time, was exposed as the 'pivot' or centre 
of gravity of all human existence.97  With such an ambitious strategy calling for colonial 
acquisition and territorial growth, the ideas of Haushofer did not only serve as a strong 
inspirer but also a source of legitimization for Nazi policies. With regards to his academic 
imprint, it was indeed Haushofer‘s association with the Nazi war machinery that caused a 
pause in the evolution of geopolitics as a separate social discipline in international politics.         
 
The Dutch-born American scholar Nicholas Spykman isknown for introducing European 
geopolitical thinking to the US. At a time when Wilsonian liberalism seemed triumphant 
across the Atlantic, Spykman told Americans that ―foreign policy is about power rather than 
ideals and the struggle for power is the real name for world politics.‖98 He also called for an 
end to isolationism and passivity in American foreign policy in the aftermath of World War I. 
As Spykman puts it, ―geography does not argue, it simply is‖99 thus making it impossible for a 
state to escape from its geography. Spykman characterized the geographic location of a 
state as ―the most fundamental factor in its foreign policy.‖100 According to him, ―the full 
meaning of a given location can be obtained only by considering the specific area in relation 
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to two systems of reference: a geographic system of reference from which we derive the 
facts of location, and a historical system of reference by which we evaluate those facts.‖101 
 
Spkyman is also well known as the Rimland theorist. He identified the ―inner crescent‖ in 
Mackinder‘s theory as the ―Rimland‖, the geopolitical area holding the key to global 
domination as he explained;  
 
“The Rimland of the Eurasian land mass must be viewed as an intermediate region, 
situated…between the heartland and the marginal seas. It functions as a vast buffer 
zone of conflict between sea power and land power. Looking in both directions, it 
must function amphibiously and defend itself on land and sea.”102 
 
In his account, the maritime region around Eurasia is seen as ―the great circumferential 
maritime highway of the world.‖ The oceans, due to modern technology and advanced 
means of navigation and communication, are ―not barriers but highways. 103  Hence his 
formula was ―whoever rules the Rimland commands Eurasia, and whoever rules Eurasia 
commands the world.‖104 
 
III. CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 
 
Introduction  
 
The body of work, which aims to revisit and unpack the foundational assumptions of classical 
geopolitics that has developed since the 1980s can be described as critical geopolitics. This 
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strand provides a framework of analysis for the relationship between territoriality and politics. 
It assumes, in the words of Muller, that classical geopolitical reasoning constructs, 
administers, and organizes space through language.105 Muller defines critical geopolitics as 
the examination of ―the very construction and social effects of geopolitical imaginations and 
geopolitical identities- the imaginary spatial positioning of people, regions, states and the 
shifting boundaries that accompany this positioning‖.106 As such, this rather new approach 
tries to better understand the cultural origins, biases and theoretical limitations of classical 
geopolitics.107  Geopolitics and geopolitical knowledge per se is not taken-for-granted as 
innocent, objective and impartial. To the contrary, classical geopolitics is criticized for 
envisaging geographical determinism and justifying imperial hegemony and superiority of 
Western European civilization. Instead of being a descriptive term intended to cover the 
study of foreign policy and grand statecraft, geopolitics is re-conceptualized as a form of 
political discourse. 108  It is, what Toal calls, ―a culturally and politically varied way of 
describing, representing and writing about geography and international relations.‖109 In this 
context, production of geopolitical knowledge is itself problematized and treated as an 
essentially contested political activity.110 
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This is why the naturalist approach in classical geopolitics, namely claiming a neutral gaze 
on geopolitical reality is heavily criticized.111  Geopolitics in the new strand of thought is 
understood as ―a discursive practice by which intellectuals of statecraft ‗spatialize‘ 
international politics in such a way as to represent it as a ‗world‘ characterized by particular 
types of places, peoples and dramas.‖112 Therefore, an underlying claim is that geopolitical 
discourses are all human constructions, biased and in service of those who construct them. 
Subsequently, geopolitics is construed as prejudiced with power. The critical approach 
―involves deconstructing the ways in which political elites have depicted and represented 
places in their exercise of power‖.113 It tries to deconstruct ―the hegemonic fixations of spatial 
imaginations‖,114 thus deconstructs the supposedly ―objective‖ geopolitical knowledge and 
exposes the power-knowledge relationship behind these constructions. In a nutshell, the 
post-structuralism embedded in critical geopolitics necessitates closer scrutiny and critical 
self-reflection on the power relations involved in the socio-cultural construction of geopolitical 
knowledge.   
 
Centrality of Discursive Analysis  
 
The theoretical underpinnings of critical geopolitics are usually traced back to the writings of 
Michel Foucault on the archaeology of knowledge. Modern day scholars such as Agnew, 
Toal, Dodds and Dalby base their analysis on Foucault‘s critical and deconstructive approach 
whereby the objectivity of geopolitical knowledge is problematized. Foucault‘s strong call for 
a closer scrutiny of the power/knowledge nexus in discourse is the starting point in critical 
analysis. As such, the broad assertion that there is no knowledge separable from the 
processes of power is strongly embraced in critical thinking. In the words of Toal and Agnew, 
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―geopolitical writing is a highly ideological and deeply politicized form of analysis‖.115 As such, 
―it produces knowledge to aid the practice of statecraft (foreign policy) and further the power 
of the state‖. 116  Therefore, critical geopolitics is an attempt to ―problematize theoretical 
enterprise that places the existing structures of power and knowledge in question‖.117 The 
research agenda of critical geopolitics is about critiquing geopolitical discourses in order to 
understand why and how they are constructed the way they are to supplement certain 
agendas. 
 
Hence, this new approach to geopolitics is more discourse oriented. It understands 
geopolitics as a form of political discourse of power and space. It is through discourses that 
spatial, cultural and political boundaries are created in defining ―self‖ in the face of a 
threatening ―other‖. Discourses in this understanding are not merely texts, speeches and 
images but are language, ideas and practices which articulate, limit and position subjects. 
According to Bialasiewicz et al. ―discourses refer to a specific series of representations and 
practices through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations 
established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible‖.118 Discourses 
are thus linguistic and cartographic constructions which aim to constitute the objects they 
speak of. One shall not be mistaken, however, that if policy makers thought differently of the 
world, it would be become different. Critical inquiry‘s concern with discourse does not involve 
a denial of the world‘s existence or the significance of materiality. 119  In this context, 
discourses are conceptualized not only as language (discursive) but also as language and 
practice (performative). 120  Discursive signification, i.e. communicative construction of 
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117TOAL, G. Ó. (1999). Understanding Critical Geopolitics: Geopolitics and Risk Society. Journal of Strategic Studies. 
22, p.107. 
118 BIALASIEWICZ, L., CAMPBELL, D., ELDEN, S., GRAHAM, S., JEFFREY, A., & WILLIAMS, A. J. (2007). 
Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of Current US Strategy. Political Geography. 26, 405.  
119 Ibid, p. 406. 
120 MULLER M. (2008). p. 322.  
58 
 
 
meaning in a system of signification, lies deeply beneath critical analysis in geopolitics. It is 
not simply descriptive but normative and institutive. In other words, discursive 
representations and practice at the same time constitute ontological effects. Through 
reiterated practices discourse produces effects of which it names. 121  Recitation and 
reiteration as limitations/enablers on policy reveal the importance of discourses in 
constituting geopolitical/geographical imaginations of policymakers and (foreign and security) 
policies that are followed accordingly.  
 
As noted by Toal and Agnew, there are four general observations about geopolitical 
discourses and political elites.122 First is that ―simply describing a foreign policy problem is 
implicitly and tacitly normalizing a particular version of the world. To designate a place is to 
open up a field for possible taxonomies and trigger a series of narratives, subjects and 
appropriate foreign policy responses‖. As written by Said, merely to designate an area as 
‗Islamic‘ is to designate an implicit foreign policy‖.123 Likewise, to designate an area/country 
in the West brings along a different set of foreign policy options. Secondly, most geopolitical 
reasoning is practical rather than formal. Practical geopolitics is related to policy making and 
using geopolitical reasoning as a means of justifying concrete foreign policy actions. As such, 
there is a strong relation between how foreign policy discourses are practiced and 
geographies are imagined. It relies on narratives and binary distinctions found in societal 
mythologies,124  which are self-ascribed. The third is that geographical knowledge has a 
reductive nature which is filtered and suppressed to fit into simple geographical categories. 
Geopolitical reasoning actively suppresses the complex geographical reality of places in 
favour of simpler and controllable geopolitical abstractions.125 Fourthly, political elites in the 
core states have disproportionate influence on the constitution of dominant geopolitical 
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discourse. It does not mean however that geopolitical reasoning by the dominant power of 
peripheral or semi peripheral states remains unchallenged.  
 
Types of Geopolitical Discourses  
 
Critical geopolitics on micro and macro levels can be understood as consisting of geopolitical 
discourses and geopolitical cultures. Geopolitical discourses can be defined as public 
articulations and narrative codifications of the elements that make up a geopolitical culture.126 
It is possible to identify three areas of study in critical geopolitics. These are formal (the way 
intellectuals of statecraft -academics mostly- study geopolitics), popular (ordinary people) 
and practical (foreign policy elite) geopolitics. It is possible sometimes that ―practical‖ serves 
―formal‖ and ―popular‖ while ―formal‖ has ―practical‖ ramifications. The boundaries among the 
three categories are not fixed but rather intermingled. Such categorization nevertheless 
merits benefit for analysis.  
 
This research is closest to practical geopolitics which also carries inroads to the realm of 
formal geopolitics. Practical geopolitics is what Dodds and Atkinson call ―everyday practice of 
statecraft whereby the world is spatialized into regions with imagined attributes and 
characteristics—leading to a mosaic of places of ‗danger‘, ‗threat‘, or ‗safety‘ that underpins 
foreign policy. 127  For the purposes of this study, the narratives used by politicians, 
practitioners and intellectuals are the focal points of analysis. They are the ones through 
whom geopolitical representations are articulated in an attempt to set the limits and 
possibilities on foreign policy choices as well as to justify them.  
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How geopolitical discourse shapes and is shaped by foreign policy is a major theoretical 
question. Nevertheless it is clear that these two are densely intertwined. As argued by 
Painter, it is through discourse that (foreign policy) is made meaningful and justified. 128 
Therefore, geopolitical representations of world politics (and one‘s place in it) as manifested 
in geopolitical discourses help constitute and legitimize foreign policy behaviour. Thus, 
geopolitical representations are instrumental in informing which policy options shall be 
preferred over others.  
 
Toal notes that a geopolitical story-line is ―a relatively coherent foreign policy narrative and 
argument about a policy challenge that is defined in debate by competing antagonistic story-
lines. They are discursively fashioned from geographical imaginations, traditions, visions and 
other aspects of geopolitical culture. In a debate, they help delimit the policy space within 
which a certain issue, event or drama is debated.‖129 
 
The end product that is reflected in the geopolitical discourse is called geopolitical script. A 
geopolitical script is ―what foreign policy leaders agree to say and perform publicly about a 
foreign policy question‖, 130  as defined by Toal. He argues that, geopolitical script is a 
formulaic and diplomatic way of speech acting that sometimes articulates one geopolitical 
storyline to the exclusion of others but sometimes deliberately chooses not to decide 
between them and acts in a manner that retains ambiguity, flexibility and superficiality in 
making foreign policy.  
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Another aspect of geopolitical discourses is geostrategic discourse. As stipulated by Toal, 
it can be understood as a form of geopolitical discourse that makes explicit strategic claims 
about the material national security interests of the state across a world map characterized 
by state competition, threats and dangers.131 It is usually culminated by national security 
bureaucracies. Preoccupied with scenarios of state competition, war fighting, resource 
scarcity, pervasive danger and insecurity, the national security bureaucracy claims a 
privileged position for itself beyond established foreign politics on the basis of the claim that 
it addresses transcendent national interests and existential concerns.132 Toal suggests that 
geostrategic discourse can be conceived as operating the same way as “securitization” in 
the form of “geo-strategization”.133 ―It is making a discursive claim that a particular foreign 
policy crisis or challenge has the locational and transcendent material national interest 
qualities that make it ―strategic‖. In this perspective, geostrategic discourse is whatever 
intellectuals of statecraft and a state‘s power structure make of it.‖134 
 
Concepts of Foreign Policy Analysis  
 
What critical geopolitics brings to the foreign policy analysis is that traditional constructivism 
pays less attention to the relationship between power and space in the creation of not only 
national and sub-national but more so of transnational/geopolitical identity by focusing 
specifically on the (trans)national dimension of imaginative geographies. 135  In terms of 
foreign policy analysis, ―critical geopolitics is thus located within the broader discussion of 
state sovereignty, spatial representation and identity formation simply because how 
discourses of representation are formed is central to the writing of foreign policy.‖136 As 
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Campbell argues, state identity is a by-product of prevalent geopolitical discourses and 
foreign policy is performed in response to the threats, whether real or 
interpretative/representational, to this identity. It is therefore a political practice which plays a 
principal role in constituting, producing, and maintaining identity in relation to 
differences/dangers/others. 137  The way security and national interest are framed thus is 
informed by geopolitical/geographical imaginations, which are determined by identity 
perceptions as displayed in discourses.138  Identity, security, national interest and foreign 
policy are interdependently shaped by each other in the process of constructing spatial 
discursive formations. Therefore, geopolitical scripture translates into an act of drawing 
mental maps of danger, threat and security in constitution and justification of identities, 
interests and foreign policy.   
 
As noted by Dodds, these practices of (re)presentation that constitute foreign policy are 
important in establishing ‗understandings‘: ways of seeing, knowing and speaking. 139  In 
writing the story of space and foreign policy, conceptual abstractions such as identity, biases 
and perceptions are equally crucial as material factors like territorial borders, geographical 
situatedness and proximity. In this process, identity formation is not simply an act of 
attachment to a culture or civilization. More importantly, identity is spatially formed on the 
basis of a series of ‘exclusions‘, which demarcate the boundaries of the state (domestic-
inside) and the international system (external-outside).140  In the words of Dodds, critical 
geopolitics ―is concerned as much with maps of meaning as it is with maps of states. The 
boundary-drawing practices … are conceptual and cartographic, imaginary and actual, social 
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and aesthetic.‖141 Similarly, Campbell argues that ―foreign policy, in this understanding, is not 
so much behaviour across boundaries. It is instead a specific form of boundary producing 
political performance. Foreign policy, then, is a political performance taking place in a 
historically carved out social space, and having, amongst its important effects, the 
constitution and reaffirmation of socially recognizable boundaries separating fields of practice 
on a global scale.‖142  Foreign policy is not only a physical but also a social boundary-
producing practice that enframes the state to contain challenges to the identity which 
results.143 As noted by Campbell, it is through this practice that ―boundaries are constructed, 
spaces demarcated, standards of legitimacy incorporated, interpretations of history privileged 
and alternatives marginalized.‖144 To sum up, foreign policy is about divisions of space and 
identification of spheres of interest. In this vein, the research agenda of practical geopolitics 
is twofold; to critically investigate geographical depictions that constitute foreign policy and 
how the divide between the domestic and the international is actually articulated in foreign 
policy discourse.145 
 
In terms of politics of identity, critical geopolitics renders repetition of themes as an effective 
method of constructing identity. As Dalby and Dodds note ‗repetition is an important facet of 
rendering particular understandings "common sense". The ideological production and 
reproduction of societies can, in part, be understood as the mundane repetition of particular 
geopolitical tropes which constrain the political imaginary‘,146 and hence limits of bounded 
rationality for external action.  
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Therefore, critical geopolitics does not analyse foreign policy by simply looking at actual 
practices but at the same time questioning how discursive representations of space are 
incorporated into foreign policy. That is because, as noted by Agnew and Corbridge, a simple 
description of a certain foreign policy situation is an act of geopolitics in itself.147  In so doing, 
certain assumptions about other states, peoples and regions are made. As noted by Sapiro, 
foreign policy is ‘the process of making the foreign or exotic, and thus different from the self, 
someone or thing. Given the usual esteem within which the self is constituted, the exoticizing 
of the ‗Other‘ almost invariably amounts to the constitution of the ‗Other‘ as a less than equal 
subject‘.148 Categorizing and labelling space in this manner is an act that brings ideas and 
visions about that place and policies it follows. Those representations, whether in formal or 
practical assessments, ―play an important role in consolidating elite interpretative schemes 
and also in constituting political representation of places and peoples.149 By resorting to 
geopolitical representations, practitioners of statecraft try to legitimize a specific foreign 
policy position. Those who engage in such an act are as a result exposed to a set of policy 
possibilities and constraints. The way this spatial representative practice works can be 
analysed with reference to some key concepts in critical geopolitics as discussed hereafter.  
 
The peculiarity about critical geopolitics is its authoritative rejection of agency-structure 
dichotomy. Critical scholars are dissatisfied with realist/neo-realist accounts which do not 
leave any room for human creativity. In this sense, an analysis of state behaviour based 
solely on the conditioning impact of systemic factors (structure) is not applicable in critical 
geopolitics. Instead, critical inquiry rests on the transformative ability of human-beings and on 
the proposition that collective human action leads to historical transformation in the system. 
As Amineh and Houweling put it;  
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―The representatives of critical geopolitics take state-society relations as the unit of 
analysis. According to this view state-society complexes come into interaction through 
their (foreign) polices. By these interactions they create a “system level of social 
order”. Since the mid-19th century, the system-level of social order is characterized 
by sequential industrialization of state-society complexes.‖150 
 
Foreign policy practice then is a function of both internal and external dynamics. The internal 
dynamic is about how the world is spatialized and the place of one‘s own self as well as that 
of others is socially and constructively constituted/represented. This inevitably necessitates a 
closer scrutiny of domestic distribution of power as it is crucial in understanding whose 
representative images and discourses of the world are reflected onto foreign policy practice. 
The external dimension is about the foreign policy practices and geopolitical representations 
of other (most influential) states in the system. 
 
a) Geopolitical Culture and Traditions  
 
Geopolitical culture refers to ―interpretative culture and traditions within which a state 
makes sense of its identity and its encounter with the world of states, and codifies a set of 
strategies for negotiating that encounter‖.151 In other words, ―the geopolitical culture of a state 
is normally characterized by a series of antagonistic and competing geopolitical traditions 
that are drawn upon to help write similarly contending geopolitical storylines around foreign 
policy developments and dramas‖.152 It is conditioned by factors like a state‘s geographical 
situation, historical formation and bureaucratic organization, discourses of national identity 
                                                          
150AMINEH, M. P., & HOUWELING, H. (2003). `Introduction: `The Crisis in IR-Theory: Towards a Critical Geo-politics 
Approach¿. Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 2(4). p.11. 
Leiden, Brill. http://site.ebrary.com/id/10171770 .  
151 O'LOUGHLIN, J., TOAL, G., & KOLOSSOV, V. (2004). 
152 TOAL, G. (2002). Theorizing  Practical Geopolitical Reasoning: The Case of the United States’ Response to the 
War in Bosnia. Political Geography. 21, quoted in OALOUGHLIN, J. (2004). p.285. 
66 
 
 
and traditions of theorizing its relationship to the wider world, and the networks of power that 
operate within the state.153 
 
As noted by Toal, geopolitical culture is a product of prevalent geopolitical and geographical 
imaginations, the particular institutional organization and political culture (including 
geostrategic culture) of a state, and longstanding geopolitical traditions.154 It also refers to the 
cultural and organizational processes by which foreign policy is made. 155  The role and 
mission of a state in foreign affairs, and popular perceptions of the danger, foreign policy 
priorities and security challenges facing a state in world affairs are reflected in its geopolitical 
culture.156 Some states have a strong sense of mission and destiny while others determine 
their relationship to the world as part of a larger community, e.g. NATO. 
 
In assessing how foreign policy of a state is made, one cannot simply take its national 
interests for granted. One needs to look deeper into the particular ‗historical block‘ or 
ensemble of practices which interpolate economic, political, ideological, religious and other 
motivations into what is called geopolitical culture.157  This is because, as argued by O‘ 
Loughlin, ―state leaders and political decision makers can never just ‗read off‘ the interests of 
their state or the meaning of international affairs from their geographical location or objective 
structures delimiting their state in the interstate system as classical geopolitics implies. 
Rather, foreign policy decision makers and elites construct the meaning of international 
affairs and their state‟s interests within the geopolitical culture of their state.‖158 
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Geopolitical culture is also about the legitimating myths of a state and how state elites 
conceptualize their geographical situatedness, historico-cultural inheritance, and geopolitical 
circumstances within the world.159 It helps define friends and foes and how the national 
interest is evoked in a world of state actors. Though ostensibly an expression of uniqueness, 
geopolitical cultures are produced by borrowing, adapting, and reworking available discursive 
formations in the international arena whether mythical, historical, religious or scientific.160 It is 
therefore safe to argue that decision-makers see what is appropriate with reference to 
storylines embedded in the geopolitical culture they come from. Summarizing this point, 
O‘Loughlin et. al.acknowledge that;  
 
―geopolitical culture is formed not only by the institutions of a state, its historical 
experiences and geographical embeddedness, but also by networks of power within 
society, debates over national identity, prevailing geopolitical (geographical) 
imaginations, codified geopolitical traditions and the institutional processes by which 
foreign policy is made in the state.‖161 
 
As defined by O‘Loughlin, Toal and Kolossov, geopolitical traditionsare the range of 
relatively formalized and competing schools of geopolitical thought that comprise the ‗high 
culture‘ of a state‘s geopolitical culture. Each tradition is a separate strand of thought on state 
identity, national interest and normative foreign policy priorities. 162  They compete in 
interpreting a state‘s position in world affairs. In debating each other, these foreign policy 
philosophies and geopolitical orientations are the building blocks from which intellectuals of 
statecraft produce particular geopolitical discourses and storylines. 163  Each tradition can 
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produce its own narratives and geographical imaginations in stipulating a preferred course of 
action with regards to interstate affairs in line with how they perceive their state‘s position in 
the world. Existing geographical representations can be taken as starting points and new 
discourses can be built on these representations. Quite often these two do not entirely 
contradict. As argued by Mamadouh, past geopolitical reasoning lines are resources for 
actors. However, they can be assets or liabilities, depending on whether they open or close 
options for identification with others and consequently for acting capabilities.164 
 
Within critical geopolitics, there is a tendency to use the term ―geopolitical traditions‖ to 
describe histories of formal geopolitical thought. This however disregards geopolitics that 
does not explicitly call itself geopolitics.165 Beneath most societies there is a culture of hidden 
geopolitics that codifies ways of construing, representing and practicing discursive spatial 
formations. In this sense, all major states have well established geopolitical traditions that go 
back to the very process of state formation and development.166 It is therefore possible to 
identify geopolitical traditions disguised as expressions of geopolitical thought in poetry, 
philosophy or other artistic and literary fields.  
 
As emphasized by Toal, taking geopolitical culture as the object of analysis enables avoiding 
two common misinterpretations of geopolitics: that it is based upon and responds to ―the 
permanent realities of geography‖ or that it is an idiosyncratic product of an individual 
politician or academic. 167  It would be misleading to reduce geopolitics to individualized 
visions with an overly personalized emphasis. To the contrary, geopolitics is always a 
culturally embedded practice operating across networks of power and needs to be 
approached as a field of competing geopolitical constructions vying to describe the 
conditions within which states operate and what normative strategy best realizes state and 
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national interests.168 Toal also underscores that studying geopolitics as culture, therefore, ―is 
a much sounder ontological position for it reifies neither the ‗economic‘ nor the ‗political‘ but 
postulates a dialectical (interconnected) relationship between the two within the historical 
context of particular signifying practices.‖169 Foreign policy elites are located within a larger 
geopolitical culture and set of imaginative geographies (geopolitical and geographical 
imaginations) that create possibilities and constraints upon individual geopolitical 
entrepreneurship. 170  As such, geopolitical and geographical imaginations, geopolitical 
traditions and geopolitical culture are densely interwoven in an attempt to formulate best 
strategies in the face of a domestic and international audience.   
 
b) Geopolitical Imaginations  
 
Modern geopolitical imagination, asto distinguish fromgeographical imagination,is 
historically and geographically constructed discourses, which Agnew posits that ―provide 
meaning, and rationalization to practice by political elites.‖171 As such, it relates to geopolitical 
meta-schemes that divide the world into large swaths of territory according to some a political 
formula. In other words, it is a way of seeing, labelling and identifying the totality of the world.  
 
One of the earliest systematic critiques of classical geopolitics is provided by John Agnew in 
―Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics‖.172 In his work, which is one of first of its kind, 
Agnew identifies three types of geopolitics that are reflective of modern geopolitical 
imaginations. These are civilizational, naturalized and ideological geopolitics.  
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During the early epoch (1815-1875) in European history, geopolitics was employed without 
making an overt reference to the academic discipline. This was named the civilizational 
geopolitics of the early era, characterized in the words of Agnew ―by a commitment to 
European uniqueness as a civilization.‖173 It emerged as a reaction to the chaos of the wars 
of religion through which Arab and Ottoman threats created loyalty to Respublica 
Christiana.174 The geographical realm of Europe was thus transformed into a cultural area. 
The world was rather simplistically divided into two, Europe and the Rest, in terms of cultural 
peculiarities. This gave rise to a feeling of European superiority as the most civilized and best 
governed of all the world regions, the former being the homeland of civilization while the 
latter of a colonial, peripheral, inferior and frontier character. As argued by Agnew, ―outside 
this realm was an immense space of primitive and decadent political forms‖175 that very well 
deserved European domination, hegemony and subjugation.  Therefore, on very categorical 
and simplistic terms, the world was divided into civilized and not-so-civilized cultural spaces. 
Geopolitics, in this account, as an understanding of civilization and culture was the 
preordained determinant of state behaviour.176 
 
Civilizational geopolitics is resurrected in the post-Cold War era with Huntington‘s clash of 
civilizations article which later is published as a book.177 In the midst of an atmosphere of 
utmost uncertainty towards the future of world politics, he came up with an observation that 
the days of global ideological rivalry are gone. Upon this he based his thesis that 
contemporary conflicts will be among civilizations.178 It was his belief that peoples‘ identities 
have changed dramatically and so did world politics, hence the shape of international political 
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space through a dominantly cultural reasoning. His way of constructing ―us‖ versus ―them‖ 
dichotomies is reconfigured along cultural lines.179 
 
The novelty about Huntington‘s civilizational geopolitics is that it is not explicitly based on 
West vs. the Rest type of duality as imbued with the earlier European civilizational discourse 
despite the fact that most of the discussion about his controversial division of world space 
took exactly this shape. Instead he proposes a multiplicity of civilizations through which he 
offers a rather simplistic world view composed of seven or eight civilizations.180 Thus ethnic, 
religious and regional differences are summarized under the broadest cultural entities which 
are called civilizations. Very broadly in Huntingtonian analysis the most prominent 
civilizations are Western, Muslim, Orthodox (Christian), Latin American, Japanese, Hindu, 
Chinese and African. He even developed a map to spatialize the cognitive cultural borders 
among major civilizations.  
 
Huntington propagates that state behaviour is conditioned upon pursuit of power and wealth 
in which cultural preferences, commonalities and differences play the most crucial role. 
Through an over simplistic orientalist discourse, as Said coined the term, he sees the root 
cause of underdevelopment, authoritarianism and lack of participatory democracy in the 
underlying characteristics of each culture/civilization,181 which are, according to Huntington, 
at the same time sources of enduring conflict in world politics. Religious differences play a 
key role in visualizing world politics in such an antagonistic manner. The main causes of 
civilizational conflict in the post-Cold War era then, argues Huntington, are western 
universalism, Muslim fundamentalism and the rise of Asian powers. Despite identifying more 
than one culture and civilization in visualizing the world map, he nonetheless implicitly goes 
along with traditional binaries in further asserting that future global conflicts will be between 
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the West and the Rest (especially Chinese-Muslim alliance) and local clashes between 
Muslims and the others.182 
 
The naturalized geopolitics that developed in the period from 1875 to 1945 is about the 
origins of the academic field of geopolitics. In this epoch the dominant Euro-centric modern 
geopolitical imagination is normalized and naturalized. Nature and the physical environment 
of states is thought to constrain and direct state formation, nation building and foreign policy. 
Western (European) superiority, states as living organisms mentality, social Darwinism on a 
map, i.e. conceptions of the survival of the fittest and lebensraum, as elaborated earlier, were 
the key themes in naturalized geopolitics.    
 
The third phase that lasted from 1945 until 1989 was called ideological geopolitics. It was 
with resort to two competing dominant ideologies, communism vs. capitalism that the shape 
of world politics and global space was determined. Therefore the world was once again 
spatialized in the form of antagonistic dualities along ideological lines, mostly the capitalist 
West vs socialist East, with a flavour of non-aligned third world.  
 
As Toal notes, there are four characteristics of modern geopolitical imagination which all 
concern its Euro-centrism and ethno-centrism.183 These are ―the seeing of the world as a 
unified whole that powerful actors must survey and subdue, the operation of a putative ―view 
from nowhere‘ that normalizes a parochial western gaze as the universal one, the turning of 
spatial differences into temporal differences (representing other regions as a phase of 
Europe‘s past, for example) and the operation of a state-centric form of reasoning that traps 
world politics in a territorial-states-in-conflict grid of intelligibility‖.184 
                                                          
182Ibid. p.255. 
183  TOAL, G. (2004). Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the Critical Study of 
Geopolitics in TCHANTOURIDZE, L.  Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns. Winnipeg, Centre for 
Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, p.82. 
184Ibid. 
73 
 
 
 
 
 
c) Geographical Imaginations  
 
Geopolitical culture encompasses ―geographical imaginations‖, which in light of the 
discussion so far can be defined in rather simplistic terms as ―boundary drawing practices 
between inside/outside, us/them, national self/foreign other‖ 185 , resulting in moral and 
physical boundaries that divide the world into ―our‖ space and ―their‖ space.186  In other 
words, ―prevalent images, conceptualizations and discourses amongst the general 
population of where that state is positioned and located within the world‘s community of 
states‖187 refers to geographical imagination. Put differently, a mix of popular geopolitics and 
the geopolitical orientations of a state‘s population is what geographical imaginations are.188 
 
Some of the pertinent questions regarding these imaginations are; ―which civilization or 
cluster of nations is a state believed to belong to? Where in the world is the geopolitical 
identity of a state located vis-à-vis other states and identities? As such, who are its enemies 
and potential allies? What means are envisaged to keep and foster existing and potential 
allies?‖ In answering these questions, influential groups in the cultural life of a state define 
that state and nation within the world.189 As such, geographical imagination serves a vital 
building block of geopolitical culture.  
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The origin of geographical imagination (or imagined geographies as he uses the term) is 
usually traced back to Edward Said‘s famous piece Orientalism (1978). Said, as arguably the 
first critical geopolitical scholar, had had the strongest imprint on the evolution of critical 
discipline. As Dodds puts it, ―if there is a single text that has influenced the existing critical 
geopolitics literature more than any other, it is probably Said'sOrientalism”. 190  His work 
provided a framework by emphasizing the importance of the representational practices used 
by political elites to describe foreign affairs.191  In defining what critical geopolitics aims at 
Toal reflects Said‘s line of argumentation in the following.  
 
"The focus of critical geopolitics is [therefore] on exposing the plays of power involved 
in grand geopolitical schemes ... Fundamental to this process is the power of certain 
national security elites to represent the nature and defining dilemmas of international 
politics in particular ways ... These representational practices of national security 
intellectuals generate particular 'scripts' in international politics concerning places, 
peoples and issues. Such 'scripts' then become part of the means by which 
hegemony is exercised in the international system."192 
 
In this context, Said is believed to be the first to challenge and deconstruct fundamental 
systems of power and knowledge in the field of geopolitics. He creatively invested in earlier 
studies on myth, power, knowledge, and discourse by the likes of Levi-Straus, Barthes, 
Derrida, and Foucault in his critique of Orientalist studies. Said revealed the ways in which 
the Occident (the West) exploited, subordinated and constructed the Orient (the East) 
through the former‘s mechanisms of ―knowledge‖ and ―understanding‖. His purpose was to 
depict the spatial cultural bias in the ―Western‖ world of itself and the ―East‖ through which 
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geopolitical ―knowledge‖ was used as a means for exercising discursive power. Such power 
lies in ―the ability of Western countries to create particular understandings of the rest of the 
world, or classify weaker countries and their inhabitants.‖ 193  This knowledge is usually 
unquestioned because it is reflected as uncontestably objective. ―The authority of the 
knowledge given that it is largely unquestioned or countered by alternative images, allows 
for, or demands, particular foreign policy stances toward particular countries.‖194 As argued 
by Flint, this is a two-way process. While portraying non-Westerners as ―backward‖ and 
―uncivilized,‖ etc., Western countries and their geopolitical practices were painted, for self-
consumption, as the exact opposite: ―modern,‖ ―the bearers of civilization,‖ etc., and hence 
the ―natural‖ rulers of the globe.195 This self-portrayal was used to justify acts of oppression 
and hegemonic rule against non-Westerners.  
 
Said thus tried to expose why geopolitical knowledge in the West did not necessarily reflect 
ground ―truth‖ but it was produced in a political and cultural environment. All claims to 
geopolitical knowledge, for Said, then ―were historically contingent, situational and 
incomplete.‖196 This is the way in which one sees and understands the world and his/her 
place in it, as is called ―imaginative geographies‖ or more popularly ―geographical 
imagination‖. In Said‘s words, imaginative geography is;  
 
―the universal practice of designating in one‟s mind a familiar space which is „„ours‟‟ 
and an unfamiliar space beyond „‟ours‟‟ which is „„theirs‟‟‟… this practice „help[s] the 
mind to intensify its own sense of itself by dramatizing the distance and difference 
between what is close to it and what is far away‟197 
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In this context, portraying the East as backward, uncivilized, primitive, barbaric, child-like and 
permanently disadvantaged vis-à-vis the West is at best dubious in terms of scientific 
objectivity. It is however a well-established geopolitical claim helping in the formation of 
European identity to differentiate it from the new worlds, and informs the set of policy choices 
any political leader finds before him/her in conducting foreign policy.  Even today certain 
places such as the Middle East and Afghanistan are treated as permanent sources of danger 
and threat and, thus clearly ―the other‖ as opposed to the ―Western self‖ in modern 
geopolitical discourse.  
 
Imaginative geography then is a means of geopolitical identity construction which equates 
spatial distance with cultural, ethnic and social difference, associating the non-spatial 
characteristics of ‗self‘ and ‗other‘ with particular places.198 
 
Contrary to classical geopolitics by which wise men of statecraft design grand strategies of 
power, critical geopolitics deals with spatial practices of statecraft both material and 
representational. Since geopolitics today is about world politics with a particular emphasis on 
state competition and geographical dimensions of power, to study geopolitics one must study 
discourse (on especially spatial representations) 199  Geopolitics in this sense is 
reconceptualised as a discourse that contributes to the cultural construction of the global 
geopolitical map. Thus, geopolitics analyses geopolitical culture, geographical imaginations, 
geopolitical visions and the resultant geopolitical discourses. Constructing a national 
community within demarcated boundaries involves construction of national identity, drawing 
boundaries between inside and outside and thus creating ―self‖ and ―other‖, producing 
national history, and projection of a visual order of space such as national maps. Critical 
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geopolitics analyses all these factors.  Table 1 below summarizes the theoretical discussion 
provided so far.  
 
 
Table 1. Concepts in Critical Geopolitics200 
 
d) Geopolitical Visions 
 
Geopolitical/geographical imagination is a reflection of the geopolitical vision201 of a country‘s 
leaders (and its people), borrowing the latter term from D. Newman and S. Peters. In this 
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sense, geographical vision embodies representations of a country‘s territorial limits, its 
geopolitical codes and national mission.202 In other words, geopolitical vision determines to a 
large extent what kind of geographical imagination a country will have. ―Any idea concerning 
the relation between one‘s own country and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or 
(dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a mission or foreign policy advantage‖ refers to 
geopolitical visions.203 In his analysis, Dijkink identifies five elements that are expected of a 
geopolitical vision.  
 
 Some justification of the naturalness of the territorial borders or a core area 
reinforcing national unity, 
 A geopolitical code (a list of friendly and hostile nations), 
 A model to follow or to reject (a state to emulate),  
 A national mission (such as imperialism),  
 And assumptions about impersonal forces (such as modernization or free 
enterprise).204 
 
Dijkink‘s concept of geopolitical vision, aside from the notion of geopolitical code, overlaps 
with the theoretical discussion on geopolitical culture. Therefore, this research takes the 
understanding offered by Toal with reference to the work of Gerry Kearns which posits 
geopolitical visions as perceptions of the world. Geopolitical visions refer to discursive 
accounts of the reorganization of world space and the emergence of a new world political 
map by the intellectuals of statecraft.205 Geopolitical visions are ―wish posing as analysis‖, i.e. 
normative pictures of the world.206 This is how powerful states construct the world political 
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map in ways that conform with their imaginings of it even as their practices contradict the 
moral order they espouse.207 In other words, these are normative claims about the prevalent 
geopolitical order or how it should be.   
 
e) Geopolitical Codes  
 
Ideas bear the capacity to shape foreign policy provided that they are coherently structured. 
Geopolitical codes are as such defined as a set of strategic assumptions by Gaddis that 
underlie foreign policy making.208 Geopolitical codes comprise of ―a definition of a state‘s 
interests, an identification of external threats to those interests, a planned response to such 
threats and a justification of that response‖.209 In other words, it is how a country orients itself 
towards the world.210 Geopolitical codes are comprised of five calculations.211 
 
 Identifying current and potential allies 
 Identifying current and potential enemies 
 Defining the means of maintaining current allies and fostering new ones 
 Defining the means of facing existing and emerging enemies 
 Representing the practices in the points above to domestic and global audiences.212 
 
Geopolitical codes provide important clues for the geopolitical component of belief systems. 
They are therefore important analytical tools for understanding foreign policy behaviour.213 As 
put by Taylor and Flint, a number of calculations are considered while formulating a country‘s 
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geopolitical codes. These are identifying current and potential allies and enemies, and 
determining how the country can maintain its alliances and nurture potential allies, identifying 
how it can counter current enemies and emerging threats, and, finally, determining how it can 
justify the above-mentioned calculations to the public, and to the global community.214 
 
Geopolitical codes reflect perceptions of identity including a country‘s natural friends and 
enemies, about the essence of external threat perceptions, major international problems and 
how to deal with them.215 Geopolitical codes evaluate places and are the spatial expressions 
of geopolitical efforts to transform ―a global space into fixed perspectival scenes‖.216  In a 
way, geopolitical codes are the instruments by which decision-makers give meaning to their 
location in the world, determine their friends and foes, decide what set of relationships to 
have with others and how to justify (to domestic and international audience) the preferred 
course of action towards other countries.   
 
These codes are not necessarily permanent but subject to change. They can change 
radically over a rather limited period of time. Radical changes in geopolitical codes are 
sometimes attestable to perceived foreign policy failure. But more often than not, change in 
geopolitical codes is due to an alteration in elite perceptions. Geopolitical codes can also be 
left or replaced by new ones in foreign policy discourse without an apparent structural 
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explanation.217 The reason behind change, as it appears, is not only the external milieu 
(environment) but also what policy makers imagine the external milieu to be.218 
 
The roles of identity, associated belief systems and national myths are important in 
determining a country‘s geopolitical codes. The visualization of one‘s own country and its 
position in relation to others is formed with reference to certain national myths, which form 
the basis for geopolitical codes.219 The fact that enemies are portrayed as barbaric or evil is 
tailored for the immediate situation, but it is based upon stories deposited in national myths 
that are easily accessible to the general public.220 This is important for mobilizing public 
support for foreign policy choices since ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy 
strategy are emphasized. Geopolitical codes require ―them vs. us‖ kind of dichotomy and 
emotional attachment to a place.221 In this way, ideological reference to national values, as 
well as to strategic concerns about resources and economics, become important in the 
formation of geopolitical visions.222 
 
To indicate the difference between the two, as put forward by Flint, a geopolitical code is 
more dynamic - it changes with changing circumstances –and is the product of state elites. It 
is an outcome of daily foreign policy calculations. A geopoliticalvision on the other hand is the 
understanding of a state‘s national history, character, or even destiny that is more stable and 
                                                          
217 HULIARAS, A., & TSARDANIDIS, C. (2006). (Mis)understanding the Balkans: Greek Geopolitical Codes of the 
Post-communist Era. Geopolitics. 11, p.466.  
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Conflict Resolution. 1, p. 328.  
219 TAYLOR, P. J., & FLINT, C. (2000).p.127. 
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is rooted in popular sentiment. The vision is the foundation that is mobilized to 'make sense' 
of the code.223 
 
Table 2. Geopolitics as Culture: Key Concepts224 
 
Domestic Distribution of Power, Geopolitical Culture and Imaginations  
 
As elaborated so far, in contrast to traditional geopolitics, critical geopolitics is not only about 
the impact perceptions of physical geography bears on foreign policy but on the analysis and 
deconstruction of geographical imaginations and arguments used to justify foreign policy 
positions. These discourses are constructed by intellectuals and practitioners of statecraft 
and thus reflect their gaze towards the world. Therefore, critical inquiry has to acknowledge 
                                                          
223  FLINT, C. (2012). Interview for exploringgeopolitics website, available at 
(http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Flint_Colin_Structure_Agency_Identity_Peace_Networks_Geopolitical_Co
des_Visions_Agents_Actors_Representations_Practices_Spaces_Powers_Environmental_Geopolitics.html. (consulted 
on September 30, 2012).   
224 This table is extracted from TOAL, G. (2004). Geopolitical Structures and Cultures: Towards Conceptual Clarity in the 
Critical Study of Geopolitics in TCHANTOURIDZE, L. Geopolitics: Global Problems and Regional Concerns. Winnipeg, 
Centre for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, p. 98. 
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the workings of power networks in shaping the prevailing forms of geopolitical discourse in a 
state.225 
 
As argued by Toal, the geopolitical culture of a state is, among other factors, conditioned 
upon the particular institutional organization and design of foreign policy bureaucracies.226 
Conflicts between and within the ministries of foreign affairs and defence sometimes produce 
a geopolitical culture that is powered by division and contradictory impulses and drives.227 A 
crucial feature having a decisive impact on a state‘s geopolitical culture pertains to the way 
domestic power is distributed, i.e. how the foreign policy process works and who gets to 
make decisions.228 As argued by Toal, geopolitical discourses (and geopolitical culture) and 
social structures of power within states are closely interrelated.229 Therefore, fully grasping 
the operation of power not only necessitates an analysis of power struggles between states, 
as stipulated in the realist school, but also examination of the domestic sources of social 
power.  
 
Following the sociological model developed by Michael Mann, societies are constituted of 
multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power. 230  These are 
overlapping networks of social interaction and organizations as well as institutional means of 
attaining certain goals.231 Mann identifies four bases of social power; political (party leaders 
and politicians,etc.), ideological (political parties, mass media, think tanks, religious 
institutions etc.), economic (business) and military (security and defence structures).232 
 
                                                          
225 TOAL, G., DALBY, S., & ROUTLEDGE, P. (2006).p.10. 
226Ibid. p.7 
227TOAL, G. (2004). p.87. 
228Ibid. 
229 TOAL, G., DALBY, S., & ROUTLEDGE, P. (2006).p.9. 
230MANN, M. (1986). The Sources of Social power. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire], Cambridge University Press. p.1. 
231Ibid. p.2 
232MANN, M. (1996). The Sources of Social Power. Vol. 2, The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914. 
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a) Political power is the centralized territorial regulation of social life by a state 
bureaucratic complex. As part of the complex, security forces exercise coercive 
power in enforcing the law. Those in control enjoy considerable power not only in 
areas like taxation and rules of capital accumulation but also in determining 
whose/which geopolitical representations are reflected in practice.  
b) Ideological power is the power to shape, formulate and mobilize the values, norms 
and rituals that characterize human life. It derives from the need to impose 
meaning on the world. It is the power to steer culture in certain directions, to 
shape what values are predominant, what norms are to be considered legitimate 
and what rituals are to characterize the life of the community. When an individual 
or group monopolizes meaning in a community, it is a source of substantial 
discursive power. Besides, ideologies provide common norms that are necessary 
for collective cooperation. Ideologies thus increase the collective power of certain 
social groups over others. Ideological power is predominantly diffused, 
commanding through persuasion. Transcendentally an ideology may diffuse 
through the boundaries of economic, military and political power organizations.   
c) Economic power is the power vested within the circuits of production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption in society. This is conceptualized in the Marxist sense 
in propagating that classes emerge out of the relations among different social 
groups in relation to the means of production, i.e. class-based analysis. The 
argument is that the dominant economic class controlling the means of production 
wields considerable amount of power. This is not however giving primacy to 
economics over other sources of power.  
d) Military power is the power that comes from the organization of security and 
defence in a state. It resides with the military elite who run various state 
bureaucracies that are charged with national security. In some instances, military 
elites can take over the state apparatus or become future state leaders because 
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the role of military is considered so vital to the existence of a state and due to their 
perceived leadership qualities.233 
 
These sources of social power produce different institutions in society. In this context, 
ideologies may create churches, mosques, and solidarity organizations; different economic 
classes can create their respective associations and have links to different media outlets; the 
need for physical defence brings about military structures and so forth.234 These organized 
groups in a society may stand united in the face of a perceived external threat. But other than 
that, they do represent different agendas and interests which are articulated on behalf of 
different segments they represent. Thus, as put by Mann, the struggle to control ideological, 
economic, military and political power organizations provides the central drama of social 
development.235 Societies are then structured primarily by entwined networks of ideological, 
economic, military and political power.236 
 
To pursue their own interest and agendas, all domestic actors involved in social sources of 
power try to build geopolitical networks amongst like-minded players in order to capture the 
state apparatus because the rewards are so great.237 In so doing, these social sources of 
power interact with each other and form entwined structural networks of power.238 Hence, the 
interplay among power networks determines to a large extent which geopolitical tradition 
bears the strongest imprint in determining what type of imagination captures a state‘s foreign 
policy agenda.  
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In this context, geopolitics per se is not a contest of ideas produced by free floating 
intellectuals in which truthful and intellectually superior arguments triumph over mendacious, 
flawed and weak ones.239  To the contrary, geopolitical discourses are merely a by-product of 
networks of power and reflect the influence of prevalent power structures,240 as remarked by 
Toal. In the end, it is the geopolitical scripts of the dominant power networks that are 
performed by a country‘s elite. The purpose of the practical strand of critical geopolitics is to 
render the relations of power embedded in geopolitical discourses visible and manifest.241 
After all, the exercise of power is always deeply entwined with the production of knowledge 
and discourse.242 It is following the path of Foucault in trying to document how structures of 
power in society create structures of (geopolitical) knowledge that justify their own power and 
authority over subject populations.243 This is a crucial premise in this research.   
 
IV. GEOPOLITICS AS A COMBINED FRAMEWORK TO INFORM FOREIGN POLICY 
 
In light of the theoretical discussion so far, employing geopolitics as a framework of analysis 
reflects a combination of the following in foreign policy choices.  
 
A compelling geopolitical narrative, reflective of a geographical imagination: In making 
sense of one‘s geography, it is imperative to develop a distinct geographical imagination by 
highlighting the boundaries between ―in‖ and ―out‖, identifying threats and dangers as well as 
a list of enemies and allies, and the ways to handle threats while forging and consolidating 
alliances without disregarding national role conceptions. Geopolitical knowledge grounded 
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upon space-based analysis will then allow for a compelling case for policy action. In this 
manner, the most striking aspect of geopolitical knowledge is its function as a source of 
policy initiation, consolidation and legitimization. 
 
Wide domestic consensus among sources of social power on geopolitical knowledge 
as a guide to inform foreign policy: Geopolitical analysis as a means of informing foreign 
policy can come in handy to a variety of actors. Political parties, armies, business 
associations, media, think thanks, influential academic circles and universities can all be 
sources of geopolitical knowledge. The crucial question remains how to translate one‘s 
geopolitical agenda into policy practice. In advanced democracies, convincing a state‘s 
foreign policy bureaucracy (state department, ministry of defence and/or the army) or at least 
a significant portion of it is a must. In this respect, having holders of political power on one‘s 
side is an indispensable requirement. As discussed earlier, legitimization is an aspect one 
cannot simply put aside in geopolitics. In this regard, political parties, mass media, think 
tanks, religious institutions etc. all play an important role. Having a considerable fragment of 
the business community behind a geopolitical project is also a valuable asset but not an 
absolute necessity. 
 
Presence of charismatic leaders: Basing foreign policy action on geopolitics involves a lot 
of convincing, influencing and opinion management. It is useful to have leaders with 
developed oratory skills to sway people‘s minds towards a certain direction both at home and 
in the forward theatres of policy action. This is all the more important if a country with relative 
disadvantage in the international system is trying to challenge established behavioural 
patterns. In this case, not only the public and opinion leaders at home need to be persuaded 
but also publics and the elite at large in the dominant systemic actors. It must also be 
remembered that projecting an attractive self-image through public diplomacy is of 
paramount importance in terms of winning the hearts and minds of those towards whom a 
country‘s policies are aimed at.    
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A favourable geopolitical environment: Institutions such as think thanks, universities, 
media outlets, religious institutions, etc. operating locally, regionally and internationally help 
invaluably in justifying and legitimizing proposed policy choices by a state through their 
writings, declarations and discourses. This is because geopolitical knowledge as a means of 
foreign policy is not only declaratory but also performative and constitutive. It is only through 
iteration and reiteration that old/new meanings are attributed to space. Based on such 
attributions, established/suggested roles are ascribed to a state. Through these constituted 
and re-constituted meanings, behavioural patterns are expected of a country which are made 
legitimate and justified by institutions that operate in the ideological sphere.   
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CHAPTER 2 - TURKEY’S GEOPOLITICAL CULTURE  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Ideas, as in many other disciplines of life, are extremely important in shaping foreign affairs. 
They are particularly useful in understanding policies and policy change. After all, a policy in 
foreign affairs can be construed as embodiment of ideas about states, countries, the 
international system and the structured relationships among them. As noted by Goldstein 
and Keohane, ―ideas influence foreign policy when the principled or causal beliefs they 
embody provide roadmaps that increase actors‘ clarity about goals or ends-means 
relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique 
equilibrium‖.244  Hence, an understanding of the belief systems or ‗assumptive worlds‘ of 
political actors can contribute to an explanation of external action and behaviour.245  Based 
on the images of one‘s own self and its territoriality as well as of the images of other actor‘s 
spaces; prescriptions about proper courses of action are appropriated.246 
 
The case of modern Turkey is no exception. A most striking aspect of the foreign policy 
choices Turkey makes, which is rather insufficiently studied in the literature, is the 
overwhelming influence of ―geography/space‖ based reasoning. As in many other states, 
identity formation in the early Republican era was the outcome of a space-based series of 
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exclusions that virtually demarcated the boundaries between ―in/out‖, ―internal/external‖, 
―self/other‖, ―us/them‖, ―our space/theirs‖, etc. Thus the initial orientation of Turkish foreign 
policy was inextricably premised upon the geopolitical reasoning and spatial representations 
developed upon the discourses by the founder of the state, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Such a 
choice was due to a distinct geopolitical mentality which culminated in a deliberate westernist 
foreign policy orientation. But conceptions about Turkey‘s territoriality were not singlehanded. 
In different contexts, spatial reasoning kept influencing Ankara‘s external policies in different 
ways.  
 
II. TURKISH GEOPOLITICAL CULTURE  
 
The newly emerging literature on the practice of geopolitics in Turkey claims that as a 
separate discipline informing foreign and security policy, it has come into circulation during 
the Second World War through a series of articles published in newspapers.247 Pointing out 
that geopolitics in the classical sense is borrowed from the writings of German geopoliticians 
like Haushofer, such studies tend to emphasize the role of the Turkish military by virtue of its 
command over the discipline.  
 
However, before anyone used the term geopolitics or there was a separate academic 
discipline called geopolitics, there was a way of thinking geopolitically both in the West248 and 
in Turkey. In fact, European ―civilizational geopolitics‖ per se neither arrived late nor left 
                                                          
247EREN, A. C. (1964). Jeopolitik Tarihine Toplu Bir Bakış (An Overview of the History of Geopolitics). Istanbul: 
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YEŞİLTAŞ, M. (2012). Coğrafya Kaçınılmazdır:Jeopolitik Zihniyet ve Türkiye’de Ordu (Geography is Unavoidable: 
Geopolitical Mindset and the Army in Turkey). Paper presented at the workshop titled “Where Turkey is Located?: 
Geography, Geopolitics and Competing Storylines”. May 11. Marmara University. İstanbul/Turkey.  
248 AGNEW, J. A. (1998). p.3. 
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hastily the lands of Turks. It was during the Ottomans‘ longest century of decay,249 the 19th 
century, that the Young Turks movement strongly embraced the European way of seeing the 
world through cultural and civilizational binaries. As the new Turkish Republic was 
established under the leadership of a former Young Turk, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the impact 
of civilizational geopolitics as a means of state and nation building as well as identity and 
foreign policy formulation was profound as ever. Atatürk no doubt was steeped deep in the 
western culture but he was not the only one. In fact, both Turkey‘s forefathers and their 
intellectual opponents perceived the world through the prism of European ―civilizational 
geopolitics‖. The modern geopolitical imagination that broadly divided world space along 
civilizational lines, i.e. the East vs. West, created a bipolar image of global space in Turkish 
geopolitical culture.  
 
Against this bipolar image of the world, locating Turkey geopolitically has never been easy. In 
this vein, the never ending quest to find answers to questions of ―where in the world Turkey 
belongs to?‖, ―what identity should the new state have?‖ and ―what do Turkey‘s geopolitical 
location and its geographical surroundings stand for?‖ dominated the intellectual agenda of 
the Turkish elite. Without explicitly naming the practice they engaged in geopolitics, the 
Turkish intelligentsia by disseminating ideas on the whereabouts of Turkey‘s place in the 
international theatre of states laid the foundations of thinking geopolitically in Turkey.  
 
There was a perceivably irreconcilable distance between two distinct geopolitical spaces, the 
West and the East, symbolizing the developed, civilized and superior, and the less 
developed worlds respectively. Between these two cultural/civilizational meta-spaces, the 
Turkish elite sought Turkey‘s place, identity, soul, character, orientation and future in world 
politics. As a result, two different notions, i.e. geographical imaginations, of Turkey competed 
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for dominance. In the very same way Dalby and Toal point out, the Turkish case was no 
exception in which "multiple narratives rendered a particular place or (that) state in a number 
of ways simultaneously‖.250 
 
The study of geopolitics in the Turkish case therefore necessitates not only a study of those 
writings and readings that make an overt reference to the academic field but also a study of 
those, which perhaps rather unwittingly, engage in geopolitical reasoning, representation, 
scripting and entrepreneurship. This is because the usually unnoticed impact of ―hidden 
geopolitics‖ has been as deep as its overt akin in Turkey. Moreover, focusing on the physical 
qualities of space in the Turkish case without considering the broader culture of geopolitics 
would at best be tentative and inadequate. Analysing such impact therefore involves placing 
geopolitical thinking, representations and practices in time, place and within a geopolitical 
tradition because context usually defines content in foreign policy. It is only through the study 
of the different historical means by which Turkish intellectuals (and not only practitioners) 
made sense of the global political space as well as Turkey‘s territoriality that one can 
understand how international politics was spatialized in Turkey as ―a world characterized by 
particular types of places, peoples and dramas‖251 upon which foreign policy strategies were 
drawn up.   
 
It is worth mentioning at the outset that Turkey‘s geopolitical culture has been largely shaped 
by the experience of replacing the Ottoman Empire. Losing an empire of nearly 600 years 
with territorial outreach in three continents was so traumatic an event that Turkish people 
suffered an identity crisis (a crisis arguably still relevant today) as well as ensuing feelings of 
insecurity. The latter stemmed from facing near extinction after the First World War. As part 
of this ―post-imperial trauma‖, Turks found it rather hard to adjust to the loss of large swaths 
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of territory as well as to the prestige and leverage once enjoyed in the wider Muslim world. 
The impact of such a profound transition inevitably necessitated a recalibration of foreign 
policy in accordance with the new geopolitical conditions.  
 
The critical question was whether Turkey would identify itself with the Ottoman heritage 
including a special connection with ex-Ottoman territories and its geopolitical legacy (leader 
and protector of the Muslim world, etc.) or would Turkey be organized as a nation-state 
associating its future solely in the West? As a result, two distinct geopolitical traditions 
produced different geographical imaginations and discourses with regards to the 
whereabouts of Turkey‘s global location, meaning of the geographies around Turkey and 
how its external relations, especially with the new states established in its ex-territories, 
should be operationalized.  
 
Thus, subsequent years witnessed relentless efforts by two competing schools of thought, 
Kemalism and Conservatism, to ascribe Turkey a new position and a new identity in world 
affairs.252Bernard Lewis, a keen observer and analyst of Turkey, calls this ―an eternal conflict 
between pro-Western modernists (Kemalists) and anti-Western traditionalists 
(Conservatives)253 although the real picture is always somewhat more blurry. For once the 
latter seems to have lately embraced some elements such as democracy (if not necessarily 
pluralism), rule of law (with its limitations), a more liberal approach on human rights, free 
market, free enterprise, etc. associated with modernity. Likewise, there is no straitjacket 
notion of Kemalism that fits and explains all its variants. Therefore, this is by no means to 
deny the possibility of dividing each tradition into subgroups to have a more nuanced 
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understanding.254 Nevertheless the merit of such a rather simplistic categorization is that it 
helps address the dominant geopolitical understandings, reasonings, trends, modes of 
representation and practice propagated in each strand.  
 
As Hansen contemplates, spatial construction of identity is all about delineation of space and 
construction of boundaries.255The politics of identity employed in Turkey were territorial and 
spatialwithin the process of nation and state building.  In this line, debates around identity 
formation focused on signifying boundaries (whether geographical or epistemological, 
physical or mental) for the sake of maintaining the relevance of geopolitical identities 
(western vs. eastern) 256  these two traditions constituted. Hence, discourses signifying 
―others‖, ―enemies‖ and ―threats‖ around two competing spaces, the East vs. West, were 
continuously produced and reproduced. As will be elaborated further, these were temporal as 
much as geographical and cultural/civilizational spaces represented by common themes of 
development, progress, modernity, transformation and backwardness. In a way there was a 
perceivably unspoken time difference between the East and the West, pretty much reflecting 
the linear conception of history.257 Constituting an essential component in the construction of 
these spaces; discourses of danger were mobilized against competing identities. 
Consequently, distinct sets of policy prescriptions were called for.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is better to identify how these two terms, 
Kemalism/republicanism and Conservatism, will be used throughout this dissertation. By 
Kemalism/Kemalists, actors and institutions such as the Turkish military, CHP (Cumhuriyet 
                                                          
254 It is always possible to add Turkist (nationalist), Islamist (religious) and Ottomanist (conservative-religious) categories 
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Halk Partisi – Republican People‘s Party), defunct DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti – Democratic 
Left Party) and SHP (Sosyal Democrat Halkçı Parti – Social Democratic People‘s Party), 
foreign policy bureaucracy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and judiciary will be referred to. This 
group also includes academics, columnists and other intellectuals subscribing to a Kemalist 
worldview. What binds such a variety of actors is a strict adherence to ―European 
civilizational geopolitics‖ and the subsequent Westernist geographical imagination, which 
aspires to radically transform Turkey after the example of western modernization. At the 
same time, Kemalism propagates a vocal discourse scripting geopolitical identity of post-
Ottoman Turkey in the west (Europe). Hence, Kemalists perceive western modernization of 
Turkey as a sine qua non for a strong nation state. 258  From this flows the westernist 
orientation of Turkish foreign policy. A strict observance of nationalism, laicism (the French 
version of secularity) and independence looms large across Kemalists. Discourses attributing 
alternative geopolitical identities to Turkey (such as those from conservative circles) are 
approached with extreme caution and scepticism and are usually treated within a national 
security discourse trying to negate them by emphasizing the risks, threats and challenges 
posed to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Turkey.   
 
Conservatives on the other hand refer to those elements of Turkish society who are not 
happy with Kemalists‘ disassociation of Turkey from its past, former geopolitical space and 
geo-cultural heritage which includes religion. What unites them is a strong sense to 
‗conserve‘ all these olden qualities. Against a western modelled nation state, they propagate 
a post-imperial Turkey. Retrospectively, conservatives were scattered around political, 
academic and literary spheres of life and less so in the foreign policy establishment. Lately 
they are more visible in fields such as business, media, education and health. From 1923 to 
this day, the intellectual activities of conservatives centred on relating Turkey to three 
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spaces; a) the wide geography on which Muslims live (the Muslim East) including the Middle 
East, b) the Turkish speaking world, and c) the West.  
 
The rivalry between these two well-established geopolitical traditions brought about another 
characteristic of Turkish geopolitical culture, namely domestic competition for power. 
Adherents of each tradition with an attempt to translate their own imagination into practice 
formed social networks of power in order to capture the state apparatus and sought broad 
support across all sources of social power. In this framework, the nature of the Turkish 
political system, role of the Turkish army and civil-military relations, restructuring of the 
Turkish economy and subsequent emergence of different social classes inevitably had a 
crucial influence on Turkey‘s geopolitical culture and the character of its foreign policy. 
Furthermore, the nature of the policy-making process also had a great impact on policy 
practice. This needs to be conceptualized in relation to civil-military relations, political culture 
and the command enjoyed by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the most experienced 
institution over external relations. Lastly, geopolitical/geographicalimaginations and practices 
of other state actors (the US, European countries and states in the Middle East, etc.) 
significantly shaped Turkish foreign policy.  
 
Kemalist Geopolitical Tradition  
 
Vying to re-locate modern Turkey in global affairs with resort to ―civilizational geopolitics‖, 
Kemalism represents one of the longest lasting geopolitical traditions in modern Turkey. 
Since the new Turkish nation state established in 1923 was a clear rupture from its Ottoman 
predecessor, Kemalism represented a geopolitical project of state and nation-building that 
aims to reformulate Turkey a position and a new identity in international politics by relying on 
a persistent westernist geopolitical discourse. Kemal Atatürk himself laid the foundations of 
this tradition and the geographical imagination. This is no doubt the tradition that had the 
strongest imprint on Turkish foreign policy. The new state established its own intellectuals, 
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and political and foreign policy elite to help produce (and reproduce) geopolitical discourses 
to propagate the new imagination to a domestic public which was deeply confused and 
astounded by long years of war fighting, humiliation and distress. Harbiye (War College) and 
Mülkiye (Civil Service School) played key roles in shaping the upbringing of the new elite. 
State-sponsored media and academia helped disseminate westernist discourse as a 
legitimate choice. A deliberate attempt at creating a loyal commercial-industrial bourgeoisie 
and middle class was also part of the Kemalist project. Thus subsequent revolutionary effort 
lead by Mustafa Kemal was a top-down process of formal, popular and practical geopolitical 
entrepreneurship.  
 
a) Westernist Imagination 
 
Coming from the ranks of the Young Turks movement of the late Ottoman period, Turkey‘s 
new leaders were, when it came to East-West (or as what Said later coined the Orient-
Occident) relations, prone to the premises of civilizational geopolitics. In devising a new ―self‖ 
in the face of a threatening ―other‖, storylines were drawn in dividing the world into two. In the 
very same manner European civilizational geopolitics labelled global spaces, so too did 
Kemalists come to perceive the world. The West was a cultural area associated with 
modernity, civilizational superiority and advanced economic and scientific development. It 
was an idealized notion of the West which mostly depicted Europe (the US as well as the 
time went by) most positively. The Islamic world represented its exact antonym. In other 
words, the Muslim world was everything that reform, progress and civilization were not.259 In 
this mental process of creating metaphorical binaries, the Muslim East was not capable of 
the rationality, positivism, progress and modernity that Turkey very much needed. As Andrew 
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Mango states, the East simply stood for superstition, inefficiency, lethargy, and dubious 
morals.260 
 
As part of the vigorous geopolitical entrepreneurship Mustafa Kemal and his followers 
undertook, the most crucial aspect was ascribing a new place in world affairs to Turkey. 
Succeeding the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey was, in the mind of Kemalist intelligentsia, 
neither a Caucasian nor a Middle Eastern country, likewise neither in the Balkans nor 
belonging to the Turkish speaking world (the latter was not a point of reference because 
Turkey was against irredentist movements such as those harnessed by Kurds, and hence did 
not seek ties with the Turkish speaking communities in Soviet Russia). Of all that was left 
was the West, which Turks fought a war of independence against.261 
 
Although only 5% of Turkey‘s total landmass is in Europe, the place ascribed by Mustafa 
Kemal and his followers was based explicitly on a civilizational discourse representing the 
new state politically, culturally and geographically as part of the West. They defined modern 
Turkey as a western country in juxtaposition to its Asian or Middle Eastern alternatives262 and 
thus carefully avoided any association with the Islamic world, the Ottoman legacy or Muslim 
identity. The western model was defined against the Ottoman and Muslim characteristics as 
these were thought of espousing the negation, anti-thesis and inverse of the Kemalist 
project. Supressing these features gave Turkey a new identity which strove to imitate the 
West. If Kemalist western identity was a positive one, its post-Ottoman conservative 
alternative (Eastern-Muslim) was clearly negative. In this regard, a strong European vocation 
was envisioned. The only way seen possible to become a modern and civilized country was 
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by being part of Europe not only in geographical but also in political, economic, social, 
cultural and civilizational terms. Turkey‘s new geopolitical ―self‖ thus was western while 
―them‖ were associated with those unworthy countries and spaces in the Muslim East. As 
noted by critical analysts, this was a historical trajectory of Turkey whose past is rooted in the 
East yet whose future is sought in the West.263 
 
In the effort, civilizational geopolitics was invoked in a somewhat deterministic manner to 
help justify, normalize and naturalize the firmly westwards orientation of Turkey. The new 
spatial relocation was simply deemed ‗historically natural and objective‘ in shaping Turkey‘s 
geopolitical practices. This was substantiated on the following by Kemal Atatürk.  
 
“It is futile to try to resist the thunderous advance of civilization, for it has no pity on 
those who are ignorant or rebellious. . .  We cannot afford to hesitate any more. We 
have to move forward… Civilization is such a fire that it burns and destroys those who 
ignore it. We will take our proper place within the (western) civilizational family.”264 
 
The ideal of the young Republic was to ―make Turkey a full-fledged member of the 
community of western European states on an equal footing.‖265Ushered on the ashes of a 
lost empire, this marked a milestone in the orientation of the Turkish state in which the West 
constituted the main axis of Turkish foreign policy.  
 
b) Emulating the West  
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Once relocated, radical western modernization constituted the raison d‟être of Turkey and its 
foreign policy. Emulating the experiences of the West in an attempt to modernize, prosper 
and develop was set as the ultimate national goal. In a way, this project was thought to bring 
Turkey back to ―civilization‖, ―development‖ and ―strength‖ in the form of an express desire to 
be on a par with contemporary (western) civilization.266 As Karaosmanoğlu puts it, ―Turkey 
vied to join the West in spite of the West‖.267The following words of Kemal Atatürk,uttered as 
tough negotiations took place with western powers at Lausanne Conference in 1923, 
epitomized this understanding.268 
 
“The West has always been prejudiced against Turkey… But we Turks have always 
and consistently moved towards the West. In order to be a civilized nation, there is no 
alternative.”269 
 
In order to survive and thrive, Turkey sought to ―embrace and internalize all cultural 
dimensions that made Europe modern‖. 270  Bozdağlıoğlu notes that ―Turkey deliberately 
chose a complete adoption of western ways and abolition of all old institutions271  while 
Zürcher argues that ―with Kemalist reforms Turkey tried to separate the links with its Middle 
Eastern neighbours by de-emphasizing its Ottoman past and its historical, cultural and 
religious links to the Middle East.‖272 
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In this way, a transition was envisaged from Turkey being part (and arguably the centre) of 
the Islamic world to Turkey which would become part (even if it meant being on the margins) 
of the West by organizing as a nation-state around the new concept of Turkishness. The new 
domestic order was strictly secular, nationalist and western. This project foresaw a 
homogeneous, laicist (French version of secularism that calls for a strict separation between 
politics and religion), non-class based national unity, oppressing differences in Turkish 
society.273The aim was to create a new state, a new society and a new individual modelled 
after the West as part of the eventual projection of formulating a new geopolitical identity in 
the global political space for Turkey in order to reach the imagined status of equality with the 
superior West.274 
 
c) Naturalness of Turkey‟s Borders  
 
It is widely recognized that with the Treaty of Lausanne, signed in July 1924, modern Turkey 
emerged as a sovereign and independent state. This treaty virtually carved up the territories 
which make up today‘s Turkey. It signifies the territorial transition from an empire to a new 
nation state because by Lausanne boundaries with Greece, Bulgaria, Syria and Iraq were 
delimited. Turkey formally gave up any claim on the Dodecanese Islands and territories on 
the Arabian Peninsula such as Yemen and Hejaz. Thus, Syria (including Alexandretta) and 
Lebanon were left under French mandate. The UK gained control over Iraq, today‘s 
Palestine, Israel and Jordan (Articles 3, 15, 17 and 20). Turkey renounced all its privileges 
over Libya and agreed to an internationalized and demilitarized regime on its Straits. In 
return all capitulations were lifted; Turkey retained a small share of territory in Eastern 
Thrace (Europe) and gained wide international recognition as the successor state after the 
Ottoman Empire.  
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The importance of Lausanne in terms of geopolitical analysis lies in two dimensions. First of 
all, Lausanne signifies major concessions from the territorial limits of the new state in 
contrast to the cartographic vision originally enshrined in the National Pact prepared by 
Mustafa Kemal and his followers in 1919. The Pact, which was approved in the last session 
of Ottoman Parliament the next year, was the driving force behind the ―liberation effort‖ that 
Mustafa Kemal led against western invaders. Defeating the Greek occupation forces in a 
number of battles between 1919 and 1922 and having scarce military and economic 
resources to hang onto the war effort, Turks, by Lausanne, were finally ready to make 
territorial concessions from the homeland they originally envisaged.  
Map 1. Borders of Turkey  
 
Turkey According to the National Pact      Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne 
 
This is important because despite voluntarily conceding these territories, a psychological 
phenomenon called Sevres syndrome, dubbed after the never-executed 1920 Carthaginian 
Treaty of Sevres signed between the last Ottoman Sultan and allied powers dividing up the 
remaining territories of the empire, kept dominating the subconscious of the Turkish elite. It is 
so because, as noted by Lewis, had it been implementedthe Sevres Treaty would leave 
Turkey ―helpless and mutilated, a shadow state‖,275 which is exactly what penetrated the 
Turkish alter ego. Consequently, the West as the ultimate model of modernity and civilization 
was much admired, yet equally feared for harbouring conspiracies against Turkey. ―Sevres 
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syndrome‖ in this context basically referred to a constant fear and anxiety that external and 
internal enemies of the young republic were after its ultimate partition and disintegration. As 
remarked by Jung, it refers to ―the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the 
destruction of the Turkish state‖276 which lingers among nationalist circles, in the left and right 
alike, in Turkey. A feeling of mistrust and isolation from outsiders culminates in Sevres-
phobia. Mustafa Kemal is quoted substantiating these anxieties by saying that ―if we are 
perceived too suspicious with regards to the activities of foreigners, it is due to the fear of 
losing our very hard earned independence.‖277 In particular, the military seemed to strongly 
embrace such an increased sense of insecurity.  
 
This was supplemented by another worry which stemmed from perceiving Turkey‘s 
geography exceptional. In the sense,Turkey‘s south and east was perceivably doomed with 
instability, turmoil, and secessionist, irredentist and fundamentalist ideologies.278Such a bleak 
perception served as the backbone of a lingering geopolitical anxiety about impeding 
Turkey‘s territorial integrity and national unity. As a result, a fear of abandonment and fear of 
loss of territory279 loomed large in Turkish geopolitical culture. It was believed that ―Turkey 
was besieged by a veritable ring of evil‖.280The expression signifying such deep-seated 
anxiety in popular culture was ―Turkey is surrounded by seas in three, by enemies in four 
corners‖.  Another expression claimed that ―there is no friend of Turk but a fellow Turk!‖  
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As highlighted by Bilgin, such non-material, non-military and non-specific insecurities (in the 
sense that there was not an easily identifiable specific counterpart/other/enemy against 
which such anxieties were directed at) were partly presented as justification to devise a 
western oriented foreign policy as early as the 1920s. 281  As Foucault outlines, the 
construction of cultural spaces is essential to how any society conceptualizes its 
existence.282In this perspective, geopolitical identity formation in Turkey was partially an 
attempt to get accepted and recognized as part of the western world in order to address 
these stumbling insecurities. Turkey sought westernization as a means of avoiding probable 
western intervention while also hoping to benefit from the privileges of membership in the 
western (European) family of nations.283 
 
Secondly, Lausanne provided a central theme, i.e. Turkey‘s territorial limits. Turkey largely 
identified the province of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace as its natural territorial homeland and 
willingly dropped all claims on Ottoman Arab provinces and the lands in the Balkans. Turkey 
was content with the arrangements in Lausanne except for Alexandretta (reunited to Turkey 
by a referendum in 1939), the status of Mosul and Kirkuk (left permanently under British rule 
in 1925 in accordance with the decision of the League of Nations) and the international 
regime on the Turkish Straits (reregulated by the Treaty of Monteux in 1936). It was so 
content that the remaining territories in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace served as the territorial 
basis for Turkey‘s westernist vision. These two reflected the natural boundaries of Turkey. To 
forge territorial attachment, Atatürk himself pioneered the development of a Turkish history 
thesis, by which ancient Sumerians and Hittites, as locals of Anatolia, were deemed Turkish 
in essence.284 In defending the naturalness of the new state‘s territorial core, Kemal Atatürk 
emphasized the principle of ―remaining within national boundaries‖ for guiding Turkey‘s 
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foreign policy. Encapsulated in his following words, this has gradually transformed Turkey 
into a survivalist status quo power which aimed to jealously guard its national sovereignty, 
independence, unity and territorial integrity.   
 
“Many continents were home to Turks throughout history. Today Turks live in a vast 
homeland lying to the west of Asia and to the east of Europe which is recognized by 
the whole world within its delimited land and sea borders. Therefore, Turkish people 
today are satisfied with (the boundaries of) their homeland for their existence. This is 
because Turks are confident that their rich ancestral heritage will be preserved and 
further developed in this homeland.”285 (emphasis added)  
 
“It is our goal, within our national frontiers, to work for the real happiness and 
development of our nation and our country, relying above all our own strength for the 
preservation of our existence, to refrain from inducing our people to pursue 
deleterious aims and to expect from the civilised world human treatment and 
friendship based on reciprocity.”286 
 
The sanctity and inviolability of borders was a central theme in the Kemalist mantra. The 
non-irredentist motto, ―peace at home, peace in the world‖, by Mustafa Kemal envisioned 
indivisible and inviolable national borders. Such perception of borders and secluded 
territoriality were strongly linked to a rigid conception of homeland, national 
unity/homogeneity and sovereignty. Borders therefore marked not only the territorial 
demarcation of Turkey but also the limits of Ankara‘s external action. A rather strictly 
legalistic understanding about the rigidity of borders led to a sense of self-encapsulation and 
enclosure even to the brink of ―locked-in syndrome‖. This was later taken as a central point of 
                                                          
285 AKÇAKAYALIOĞLU, C. (1980). Atatürk : Komutan, Devrimci ve Devlet Adami Yönleriyle (Atatürk: The 
Commander, Revolutionary and Statesman). Ankara, Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 
p.537-538.  
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contention by conservatives as it was claimed that ―taken to the extreme, Turkey‘s 
sacrosanct borders built mental walls around Turkey‖287 making it virtually impossible to steer 
contact, interaction and cooperation beyond legal frontiers.  
 
 
 
d) Kemalist Geopolitical Code 
 
In an attempt to create a new monolithic polity, differences such as Islamic and Kurdish 
identities, and other minorities were perceived as threats to national unity and security.288 
Hence, the major internal enemies of the Turkish state were identified as Kurdish nationalists 
and movements with Islamic motivation. Christian minorities were also seen as a source of 
unease, one of the reasons for exchanging populations with Greece in accordance with the 
Treaty of Lausanne. These domestic challenges kept haunting Turkey‘s external relations as 
they had cross-border ramifications, and hampered its influence over regional affairs 
significantly in the years to come.  
 
In transition from the empire to the nation state, Turkey dropped ambitions for a global 
foreign policy agenda. Facing near disappearance after World War I, the national mission of 
Turkey in this vision was identified as survival within internationally recognized borders as an 
independent and sovereign state. Mustafa Kemal‘s goal was to reinforce and preserve the 
territorial integrity of Turkey, which was put under jeopardy during World War I in pursuing 
high hopes. One could add a strong dimension of modernization, equated with European 
westernization, to Turkey‘s new national mission. Consequently, Turkey, rather than pursuing 
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a revisionist foreign policy agenda, embarked on a path of territorial consolidation to pursue 
its national interests. All of this was part of a geopolitical project aspiring to make Turkey part 
of the ―Western world‖ based on civilizational geopolitics. Apart from that, the particularities 
were largely shaped subscription to Western style international and regional organizations 
such as the League of Nations, the UN, NATO and the Western European Union. Embracing 
the role of a peripheral country during the Cold War, just as its European partners kept 
imagining Turkey since the late 19th century, as the southern flank of the Alliance boded 
perfectly well with this national mission. In this vein, Turkey did not seek any territorial claim 
against any of its neighbours in the following decades if the case of Alexandretta is put aside 
which was a last attempt to strengthen territorial consolidation. In defining this mission, 
Atatürk stated that;  
 
“We are not a people running after big dreams, like those fraudulents who chase 
things they cannot achieve. We drew the enmity, grudge and ill will of the whole world 
since we were perceived as pursuing big and imaginary dreams. We never pursued 
Pan-Islamism but said “we are and we will”. Likewise, we did not pursue Pan-Turkism 
while declaring to have been doing so. In response, our enemies said “we will kill (if 
necessary) not to let you”. This is the gist of the matter. This is how we increased the 
number of our enemies and their pressure upon us. Instead we shall be looking at the 
natural situation, what is at hand. We should know our limits.”289 
 
“Neither the Islamic Union nor Pan-Turkism is a feasible policy for us. It is from now 
on the state policy of Turkey to live independently within our national borders as a 
sovereign state.”290 
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The experience of coming to the brink of total extinction while pursuing high hopes of 
territorial recovery during World War I led the new Turkish elite to have a lower level of 
ambition in foreign policy. The official discourse was shaped by Mustafa Kemal‘s dictum, 
―peace at home, peace in the world‖. Having introduced a dramatic transformation in the 
political, social, economic and cultural make up at home, all Turkey needed was a state of 
peace, stability and tranquillity in its external relations. Pursing overarching foreign policy 
agendas could put already fragile republican reforms in jeopardy. Mufti acknowledges that 
Kemal‘s dictum was domestically interpreted as ―unity and order‖ (hence ―peace at home‖), 
and externally as ―to be left alone and leave others alone‖ i.e. ―peace in the world‖.291 This 
called for realism, insularism and caution in foreign policy. In other words, Turkey had to 
pursue goals aware of its limits, i.e. it no longer held an empire and a robust economic and 
military capacity. The new state instead had a rather mediocre image of itself about what it 
can or cannot achieve regionally and globally. Therefore Turkey had to have its feet based 
firmly on realpolitik.292 Pursuing any substantial modification in Turkish foreign policy was 
equated with adventurism and hence without good reason.293 
 
Conservative Geopolitical Tradition 
 
Conservatism, the anti-thesis of Kemalism, developed over time in conservative intellectual 
circles. This tradition was with Turkey all along, just like Kemalism, having a historical 
trajectory stretching well to the Ottoman era.294 As it is usually understood in analysing 
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Turkey and its politics, Turkish conservatism for the purposes of this research is not only a 
moral imperative to preserve religious and spiritual values or an attempt to reshape society in 
accordance with traditionalist principles. It is at the same time an integrated approach to 
portray, with resort to ―civilizational geopolitics‖, a distinct picture of world affairs and give 
meaning to Turkey‘s geopolitical position.  
 
Historically speaking, Aral notes that ―…conservatism rejects Western-oriented foreign policy 
and xenophobic nationalism that mistrusts most of Turkey‘s immediate neighbours.‖295 To the 
contrary, conservatism is an out loud cry to keep the links between Turkey and its former 
(Ottoman) geopolitical space intact. Therefore conservatism, as much as a moral and 
political project, is an attempt to re-interpret world affairs and a call to retain contact with 
former geographies. In terms of academic probing, it deserves closer scrutiny as a separate 
school of thought since most of the permanent articulations of alternative modes of 
representation and discourses in Turkey are initially brewed in this tradition. Equally crucially, 
a distinct geopolitical mentality is developed by which later politicians took up the challenge 
of operationalizing its central premises in the realm of foreign policy.   
 
Just like Kemalists, conservatives too did not make an explicit claim to having engaged in 
geopolitical entrepreneurship. Therefore, the geopolitical reasoning and discourses evolving 
around the writings of prominent conservative intellectuals296 have gone largely unnoticed in 
terms of geopolitical inquiry. These were geopolitical texts, as much as literary pieces, in 
imagining the world differently and defending an alternative place for Turkey in the 
international arena. Through the ideas disseminated in their writings, these intellectuals 
served the ideological backbone of an alternative tradition. Most of them were attendants of 
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western-style schools abroad (mostly France) or at home. Many visited territories both to the 
east and the west outside Turkey, thus were well exposed to the Western space, ideas and 
its geo-cultural traits. But conclusions they drew as to where Turkey is and how it should 
behave in foreign affairs differed fundamentally.   
 
From the early days of Turkey, the conservative counter elite grew in size and intellectual 
activity challenging many of the prerogatives of the Kemalist establishment, first and 
foremost locating Turkey firmly in the West and the stereotypical inscription of the Middle 
East. They were the harshest critiques of the Kemalist project of state and nation building as 
the top-down revolutionary project did not bring any material gain for them and also seemed 
to have undermined their values and traditions. Westernist policies, domestic and foreign 
alike, were scripted as what made Turkey despicable in the eyes of the West. 297 
Conservatives dubbed the westernization effort blind mimicking (a cheap act of travesty) 
while naming Kemalist reformists copycat monkeys 298  as it ran against where they saw 
Turkey‘s belonging at.  
 
The only exception is Turkey‘s decision to remain in the Western camp of democracies 
during the Cold War, which was considered not a calculated policy choice but an act of divine 
intervention.299 This preference is nonetheless tacitly approved not merely due to strategic or 
security considerations but on the perception that with its atheist prerogatives, the communist 
ideology of Soviets posed a direct threat against the Muslim character of Turks and their 
distinct culture. 300  From the vantage point of Turkish conservatives, Soviets and 
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communismare represented as a godless and atheist ideology and regime. Hence it 
constitutes a distinct ―other‖ that Turks should avoid at any cost. Turkey therefore had every 
reason to refrain from interacting with such a dangerously evil regime.    
 
As Mufti notes, frontrunners of this tradition differed significantly from Kemalists in embracing 
many of the post-imperial impulses and reflexes. 301  These stemmed from a different 
conception of Turkey, as a post-imperial state. That is its geographical situatedness, 
perceptions about its borders, territorial outreach, zones of influence, identity, sense of 
belonging and cultural attachment were formulated in clear contrast to Kemalists. In this 
understanding, rejecting the Eastern and Muslim credentials of Turkey would contradict its 
past, culture and prospects for a better future. Conservatives outright challenged the 
Kemalist inclination to render anything reminding Turks of their Ottoman geopolitical heritage 
and Muslim identity as a backward baggage to drop. To the contrary, they rather strongly 
embraced it. As one observer put it, if the Kemalist predicament was based on a firm denial 
of the Ottoman past, the conservatives reconstruct that legacy as a paradise lost.302 This was 
believed what would re-give Turkey a distinct character as a great state and nation.  
 
Therefore, this school of thought took pride in the Muslim character of Turks, glorified Islam, 
praised Ottoman accomplishments, embraced former geopolitical space (epitomized as the 
―Glorious East‖), and eschewed narratives degrading Turks‘ links to Muslims. The common 
storyline scripted Turkey as the natural leader of the Muslim and Turkish speaking worlds as 
the natural heir to the Ottoman Empire.303 Therefore, a common theme in the conservative 
tradition was ―to make Turkey great again‖ or to ―bring about a resurgent Turkey‖. Assertive 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Cephesiyle Komünizma (Communism Through Every Abgle). Istanbul, Doğan Guneş Yayınları and KISAKÜREK , N. 
F. (1985). Dünya Bir Inkılap Bekliyor (The World is Expecting A Restoration). İst. [İstanbul], Büyük Doğu.  
301 MUFTI, M. (2009). Daring and Caution in Turkish Strategic Culture: Republic at Sea. Basingstoke [England], 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
302 ONAR, N. F: (2009). Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival Representations of the Ottomans in Today’s Turkey. 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, No. 2. p. 234. 
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pursuit of national greatness with a somewhat romanticized notion of post-imperial legacy 
was how this concept was translated into the field of foreign policy.     
 
 
 
a) The Never Ending Controversy: The West vs. the East  
 
A monthly review called the Great East304 offers the most succinct and systematic account of 
the geopolitical argumentation in this tradition. The Great East (and the following compilation 
by Kısakürek named Ideological Texture305) is a critique of prevalent perceptions in the West 
about the East (Turks and Muslims), and representations in the East of itself. Some are 
textbook criticisms of western orientalist discourse at a time (in 1968) when Edward Said‘s 
Orientalism had not yet earned itself worldwide reputation.  
 
This line of reasoning is premised strictly upon ―civilizational geopolitics‖. The views 
expressed perceive East-West relations through the same glance and binaries as Kemalists‘ 
but with a strong flavour of orientalist critique and self-criticism. In this dialectically 
representative approach, the East characterizes the cradle of sophisticated spiritual sciences 
while the West embodies excellence in material sciences and machinery. The West is 
described as the phantom of sheer reason lacking spiritual depth306 while the East is marred 
by a lack of interest in the material world with an extreme focus on spirituality. In this context, 
                                                          
304 Great East was in circulation between 1943 and 1978. The review brought together the ideas, beliefs and 
worldviews produced by poets, artists, writers, scholars and other members of conservative intelligentsia. It was 
edited by Necip Fazıl Kısakurek, a conservative philosopher and poet. Throughout his whole life, Mr Kısakürek 
struggled against Kemalist ideology and spent over seven years in prison. Due to the content of the writings 
challenging Kemalist ideology, the Great East had been subject to numerous court cases. It was transformed into a 
daily paper, a weekly and a monthly magazine for a number of times. Kısakürek wrote extensively as an ideologue for 
the Great East to make it an alternative school of thought in politics, culture, literature and most importantly 
geopolitics even though he never made direct reference to the latter discipline.  
305 The Ideological Texture is a collection of editorials by Necip Fazıl published in the Great East from the 1940’s 
onwards. 
306KISAKÜREK, N. F. (1998).p.40-42. 
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Kemalist policies are criticized for making Turkey a slave of the technologically soulless 
machine of western civilization by wasting the true spirit of Turks.307 Turkey is then located 
within the spiritual roots of the East while not disregarding the value of borrowing the 
principles that lent the West superiority over material substance.308 
 
Some variants in the conservative tradition claim that the West has two faces. The first is 
about technological superiority, reason, progress, prosperity, universal values and 
contemporary civilization. The second magnifies the exploitative nature of the capitalist 
system and colonialism which pictures the west as harbouring an evil agenda against 
Turks.309 Consequently, imperialist and colonialist practices of the West are seen as a source 
of fierce criticism, scepticism and grave concern. 310  As noted by Aydın, conservatives‘ 
critiques of the West (in Turkey)…. strengthened the occidentalist essentialism about the 
decadent, materialist, positivist, soulless, immoral, communist, individualistic, and ―Masonic‖ 
West.311  By developing such discourses of danger and suspicion, conservatives tried to 
create an alternative identity for Turkey against an apparently occidentalist other. An inherent 
longing of umma (Islamic community) type cross border/transnational pan-Islamic solidarity 
and cooperation loomed large in the conservative mantra.  
 
b) Easternism 
 
Conservatives just like Kemalists sought an answer to the question of where in the world 
Turkey is and where it belongs. The answer, formulated in civilizational and cultural terms, 
was the exact opposite of the Kemalists‘. Conservative intellectuals stipulated that thanks to 
                                                          
307 ÇETİNSAYA, G. (2004. “İslamcılıktaki Milliyetçilik” (“Nationalism in Islamist Thought)  inAKTAY, Y. et. al.Modern 
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religious, cultural and civilizational affinity and because it served the flagship of Islam since 
the 10th century, Turkey belongs to the (Muslim) East.312 Accordingly Turkey is perceived 
fundamentally different from the west in terms of culture, civilization, historical backdrop, and 
even in the organization of society and economy. Given the social, economic and other 
difficulties Turkey faces, the remedy is prescribed as ―rebirth in the East‖.313 The East in this 
conception is a purely cultural and civilizational space that transcends regions and 
continents. With its extra-territorial nature, the East, according to Turkish conservatives, 
encompasses all places that Muslims live. Henceforth Eastern Thrace, Anatolia, the Middle 
East, Central Asia, Far East and Northern Africa, all are situated in ―the East‖ since they all 
are coloured with a common theme, Islam. In formulating this position, Necip Fazıl claims 
that;   
 
“Everything came from the East; everything, everything; i.e. our spirit (identity). 
Jerusalem is there, Mecca is there, Kaaba is there. Adam first landed in the East. 
Noah‟s ark is located there. Prophets Abraham, Moussa, Christ and Mohammad, all 
are from the East. We must believe in the East with no bigotry of geography.”314 
 
Despite an apparent acknowledgment and appreciation of its achievements, this school of 
thought is extremely wary of Western imperialist and colonialist legacy. Among other factors, 
western colonialism is thought to be a major factor why Turks and other Muslims are 
fragmented and lagging behind. 315  Furthermore, Turkey is described a prey to Western 
capitalism and imperialism. It is, in fact, on the basis of an anti-westernist discourse that 
                                                          
312KISAKÜREK, N. F. (1998). p. 39. 
313Ibid ,p.9. 
314Ibid, p.37. 
315ERSOY, M. A. (1990). Safahat (Phases), Third Book, “Voices of God” .  p.440 and KISAKÜREK , N. F. (1998). p. 
166. 
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conservative geopolitical identity of Turkey is constructed in which religion plays a key role.316 
Mehmet Akif‘s identification of the West as ―the battered, single-toothed monster called 
‗civilisation‘‖317 in the Turkish national anthem indicates how deep this ―other‖ing process 
towards the west goes. As early as 1920, Mehmet Akif describes western civilization as 
harbouring evil intentions, eternal animosity and a grudge against Turks which wishes to 
partition Turkish homeland.318 Necip Fazıl takes it further in citing Europe, the Americas and 
Australia among the list of hostiles for Turkey. Interestingly, the whole continent of Africa is 
designated among Turkey‘s friends,319 most probably because Africans shared a common 
destiny with Turks in being subjected to western imperialism. 
 
Thus, the significant ―other‖ for Turkey is not the East or Muslims but rather the colonialist 
and capitalist West. It is around these colonialist, imperialist and capitalist ambitions of the 
West that Turkish conservatives produced alternative discourses of danger, insecurity and 
threats. According to Necip Fazıl, this discourse is very well substantiated because 
―Europeans never deemed Turks and Turkey part of their own family of nations‖.320 As closer 
ties are called for with the Muslim world, conservatives are mostly aloof towards Israel since 
it is perceived an extension of the west in the East. 
 
Some accounts in this line of thought reject deeming the West superior over the East or vice 
versa. The two are thought to be essentially compatible and to complement each other in 
providing a comprehensive whole. Race, religion and culture, which seemed to be the 
essential dividing lines between the Occident and the Orient in the former‘s quest for 
                                                          
316DAĞI, İ. (2009) Beyond the Clash of Civilizations: The Rapprochement of Turkish Islamic Elite with the West, in 
ZANK, W. Clash or Cooperation of Civilizations?: Overlapping Integration and Identities. Aldershot, Ashgate.  
317  ERSOY, M.A. (1921). Turkish National Anthem. Stanza 3. Line 4. English translation is available at 
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318ERSOY, M. A. (1920). Kastamonu Nasrullah Camii Vaazı (Sermon in Kastamonu Nasrullah Mosque). Full Turkish 
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imperialist hegemony simply did not fit in the claims of universal modernity and civilizing 
mission of the West.321 Accordingly in some Turkish conservative circles, progressive values 
of Islam are strongly embraced while western values such as democracy, positive reasoning 
and free market and enterprise are not rejected. This is an attempt to offer a synthesis of the 
East and the West as a means of development, and a combined framework to guide 
Turkey‘s revival.322 A combination the East and the West (art, science and technology of the 
West and ―true character (mahiyyeti ruhiye)‖ of the East according to Mehmet Akif323) is given 
as the remedy for overcoming the difficulties Turkey faces.  
 
This requires Turkey to hinge onto its ―true self‖ (Eastern Muslim identity). If a model is to be 
followed, it is not the West but rather the glorified experience of the Ottoman Empire324 which 
is pictured as providing a tolerant, multi-ethnic and multicultural order over vast territories for 
centuries. Domestically, this means Turkey would not be concerned with different ethnic 
identities as long as Turkish society was united around a common faith, Islam. Hence 
Kurdish identity and Islamic revivalism are not seen as threats to social harmony. Externally, 
this means easier interaction with Muslim states whether they host a sizable Kurdish 
population and strong religious sentiments or not.  
 
c) The Impact of Conservative Tradition  
 
It must be noted that Turkish geopolitical conservatism, as much as symbolizing a rejection 
of the Kemalist attempt to create a new geopolitical identity and space of action for Turkey, in 
essence, was not initially codified as a project of practical grand strategy or foreign policy. It 
                                                          
321Ibid, p. 448-449.  
322 PEYAMI SAFA’s book titled Doğu-Batı Sentezi (East-West Synthesis) 1963, Yağmur Yayınları makes a strong 
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was largely a critique of the wrong-doings of Kemalist geopolitical engineering as well as a 
self-criticism about why the imperial Ottoman project eventually failed. What lessons Turkey 
should draw in order to cope with contemporary challenges of economic, social and scientific 
underdevelopment was also a key theme conservatives focused on. The most apparent 
foreign policy prescription, as an interim measure, was to manage the tough times until 
Turkey‘s internal cohesion and strength was consolidated. 325  However, Turkey was 
nostalgically hoped to make a decisive come back to global politics and acquire worldwide 
recognition.326 
 
On the other hand, conservatism, as an expression of thought and discourse did not present 
a coherent whole notably until the 1980‘s as one writer after another kept contributing to its 
evolution. As a result, conservative reasoning remained in the formal and to some degree in 
the popular genre of geopolitics in Turkey.  However, the way the world is pictured in this 
tradition heavily shaped the cognitive map of Turkish conservative elite.327 It provided the 
geopolitical framework through which global affairs were given an alternative meaning, 
distinct geopolitical pictures around the East and the West were portrayed, and different roles 
and expectations were ascribed to Turkey with regards to the future of its external relations. 
It did also provide alternative narratives around which dramas in world politics should be 
interpreted by future generations. In particular, the geopolitical views disseminated in the 
Great East served as a strong source of inspiration for later conservative political parties and 
politicians in Turkey. The ideological foundations laid in this school of thought thus influenced 
the geopolitical reasoning, modes of perception, representation and understanding of leading 
conservative figures, not least the National View Movement of Necmettin Erbakan 
(established in the 1960s and 1970s), Turgut Özal and AK Party leaders lately.  
                                                          
325 KISAKÜREK, N. F. (1998). p.443. 
326Ibid, p.460. 
327 Abdullah Gül states that the single person having the most influence over his intellectual backdrop is Necip Fazıl 
Kısakürek while Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publishes each year a message bowing before the beloved memory of the 
deceased.  
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Tradition Turkish National Interest Social Basis Cultural Identity 
Kemalist Making Turkey part of the West in 
economic, political social and (if 
possible) cultural/civilizational terms.  
CHP and other centre-left and 
centrist political parties, the 
military, top echelons of civilian 
bureaucracy and academia, 
Istanbul-Ankara based 
industrialists and businessmen 
Exclusionary Turkishness 
within nation-state. 
Conservative Improved political and economic 
relations with the Muslim world.  
MNP, MSP, RP, FP, SP, ANAP, 
AK Party tradition, burgeoning 
conservative bourgeoisie-―the 
Anatolian Tigers‖, lately urbanized 
masses coming from Anatolian 
periphery, enlightened 
conservative intelligentsia.  
Pluralistic in the sense that 
it embraces Islam, and 
ethnic and religious 
differences.   
Table-3: Geopolitical Traditions in Turkey 
 
 
Imagination Tradition Territorial Core Model  Mission Codes 
Westernism Kemalism Anatolia & 
Western Trace 
The West Survival and 
modernization  
Code-1 Allies:TheWest  
No explicit Other 
Code-2 Allies:TheWest  
The Other: Socialists and 
Muslim Middle East 
Easternism Conservatism Anatolia & 
Western Trace 
Ottoman 
Legacy 
Active pursuit of 
national interest 
& Islamic 
leadership 
Allies: Muslims 
The Other: Imperialist West and 
Socialists 
Table 3. Geographical Imaginations on Turkey’s Spatial Situatedness 
 
The Placement of Turkey by the West  
 
The remark by David Newman needs to be noted in stating that ―while the geopolitical 
(geographical) imagination of a state may be determined within, its actual positioning within 
the regional and global system is largely determined from without. As such, the geopolitical 
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imagination of a country‟s population or political elites may often contrast with the geopolitical 
positioning of that state by other states within the system, resulting in inter-state tension and 
on the one hand, and attempts to become accepted on the other.‖328 
 
An interesting aspect is to consider the way Turkey‘s ―western self‖ is perceived in the West 
itself. One therefore needs to scrutinize the concept of Europe as a spatial-temporal 
imaginary construction which in the Turkish imagination represents the most solid 
embodiment of the West.  
 
It must be noted at first that while Turkish leaders chose to cut their links with Ottoman 
geopolitical culture, space and imagination, Europeans mostly did not. They kept identifying 
Islam with Ottoman Turks,329 which served as a distinct Oriental other before a common 
European identity. In this perspective, Ottomans were historically perceived in Europe but not 
part of Europe.330 Turks were present only as an alien force. This image has been produced 
and reproduced since the fourteenth century.331 As noted by Schultz, it was the formation of 
a western front against advancing Ottomans which first popularised the concept of Europe in 
the late fifteenth century.332 Hakan Yavuz takes the argument further in stating that in Europe 
through an Orientalist discourse, the Muslim 'other' was characterized as barbaric, 
authoritarian, lazy, repulsive, and incomprehensible.333 
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A similar statement was made at the hight of the Bulgarian uprisingthat Ottomans harshly 
repressed. As he left office as the leader of liberal opposition, William Gladstone (served as 
British PM between 1891 and 1894)wrote a pamphlet in August 1876to ciritisize the position 
of the British governmentby arguing that ―…[the Turks] were, upon the whole, from the black 
day when they entered Europe, the one great anti-human specimen of humanity'.334The 
pamphlet became popular with the British public and helped Gladstone to return to British 
politics a few years later. But his sentimentsfound no sympathy with PM Benjamin Disraeli 
who was acting in line with the policy of supporting Ottomans.This policy was established 
during the Crimean War as a means of containingthe expansion of Russian power at the 
expense of British interests in the Balkans. Disraeli therefore was unhesitant in calling 
Gladstone‘s pamphlet "...vindictive and ill-written ... of all the Bulgarian horrors perhaps the 
greatest".   
 
But even when the Ottoman Empire was accepted within the Concert of Europe via Paris 
Conference after the Crimean War in 1856 that pledged respect for sovereign independence 
and territorial integrity, it was not treated on an equal footing. It still was ―the sick man of 
Europe‖ and of an origin fundamentally different than the Europeans. Ottoman state was kept 
alive as part of the greater balance of power in Europe among Britain, Germany, France, 
Russia and Austria, which had rather conflictual interests as to the resolution of ―the Eastern 
Question‖. This provided Disraeli and Bismarck of Germany with ample motive to organize a 
peace conference in Berlin once Russians conceded a large Bulgarian state under Moscow‘s 
influence in 1878. Such considerations were not only at play within the contours of Anglo-
Ottoman or Franco-Ottoman diplomacy but also in the new-found alignment between 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire before and during the First World War.     
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But beneath great power rivalry, cultural otherness/difference of Islam, represented by Turks, 
kept being a defining feature in the formation of a common European identity. As noted by 
Agnew, the ‗otherness of Turks‘ had served as a ‗fundamental barrier‘ to their participation in 
European civilizational geopolitics that drew hard lines around the European homeland‘.335 In 
this perception, the place of Turkey was seen as extra-European rather than complementary 
to it.  
 
The same continues to some degree among policy-making circles in Europe to this day. 
While the European project evolved towards deeper cooperation, the European Community 
addressed the debate on a common European identity as early as 1973.336 The central 
themes were to ―ensure the survival of the civilization which Europeans have in common‖, 
―the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice - which is the 
ultimate goal of economic progress - and of respect for human rights‖. It was yet again a 
clear identification of Europe as a distinct civilizational zone only open to other ―European‖ 
nations that share the same values, culture, history, ideals and objectives. What united 
Europeans under a common identity was subscription to a shared civilization, history, 
religion, science, culture and democratic values.337  Raised on the ancient Greco-Roman 
civilizations and Judaic-Christian cultures, Europeans, in their encounters with others, kept a 
disavowed sense of cultural and temporal superiority, as argued by Strath.338 Thus, keeping 
the civilizational geopolitics optic, modern European identity was exclusionist and rigid for 
those without albeit diverse and plural for those within.  
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The modern day application, with varying degrees, excludes Turkey from the cultural and 
civilizational space called Europe. As noted by Küçük, ―the debate on Turkey‘s EU 
membership locates the construction of a European self-definition at the frontier of its 
Turkish-Islamic ―Other.‖… (in this imagination) Turkey is neither in Eastern Europe nor the 
Middle East, but rather a grey zone somewhere in between‖.339 This is the reason why 
Turkey‘s membership prospect raises the question about where the eastern boundaries of 
Europe are located. Ruben & Wolkersdorfer draws attention to extra-European placement of 
Turkey as follows.  
 
―As it is neither rooted in its „own‟ space nor is it represented as completely „different‟, 
it is located in between two essential entities. Thus it is declared a space between 
binary oppositions, an „in-between‟ which is located in time „between past and 
present‟ and geographically between „Orient and Occident‟. In this concept of 
hybridity, it becomes apparent how geopolitical representation – falling back 
(re)productively on the dichotomous fictions of the „civilised Occident‟ and the 
„threateningly foreign Orient‟ - repeatedly conceptualises Turkey as „different‟ or 
„foreign‟.”340 
 
The lingering membership process to the EU is one of the clear testaments to this deep-
seated geopolitical suspicion. For many Europeans, Turkey is too big, too poor, too far and 
‗too different (Muslim)‘.341 German Chancellor Kohl in the 1990s for example declared that 
Europe represented a community of values which had no business with Turkey. With the 
same line of argument, Wolfgang Schäuble, the then Chairman of the CDU/CSU, stated that 
Turkey‘s entry into the EU was already closed simply for the reason that it did not belong to 
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the Western-Christian culture area.342 As Philip Robbins states, it is once again seen during 
‗the vivid controversy surrounding the European Constitution in 2004, notably in the course of 
the French (‗no‘ vote in the) referendum, that the issue of full Turkish membership has best 
illuminated (yet again) the debate about European identity.‘ 343  Deeming Turkey 
geographically and culturally non-European, former French President Sarkozy repeatedly 
stated that ―Turkey is a very great civilization and culture but not a European one‖. 344 
Likewise German Chancellor Merkel outlined her position by claiming that Turkey does not 
share the historical, cultural and historical roots with the rest of the EU.345 Hence, despite 
being a NATO member that largely embraces western values and way of life, Turkey is kept 
being treated as if on the geographical and cultural verge of Europe.  
 
It is therefore safe to argue that geopolitical representations about Turkey in Europe were, 
and to some degree still are today, in considerable contrast to Turkey‘s self-ascribed western 
geopolitical positioning. As such, Turkey is not only perceived extra-European but also 
subject to Europe‘s civilizing mission.346 Ankara‘s attempts at modernization/westernization 
mostly failed to alter this image in the west which largely took negative associations with 
Turkey. The positive representations around Turkey emphasized its character as the only 
Muslim country that can offer a suitable democratic and developmental model for the Islamic 
world. Turkey is therefore scripted as a bridge between Europe and the Islamic world but still 
outside the cultural/civilizational zone called Europe. 
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This is what led some observers to claim that Turkey suffers an identity crisis. Put differently, 
it is "a country caught between two continents, two traditions, [and] two trends in 
history".347Some went further in asserting that Turkey displays strong features of a liminal 
state, neither belonging to European family of nations nor to the Muslim world.348 Drawing 
attention to such qualities, Huntington even identified Turkey as a textbook example for a 
―torn country‖.349 It was, among other factors, this gap between the imageries of Kemalists 
and Europeans that lent a strong motive to the Conservative tradition in the first place to 
produce alternative geopolitical discourses and representations for Turkey.   
 
Representations around the Middle East 
 
Kemalist: A Swamp 
 
In order to understand Turkey‘s foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East, it is imperative to 
problematize Turkish and Arab historical and psychological inertia, i.e. geographical 
representations that bring along perceptions, apprehensions, stereotyping, prejudices and 
predispositions. That is because Kemalist Turkey operated on a ―constructed reality‖ in its 
Middle Eastern dealings. State and identity formation in modern Turkey took in the totality of 
positive symbolizations around the West in defining the new ―self‖ against the old, inferior, 
anti-modern and threatening ―other‖, i.e. the Muslim East represented by Muslim peoples, 
places and cultures. This led to what can be called ―Turkish Orientalism‖. The Middle East, 
as a place in this trajectory, was a reminder of ―Ottoman backwardness and a potential threat 
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to drag Turkey back into the dark ages‖350 of utmost incivility. It was the anathema of Turkish 
―Orient‖. As a result, the Middle East was scripted as ―a foreign space, wholly lacking in 
allure and best left to its own no doubt tragic fate‖351 invoking the analogy by Stephanson. 
Even discovery of a valuable asset such as oil did not change this perception much. For 
Kemalists, the Middle East symbolized ―the unhappy association with Turkey‘s past‖352 that 
needed to be kept at best at arm‘s length. At least, this was the most influential and durable 
geopolitical script produced by the Kemalist elite. Albeit not being a geographical 
representation substantiated by facts, the binaries created in this discourse nonetheless pre-
conditioned available courses of action for Turkey in the Middle East. As a result, the 
positions Turkey took under Kemalist leaders became a function of this westernist imagery.  
 
In this context, a general perception prevailed among Turkish policy makers and the wider 
public in seeing the Arab Middle East as backward, uncivilized, instable, dogmatic, 
untrustworthy, lacking in democracy and struggling with religious fundamentalism.353 The 
memories of the Arab revolt lead by Sharif Hussein of Mecca in the First World War further 
accentuated these negative perceptions. Hussein‘s decision to align with the British against 
the Ottoman Sultan (who was also the Caliph of Muslim umma) for the sake of his own tribe 
made a rubber-stamp imprint on Turks‘ collective memory. As Robins argues despite the fact 
that it was only a limited number of Arabs that turned against the Ottomans and although the 
net effect of such a defection on the overall war effort had been relatively limited,354 Turks 
nevertheless cognitively associated most Arabs with treason and unreliability. Thereafter 
grew a dominant geopolitical mentality that equated Arabs with back-stabbing and 
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betrayal.355 The lands of Arabs in this perception were a reminder of the tragedies of that 
war. Therefore, Turkey developed a disavowed geographical and geopolitical ignorance 
about the Middle East. As noted by Özdalga, ―academic neglect and ignorance of Arab 
culture and society have contributed to prevalent disrespect for Arabs, most noticeable 
among strictly secular nationalists.‖356 
 
In this vein, mistrust against Arabs and negative stereotyping was very common in popular 
geopolitical culture. It was so deep that one common Turkish saying stipulated that it is never 
possible to mean business with Arabs (Araplarla iş olmaz). Likewise, another called to do no 
business with Arabs (―better not have the candy of Damascus or see the face of Arabs‖ (ne 
Şam‟ın şekeri, ne Arab‟ın yüzü). The word Arab had an immediate association with dark skin. 
As such, some Turks did not even hesitate to name their black pet dogs ―Arab‖ in an act of 
denigration and arrogance. The only positive aspect was Arabic tunes incorporated into 
Turkish music popularly called arabesque. Even with this highly popular music, cultural 
connotations were pejorative as it was associated with Turkish people from the lowest social 
strata. The geography Arabs lived in was therefore popularly denigrated, mentally distanced 
and translated into an image of a foreign land for the production of discourses of danger in 
identity construction.  
 
Thanks to such mental bordering, ―other‖ing and distancing, the complexities of Middle 
Eastern politics were reduced to a simplified stereotypical image of ―swamp, bog, mud land,‖ 
in symbolizing the undesirability of dealing with Muslim Arab geographies. Thus, ―sailing in 
the muddy waters of the Middle East‖, a phrase commonly pronounced in Turkish foreign 
policy quarters, was cognitively perceived a risky enterprise that Turkey must carefully refrain 
from. In a way Turkey erected mental barriers before the legal frontiers with the states, 
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peoples, countries and cultures in this region. Hence came the mantra ―good fences make 
good neighbours‖ which promulgated to never interfere with inter-Arab disputes and refrain 
from meddling in Middle Eastern politics.    
 
b) Conservative: The Land of Muslim Brethren 
 
In stark contrast to Kemalism, the conservative mantra calls for a separate geopolitical code 
in dealing with the Middle East. Muslims, wherever they live, are represented as the people 
with whom Turkey should be befriended with. The conservative tradition sees not only the 
fate of Turks and Arabs interwoven but also sees Arabs not as the "other" to be avoided but 
"brothers and sisters" with whom Turkey shares a common past, religion, culture and 
civilization. Mehmet Akif poetically describes the relationship between Turks and Arabs in the 
following.  
 
 Turks cannot live without Arabs; those who say otherwise are so insane,  
Because Arabs are the right eye and the right hand of Turks with no room for 
disdain.” (original in Turkish, emphasis added)357 
 
Moreover, proponents of this tradition perceive Turks as the chief exponents of Islam. As 
such, the mission ascribed to Turkey is the same as its Ottoman predecessor; to serve as 
the leader of the Muslim world. Necip Fazıl calls this ―a mission earmarked to Turks which is 
dictated by historical imperatives regardless of population size‖. 358  This reflects a 
psychological state of mind that sees Turks as the chosen nation in the service Islam. Just 
like the Ottomans once led the effort to disseminate the message of God; it is believed to be 
the manifest destiny of Turks to keep carrying the banner of the East (Islam)359 in modern 
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times. As the argument goes, destiny calls Turks to lead, either by total collapse or full 
recovery, one more time the whole Muslim world360 since the flag of Islam has fallen in 
Turkey, it can only rise again from Turkey.‖361 
 
Tradition Dominant 
Imagination 
Image  
of the 
Middle 
East 
Code Popular 
Representation  
Practical 
Representation 
Policy 
Prescription 
Kemalism Westernism Swamp, 
bog, mud 
land 
Code-1 The 
Significant Other 
Code-2 
Indifferent, 
Neutral 
Backward 
Islamic land 
 
Territories of 
Arab betrayal 
A reminder of 
Ottoman 
backwardness 
and a potential 
threat due to 
embedded 
Kurds and 
Islamic faith 
1. Develop 
impartial 
relations. 
2. Avoid direct 
involvement. 
3. Do not 
meddle in 
Middle Eastern 
conflicts. 
Conservatism Easternism A region of 
brethren 
Code-1 Friendly 
exchange and 
engagement  
Code-2 Muslim 
solidarity 
 
Ex-Ottoman 
Territory 
Prey to 
imperialism, 
western 
capitalism, 
exploitation and 
manipulation 
1. Historical 
responsibility to 
lead due to 
Ottoman legacy 
2. Develop 
friendly 
relations. 
Table 4. Geopolitical Representations around the Middle East 
 
Arabs’ Image of Turks and Turkey 
 
Negative images and stereotypes were also not scarce in the Arab world. Self-inflicted Arab 
geopolitical imagery was equally distanced towards Turkey. For Arabs, the Ottoman past 
reminded them of a period of foreign domination.362 Perceiving Turks as ‗their former imperial 
masters‘, 363  they saw the root causes of Arab backwardness and underdevelopment in 
Ottoman ―colonization‖ and ―exploitation‖. Turkey was held accountable for curtailing the 
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development of Arab‘s indigenous culture, society, identity and dignity. In some accounts, it 
was even blamed for attempting to Turkify Arabs under the Young Turk Revolution (1908).364 
In this regard, Dawn states that ―Arab nationalism arose as an opposition movement in the 
Ottoman Empire‖.365 In the same fashion, Jung notes that the notion of ―the terrible Turk‖, the 
violent suppresser of Arab nationalism embodied by the Ottoman state, was a common 
denominator in the Arab imagery.366 Turkey as a place in this trajectory simply symbolized 
the centre stage of Ottoman domination against which Arabs defined themselves, their new 
states and geopolitical identities. The image of the "brutal, imperialist Turkey" from centuries 
of Ottoman rule367 would thus inevitably cast a shadow in the relations between the new 
Turkish Republic and the Arab states.  
 
As Mustafa Kemal went ahead with the republican reforms in changing the Arabic alphabet 
to Latin and abolishing the Muslim caliphate and Ottoman sultanate on the way towards a 
western-oriented state; the distance between Turkey and the Middle East was widened 
culturally, linguistically and politically as these acts were regarded as Turkey‘s ultimate 
turning its back to its Middle Eastern and Islamic character. Nevertheless misgivings, disdain 
and estrangement among Arabs vis-à-vis Turks and Turkey as a foreign place and people 
thereby grew stronger.  
 
As a separate self-view began to take shape in the early 20th century, Arabs‘ dominant 
geopolitical code was based on Prophet Mohammed‘s hadith (his verse), authentic or 
otherwise, that called ―to stay away from Turks as long as they do not meddle in your own 
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affairs (uturkû al-Turka ma tarakûkum)‖.368 The modern interpretation given was to decisively 
distance away from and almost completely disregard Turks and Turkey. Thus, anxious of a 
prospective Turkish comeback as a force for regional domination, discourses of fear, danger 
and disaffection were a thing of exceptional frequency to reinforce a distinct sense of Arab 
identity and a common Arab geography. Besides, Arabs did not perceive Turks intelligible 
partners to do business with by making a mockery through the phrase ―Turks are deprived of 
the capacity to understand (Atrâk bîla idrâk)‖ in their popular culture. Likewise, another 
common phrase called Turks stubborn and thick headed (aneed mittel el Turkî).  
 
In this sense geographical, cultural, religious, historical and lingual affinity collided with 
constructed mental distance which in turn fed into a profound sense of mutual mistrust and 
resentment. The later attempts at modernization and secularization under Atatürk further 
deepened the divide per se between Turkey and the Arab geographies.369This is due to the 
fact that the Muslim Middle East and Turkey represented the significant ―other‖ if not the 
―enemy‖ in Turkish and Arab nationalist elite‘s respective geopolitical imageries. As a result, 
both in Turkey and the Arab Middle East, mental bordering became a powerful practice just 
like legal boundary-drawing.  
 
Reducing the complexity of the Middle East to a symbol of eternal conflict, a source of 
ultimate threats and the distinct ―other‖ against which Ankara‘s new identity was constructed; 
historical, cultural and religious ties and geographical proximity were not enough to keep 
Turkey and countries lying along its southern border close. Quite to the contrary, as 
expressed by Falih Rıfkı, a close friend of Atatürk, ―the reforms blew up the bridges attaching 
Turkey to the Middle Ages‖370 which was represented in the body of Muslim Middle East. 
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Therefore, Turkey willingly subscribed to the new role of ―intimate stranger‖371 in this region. 
An observer called Turkey‘s lack of interest in Middle Eastern politics as ―benign neglect‖372 
while another described that Turkey behaved for well over half a century ―almost literally as if 
the Middle East did not exist.‖373 With westernist imagery lying at the core, at times Turkey‘s 
Kemalists seemed to engage in Middle Eastern affairs, it was either drawn by events beyond 
its control, tried to make an example after its own success in westernization or was trying to 
prove its credentials as a trustworthy partner to its western allies. Nachmani characterizes 
Arab reaction to Turkey‘s such efforts as the Middle Eastern subsidiary of Western 
civilization.374 
 
Besides, this region embedded a considerable Kurdish population and a number of Islamist 
groups, which were the two key existential threats identified for the new Turkish state with 
possible spill over effects. Hence, the Middle East was the ultimate origin for discourses of 
danger that are used in identity formation. The level of geographical abstraction and 
symbolization about the threats emanating from the Middle East was dazzling. Regardless of 
whether these perceptions were in any way proportional to the actual threat, Turkey chose to 
externalize the causes of domestic instability and unrest. Therefore, Ankara did not see this 
place within its sphere of interest and action. It was perceived a place ―beyond the line‖ and 
outreach for Turkey. Instead the young Turkish republic saw nothing but trouble beyond its 
southern border. The Kemalist elite viewed Turkey a ―lone wolf‖ in a hostile region.375 In a 
way, Turkey perceived itself entrapped by its geographical embeddedness while at the same 
time contradictorily trying to evidence its strategic significance by adopting an analogy which 
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can be read as ―Turkey is important because it is located in such a bad neighbourhood‖. In 
this vein, Turkey conceived itself a victim to its geopolitical situatedness and largely 
neglected exploring external action possibilities. Based on such perceptions that see Turkey 
located at the virtual epicentre of a Bermuda triangle, this has led some analysts to conclude 
that Turkey turned out to be a textbook example of an insulator thanks to its retraction from 
regional affairs.376These perceptions reinforced the alienation of Turkey in Middle Eastern 
affairs. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has contextualized the theoretical framework developed in the first chapter with 
a view to build a conceptual structure for understanding, explaining and analysing Turkey's 
foreign policy behaviour, in particular with regards to the Middle East. Consequently, the two 
longest-standing geopolitical traditions and mantras in Turkey are introduced in order to 
comparatively analyse how geopolitical discourses and representations produced in each 
tradition serve to enable, restrict and rationalize different sets of policy choices. In the 
meantime, the predominant geopolitical discourses and narratives in each tradition are 
highlighted to understand how the position, the role and mission ascribed to Turkey in global 
affairs are formulated as well as geopolitical representations around the Middle East.  
 
It is hoped that this chapter indicates the crucial role Turkey‘s geopolitical culture plays in 
framing possibilities of external action. By helping different Turkish actors construct 
competing representations of the world as well as the regions in Turkey‘s close vicinity, 
geopolitics premieres an important role in the field of foreign affairs. It is through how 
different groups in the Turkish elite make sense of Turkey and its geography, its role and 
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mission in the world and the places around Turkey, and not to mention perceptions of others 
that how geopolitical culture informs foreign policy.  
 
That culture tells two rivalling stories to Turks; one that emphasizes the revolutionary nature 
of state and nation building in Turkey which is firmly westwards-oriented and puts a strong 
emphasis on a rupture between the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey, and the other 
underscoring the continuities in transition from an empire to a nation state. The former, in 
addition to being extremely wary of Turkey‘s neighbours especially in the Middle East is 
contradictorily suspicious of the newly found allies in the west. It is therefore rather mired by 
insecurities, risk averseness and non-assertiveness. Modesty, self-restraint and 
retrenchment are the main characteristics of Kemalist tradition. The attempt by conservatives 
which provide a different picture of the world is also expressly and overtly geopolitical in 
civilizational sense. Put differently, it is space as much as civilization and culture based that 
practical reasoning, justification, representation and discourse are produced. Yet 
conservatives are much bolder, self-confident, assertive and sympathetic to the Muslim world 
that wishes to unleash a complex yet interdependent and supposedly complementary pack of 
relations for Turkey in which the West is perceived nothing more than one of the crucial 
pillars. In embracing post-imperial reflexes and impulses, this strand is keen on pursuing 
―Turkey‘s greatness‖ potential. The latter is rather less explored for Turkey the full results of 
which are yet to be seen.    
 
Against this structure, the next chapter focuses on domestic networks of power and 
bureaucratic procedures through which geopolitical representations and discourses, some of 
which have been long available, some re-invented and yet some totally new, are produced 
and translated into foreign policy practice. 
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CHAPTER 3 - SOCIAL NETWORKS OF POWER AND TURKISH 
GEOPOLITICAL CULTURE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Geopolitical and geographical imagination as a building block for geopolitical culture, a 
means to guide foreign policy, and restrict or enable external action is strictly conditioned on 
how power is imbued within society. One can imagine the world, a region, a place or its 
international position in a million different ways but for such grand geopolitical schemes to 
capture the locus of foreign policy practice, it is imperative to consider the power play 
between different actors in a society. The type of political system, decision making 
mechanism and the relations between different networks of power are most relevant in 
construing how mass or elite geopolitical/geographical imaginations are translated into 
practice.  
 
In attempting an analysis of power, this research rests on a simple definition, as provided by 
Morris, which is ―the capacity to impact on outcomes and the ability to affect others‖.377 
 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it aims to chronologically grasp the 
operation of power in Turkey with a view to set the dynamic context upon which contending 
geopolitical schemes unfold. The ever-going interaction among the political-bureaucratic 
process, the military‘s weight in politics and organization of Turkish economy/business are 
essential components in this regard. Equally crucial is the ideological rivalry between religion 
vs. secularism in winning the hearts and minds of Turks. As such, Kemalism and Islam, as 
sources of ideological power to shape Turkish society, state and its foreign policy, are 
examined. An analysis on the operation of media outlets as a legitimizing apparatus for 
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competing geopolitical narratives is also provided. Lastly, an overview of the decision-making 
process with regards to foreign affairs is added to the equation. In this exercise, both formal 
and informal sources of power interact in the constitution and dissemination of the 
geopolitical discourses that Turkey operates at a given time.  
 
On the other hand, this chapter aims to place the two long established geopolitical traditions 
within the evolution of political, social and economic life in Turkey. An outline of the 
competitive relations between two geopolitical traditions helps indicate what factors enabled 
or restricted the actions taken by the adherents of each school of thought in putting their 
geopolitical choices into reality. 
 
The argument here is both strategic orientation of modern Turkey as well as policy initiation, 
consolidation and/or change in Turkish foreign policy, as is observed at different intervals in 
the case of the Middle East, are brought about in accordance with the following criteria.  
 
a) A comprehensive, well-structured and compelling geopolitical narrative as a source  
  of policy initiation, mostly reflective of a distinct geographical imagination. 
b) A strong political government rooted in one of the well-established geopolitical 
traditions acquiring control over the state apparatus, i.e. single party government 
wielding stronger political power.   
c) A change in the formal and/or informal structures of power in such a manner to  
alter the decision-making process in favour of the challengers. This is crucial due to 
the peculiarities of Turkish politics in which capturing political power alone does not 
guarantee realization of alternative foreign policy agendas.  
d) Presence of charismatic leaders to provide leeway to a specific geopolitical project  
in actual policy practice by means of public persuasion and agenda setting. 
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II. SOCIETAL BASIS OF GEOPOLITICAL TRADITIONS IN TURKEY 
 
It is better to demarcate the boundaries between Kemalist and Conservative schools of 
thought in terms of the societal base they are derivative of. The republican elite, 
(Kemalist/secular establishment), comprising of the CHP (during 1990‘s DSP and SHP as 
well), the military, the bureaucracy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and judiciary) and the 
republican intelligentsia (academics, philosophers, media columnists and other urbanized 
opinion-makers) constitutes a solid societal basis for Kemalism. The last three pillars, army-
bureaucracy-enlightened intelligentsia, can be named the ―iron triangle‖ of Kemalist tradition. 
This tradition was initially allied with propertied locals and commercial bourgeoisie in bigger 
cities and western parts of Turkey (a commercial bourgeoisie), and later to a newly industrial 
bourgeoisie; the emergence and sustainment of which was enabled, encouraged and 
supported by the Kemalist establishment.  
 
In analysing how this tripartite mechanism operates, it must be acknowledged that the 
Turkish army by controlling the meaning of ―national security‖, enjoying unequal weight in 
institutional decision-making mechanisms and being emboldened by a historical claim to 
preserve Kemalist westernist legacy and ideology wielded unmatched influence in setting the 
tone of dominant geopolitical discourse. The foreign policy bureaucracy, i.e. MFA, by 
subscribing to the ideological supremacy of Kemalism acted as a civilian force of 
empowerment or resistance depending on the political government of the day (the military 
and MFA will be referred to as the foreign policy establishment). Prominent Kemalist 
academics, philosophers, media columnists and other intellectuals provided justification and 
legitimization for the westernist policy choices through their writings, teachings, and 
discourses circulated in academia and media.     
 
Masses living in Turkey‘s periphery, from the very beginning, had great difficulty in 
internalizing Kemalist geopolitical project of westernism, abandonment of Turkey‘s eastern 
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placement and characteristics, and the Ottoman legacy. Secularism was also a difficulty. 
Rural communities including peasants, small farmers, and petty bourgeoisie (small and 
medium-size entrepreneurs, artisans, manufacturers) in central, eastern and southeast 
Anatolia in addition to conservative intellectuals in bigger cities have thus traditionally been 
wary of westernism.378Their inclination was to conserve what they had; a post-imperial 
nostalgia of eastern-centric positioning of Turkey, piety, strong adherence to Turkey‘s Muslim 
identity, strict observance of traditional values and immediate localism. There existed motive 
and ground among these people to look for alternative geopolitical agendas whilst rivalling 
geographical imaginations and geopolitical discourses were brewing in conservative circles. 
Post the 1980s, a flourishing pious commercial and industrial bourgeoisie as well as re-
emerging tariqas and Sufi orders (Nakshibendi and Nur movements) became centres of 
attraction among the ranks of conservatives.   
 
III. THE REPUBLICAN ERA 
 
Politico-Military Power in Action: 1923-1982 
 
In applying Michael Mann‘s quadruple model of social power, it must be noted that ―different 
states crystalized differently.‖379 The core interaction among social power networks in the 
early years of state formation in Turkey diverged significantly from that of western countries. 
In contrast to western experience, a rising industrial and commercial bourgeoisie was not the 
engine of change in Turkey. To the contrary, bureaucratic cadres (military and civilian) 
became the agents of change through revolution-from-above. 380  In this regard a large 
number of people with military backgrounds were present under the roof of CHP, the political 
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party leading republican reforms. Thus from the very beginning, military and political power 
was densely entwined in Turkey. Through his charismatic qualities as the commander-in-
chief who championed Turkey‘s liberation effort, Mustafa Kemal made sure that the army 
was loyal to him and to the Republic.381In the absence of effective multiparty contestation 
until the 1950s and capitalist class consciousness, these two sources of social power 
preponderated in determining the shape of Turkish state, society and Turkey‘s geopolitical 
positioning from which its foreign policy sprang up.  
 
Besides the early days of modern Turkey were characterized by a large segment of 
peasants, small farmers, and agricultural labourers. 382  Sunar adds to this picture the 
presence of a considerable landowning class and the local notables of provincial towns 
(eşraf) through which he names the establishment of the Turkish state an accommodation 
between the civilian and military bureaucracy, and the commercial bourgeoisie and the 
landed class (eşraf).383 What must be noted in this tripartite interaction is that there was no 
relationship among these actors as equal partners. To the contrary, the congealment of 
political and military power was incomparably supreme. Holders of politico-military power 
―sought to control and depoliticize, rather than mobilize, the masses in the process of social 
change‖.384 
 
As a result, it was the state that stepped in to foster economic development for creation of 
jobs, industries and wealth in what Polanyi names ―an instituted process‖ brought into being 
by deliberate state intervention.385 Öncü calls this an effort by the pro-capitalist bureaucratic 
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elite to create an industrial capitalist class386 while Mardin dubs it state-led growth of a class 
of Turkish entrepreneurs.387 What underlies these analyses is that the new Turkish state was 
in search of an alternative bourgeoisie out of its own ranks to consolidate power behind its 
westernist geopolitical project.  
 
This newly emerging bourgeoisierelying on the Turkish state as the chief credit-provider, 
buyer and the biggest employer,388 was producing mainly for the domestic market. It had 
almost no motive to look beyond Turkey‘s borders for commercial or business interactions. 
As an inward looking class, the keep-to-itself stance of Turkey in regional affairs boded well 
with its interests. Besides, this class was obedient in nature since its relationship with the 
state was clientalistic and symbiotic.389 Similarly, medium size traders and farmers in western 
Anatolia, wage earners (memur) in the public sector and employees of large private 
companies as well as urban artisans constituted the Kemalist middle class. Their loyalty to 
westernism as a geopolitical choice in determining the shape of the Turkish state, society 
and foreign policy was almost unhindered.  
 
In this process, economic structures in the centre (urban areas) were strengthened at the 
expense of those in the periphery (rural parts of the country) thanks to the interventions in 
the market. 390  In other words, the politico-military elite triedto enlarge social consensus 
around its westernist geopolitical entrepreneurship by creating a bourgeoisie and middle 
class of its own in urban centres while leaving socio-economic structures in the countryside 
                                                          
386ÖNCÜ, A. (2003). p.316. 
387MARDIN, S. (2006). Religion in Modern Turkey in Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey. Syracuse, N.Y., 
Syracuse University Press. p.62. 
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with strong religious and conservative feelings open to marginalize. Zürcher holds the 
authoritarian character of early republican era accountable for the ―huge chasm between the 
government and the people because the demands of the marginalized and relatively helpless 
sectors of society were never represented in state policy.‖391As a result, until the 1950s the 
bulk of the Turkish population remained isolated and traditional while the urban centres were 
modern and secular. 392 Two Turkeys emerged in which political, military, economic and 
ideological power (Kemalism) crystalized in the centre while the rural, traditional, and pious 
Turkey lagged considerably behind. The net impact was an overwhelming dominance of 
westernist geopolitical entrepreneurship which was simultaneously accompanied by 
conservative discourses envisioning a different global positioning for Turkey.    
 
Kemalist Ideology: The Melting Pot? 
 
Kemalism in this context was presented as an ideology that Turks could give their loyalty to. 
In its simplest connotation, Kemalism refers to a set of ideas that aim to bring Turkey back to 
the level of contemporary civilization by westernizing, i.e. following the path of rationality (as 
opposed to faith) and positive science. Kemalism is developmentalist, reformist, revolutionary 
and state-centric. Kemalists attempt to make Turkey everything the West is and symbolizes 
of.  
 
As an ideology, Kemalism was given shape more explicitly in the CHP Congress of 1931 
whereby six principles i.e. republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, laicism and 
revolutionism, were codified as its central pillars. For its ardent followers these principles are 
considered sacrosanct. Kemalism proper was made part of CHP‘s Statute in 1935 and two 
years later it was incorporated into the Turkish constitution. Due to the level of abstraction in 
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these principles, Kemalism, as an ideology, was subject to much debate. For example, Bora 
& Gültekingil assert that it is an ideology of national modernization, which a large segment of 
Turkish society shares intensively.393Scholars who emphasize the progressive elements of 
Kemalist ideology draw attention to its focus on independence, popular sovereignty, 
modernity and populism.394 More explicit expression of these principles is associated with 
democracy, rule of law, human rights, progress and economic development. For others,the 
underlying feature of Kemalism is authoritarianism and eclecticism.395 
 
Regardless of whichever aspect one prioritizes, as in every ideology, Kemalism tried to 
totalize and monopolize the meaning of what‘s right and what‘s not in Turkey.  Any kind of 
thinking was denied existence without structuring a direct or indirect relation to Kemalism.396 
Thus, Kemalism tried to inhibit geopolitical and intellectual discourses that did not befit the 
interests, agendas and discourses of those who hold onto this paradigm. It aimed at creating 
a collectivity of thought and action towards a myth of homogeneity of Turkey. In other words, 
Kemalists attempted at a monolithic modern state by keeping westernist, (Sunni Turkish) 
nationalistic and laicist outlook strong at the expense of largely excluding Allevites, Kurds, 
conservatives and non-Muslims (Armenians, Greeks, Jews, etc.). 397 To this end, all the 
people of Turkey were defined as ‗Turks‘ by the 1924 Constitution regardless of their racial or 
religious/secterian background.398Economy and social order were graduallytransformedby a 
series of changes. In this vein, non-Muslim traders were excluded from Istanbul Trade 
Chamber in 1923. Likewise a law was enacted in 1926 to make Turkish compulsory in all 
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trade-business transactions. With unification of the Education Code (Tevhid-i Tedrisat) in 
1924, adoption of western style Dress Code in 1925, Civil Code and Gregorian calendarin 
1926, writing Islam out of the Constitution and transition from Arabic to Latin in 1928, 
changing to western metric system and shifting weekend holiday from Friday to Sunday in 
1930s, a comprehensive transformation was aimed.399Another law in 1934 banned using 
surnames which make reference to ethnicities other than Turkish.400  In supressing sub-
identities, Settlement Law in 1934 described in great detail how Turkish speaking Christian 
populationin Turkey would be exchanged with Muslimbut non-Turkish people in Greece in 
line with the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty.401It was thus hoped that traditional, religious 
and ethnic/sectarian symbols would cease to serve as markers of difference in social 
life.402By virtue of such steps and a persistent discourse, Kemalism created a myth asserting 
to have achieved total unification and cohesion on its westernist vocation, based on its 
ideological supremacy.403 
 
In terms of attaining supremacy in a religious society, the most crucial aspect was laicism 
(French version of secularism). In essence, it meant that the Turkish state would have an 
equal distance to every faith and religion in separating state and religious affairs. This, 
however, was not absolute neutrality. The state was actively involved in regulating religious 
life through the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı). The reason was, 
just like Christianity in Europe, Islam for centuries used to serve as ―a multifunctional peg on 
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which values, personalities, ideologies and power could be hung‖. 404 The presence of 
religious institutions, Sufi orders and the ulema (religious experts), and the moral influence of 
religion over masses were perceived latent challenges to the power of Kemalist elite.405 
Therefore, the Turkish state treated religion as a barrier to modernization and 
democratization which the West represented, and took measures to isolate it from political 
and public life.406 
 
In this context, with the abolition of the caliphate what had been ―a religion penetrating into 
every crevice of daily life was cut off from these areas‖.407  The extensive secularization effort 
included the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Pious Foundations, the abolition 
of religious courts, dissolution of religious orders (tariqat) and pious schools (medrese), 
disestablishment of Islam as the state‘s religion and abandonment of Arabic alphabet, and 
unification of education system (Tevhid-i Tedrisat). Thus Turkey‘s links with its imperial past 
were severed for good. By inculcating westernist discourses and through establishing control 
over pious activity, formal education and print media, it was hoped that religion could be 
deprived of its social appeal as a source of power and that the power of the Kemalist elite be 
inflated.  
 
Turkish print and visual media was under strict state control until the early 1990s. Eleanor 
Oxford argues that ―Turkish media has long been an official mouthpiece of the status quo, its 
main duty being the propagation of Kemalist ideology (and westernist worldview) whilst 
honouring and being sympathetic to the state-military relationship that has dominated 
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Turkey‖.408In the early years, ―Cumhuriyet (Republic)‖ and ―AkĢam (Evening)‖ newspapers as 
well as ―Kadro (Cadre)‖ magazine played key roles in propagating the Kemalist 
worldview.409In the opposite direction, with the introduction of the ―Law of Maintenance of 
Order (Takrir-I Sukun)‖ in 1925, the press in Istanbul wasput under strict control and 
newspapers from the Islamic or extreme left were shut down. All newspapers adopting liberal 
or socialist positions were closed.410By the 1930s, state controlled radio broadcasting started 
in Turkey as a further instrument of indoctrination. 411After the introduction of multiparty 
competition, dailies ―Milliyet (Nationality)‖ and ―Hürriyet (Freedom)‖,both of which live up to 
this day, were established. But since these papers relied heavily on state subsidies and 
commercial benefits, their line of publication were compatible with Kemalist 
predispositions.412In 1960‘s and 1970‘s, greater degree of proliferation in terms of circulation 
and activity of mass media was achieved in Turkey. Yet due to problems of financial self-
sufficieny, major media outlets had to develop clientalistic relations with the state, which 
inhibited in a way their ability to voice up counter narratives.413 It was against this backdrop 
that the support of the conservative masses in the periphery to the westernist project and 
laicist ideology was sought.  
 
It needs to be noted that Kemalism for a long time stayed a collimator ideology in Turkey, 
one that breeds power by diffusing through the boundaries of economic, military and political 
power organizations. It enjoyed moral power over the masses and even political parties with 
more conservative leanings, which were espoused by Mustafa Kemal‘s personal charisma 
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and the achievements of the newly established state. Although political power changed 
hands to the conservatives in 1950-1960, 1969-1971, 1975-1978 and 1979-1980 before 
more recent times, Kemalist institutionalization of power backed by its ideological influence 
that shaped the public space and framed the content of struggles over inclusion and 
exclusion to the state, remained, as bluntly remarked by Düzgün, largely intact from the early 
Republican period through the 1980s.414 
 
Decision-Making in Turkish Foreign Policy: 1923-1982 
 
Against this backdrop, there is wide consensus in the literature that Turkish foreign policy for 
a long time remained a strictly restricted realm that was reserved to a few mandarins in the 
Turkish state.415 Decision-making was highly personalized and hierarchical. This was easy 
since three war veterans served long tenures in the early years.416The legacy of Mustafa 
Kemal who singlehandedly formulated and observed the westernist orientation in Turkish 
foreign policy remained intact even after his death under his successor Ġnönü.417This was 
also the period during which the Turkish foreign service (MFA) began to take shape albeit its 
contribution to policy making remained marginal. In the absence of real popular electoral 
competition and lack of public debate, westernism as a geopolitical choice in foreign policy 
enjoyed unchallenged supremacy.  
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Once multi-party contestation was introduced in 1946 and the Democrat Party (DP) came to 
power four years later, the bipartisan consensus on Turkey‘s western positioning remained 
unaltered against a rampant Soviet threat.  However, DP leaders perceived the Middle East 
differently, mostly as a place populated by Muslim brethren. Another difference between 
CHP and DP was that the latter relied more on the input from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs.418 
 
The MFA was a largely homogenous segment of bureaucracy which took pride in its 
westernist and nationalistic credentials. It was indeed one of the staunchest adherents of 
Turkey's westernist orientation. Recruitment to the Turkish foreign service remained a 
nepotistic practice in which kinship relations and elitist (Kemalist and other) networks played 
a key role. Having completed academic studies abroad or in schools teaching in foreign 
languages in Turkey, those referred by serving or retired members of the MFA as well as by 
the civilian and military elite enjoyed considerable leverage in getting recruited to the job. The 
same applied to promotions, overseas postings and discharge. Though Ambassadorial 
postings required tripartite approval by the Foreign Minister, PM and the President, the MFA 
by carefully observing the line of promotions used to restrict the pool of eligible candidates. 
Given that out-of-MFA Ambassadors were a thing of exceptional rarity, the cohesive 
character of the MFA as a westernist institution in the Turkish bureaucracy remained almost 
unchallenged. Thus it sought institutional autonomy vis-à-vis holders of political power in 
overseeing the strategic direction of the Turkish state.    
 
Consequently, the MFA gradually emerged as the safety-valve to keep foreign affairs in order 
against DP government when championing closer relations with the Muslim world.419 As Mufti 
notes, ‗governments came and went but the MFA as the republican institution overseeing 
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foreign relations remained, making sure that the ship of state never veered too far off the 
course, and ever ready to shoot down the reckless schemes of elected politicians‘.420 But this 
was no easy job as there was yet another major divergence, i.e. the Turkish Prime Minister 
replaced the President as the most powerful actor in shaping external policy. Consequently, 
the bipartisan nature of overall foreign policy-making and the top-down characteristics of 
external affairs as an area of expert craftsmanship remained similar. 421  This ensured 
continuity in Turkey‘s western orientation but the MFA failed to determine the exact shape of 
Turkish action in the Middle East.   
 
Consensus on foreign policy was disrupted for good soon after the 1960 coup d‟etat.422 The 
liberal constitution introduced in 1961 created an environment of free debate where 
―westernism‖ as a geopolitical preference came under attack. It was not only the 
transformation of the institutional and legal setting but also changes in the political 
environment that fuelled these debates.423 The post-1960 period witnessed an increase in 
the number of actors interested in and wanting to have a say on foreign policy issues, and 
the entry into the Turkish Parliament (in the 1965 elections) of new parties (communists) with 
radically different views.424 
 
However, these dissenting voices were not strong enough to steer a change in the strategic 
orientation of Turkey. Among the two major political parties (CHP of Bülent Ecevit and AP of 
Süleyman Demirel) that ran the country during the 1960s and 1970s, none represented an 
alternative geopolitical agenda to compellingly instigate a change in Turkey‘s western-centric 
foreign policy. CHP, as the vanguard of Kemalism, simply conformed to the prevalent 
westernist orientation. AP (Adalet Partisi - Justice Party) of Demirel, relying on the electoral 
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core of the defunct DP was careful enough to distance itself from the legacy of Menderes. 
Besides, AP was never a party of strong geopolitical convictions in running the external 
affairs portfolio as ―Demirel never claimed any special expertise or even an interest in foreign 
policy‖425 and mostly deferred the portfolio to the foreign policy establishment. The two other 
parties, namely MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi - National Salvation Party) of Necmettin Erbakan 
and (MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - National Movement Party) of Alparslan TürkeĢ 
embracing such a geopolitical narrative (Easternism/Asianism/Turkism) were junior coalition 
partners in the brief periods they were in office. Therefore, their impact on foreign policy 
remained limited. Instead they mostly chose to underscore the ―national unity‖ clause on 
foreign policy despite their indigestions about the preferences of the bigger coalition partner.  
 
Besides, the rise in the power of the military especially after the 1971 memorandum simply 
placed political actors in a rather marginal position in influencing foreign policy. In an 
environment of coalition governments (from 1961 to 1982) and with a powerful military (1971-
1982), the MFA, as a relatively autonomous and coherent institution in the bureaucracy 
strived to enhance its role in foreign relations. Ġskit astutely remarks that ‗the Ministry tried to 
keep its autonomy and monopoly in the formation of foreign affairs and perceived politicians 
as the signatories of the decisions made by the bureaucrats of the ministry.‘426 As a result, 
two notions emerged in Turkish foreign policy. ―State policies‖ referred to Kemalist policy 
preoccupations anchored to the west which the MFA and military strictly observed. 
Presented as reflecting the ―national consensus‖ on foreign policy, these were presented as 
sacred, omniscient and unchangeable. ―Government policies‖ on the other hand were about 
the choices made by the politicians of the day who were branded as neither experts nor 
competent enough to devise alternative courses of action.  
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IV. NEO-LIBERAL ERA  
 
Turkey Opens Up: 1982 -      
 
A substantial reconceptualization of Turkish foreign policy did not arrive without a decisive 
change in the relative weight of social structures of power. This is what happened in Turkey 
after the coup d‟état in 1980. Albeit operating within the remits of the authoritarian system 
established by coup-makers, the 1980s were ironically the period when Turkey went through 
a remarkable process of liberalization in politics, economy, society, culture and foreign policy. 
This process set in motion a new set of dynamics which eventually resulted in the 
emergence of new power centres. ―The increasing economic and political power of pious 
Muslims changed the previous power structure where the Kemalists effectively ruled 
alone.‖427This inevitably reflected on foreign policy.    
 
The politician who started this process was Turgut Özal who had unsuccessfully run for the 
parliament in 1977 as a candidate for Erbakan‘s MSP. He was of a peripheral background 
from a conservative family.428 Özal was Kurdish in origin, a devout Muslim and a confessed 
follower of Nakhsibendi leader Zahit Kotku.429 Being an engineer and spending two years in 
the World Bank in the early 1970s, Özal was well exposed to western culture and ideas 
(especially liberalism). Thanks to the blend between moderate religious leanings and 
reformism, Özal managed to consolidate his hold on power from 1983 until the year he died 
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in 1993. He brought together a cadre of liberal, conservative, nationalist and welfarist 
approaches.430 
 
The 1980s were the years Turkey reversed decades old import substitution which aimed at 
protecting the blossoming republican entrepreneurs and middle class in line with Kemalist 
etatism. Instead export-led-growth was embraced as the new mode of development through 
which the state‘s role in the economy was gradually minimized.431 The new economy relied 
on the export potential of Turkey, foreign direct investments and capital inflows. Coupled with 
privatization of state owned enterprises, cheap credit opportunities, export subsidies, and 
trade and capital liberalization; new avenues were opened for small and mid-size 
entrepreneurs. Particularly important was the decision to allow interest-free finance houses 
which provided Turkey‘s pious entrepreneurs with much needed capital.   
 
Segments of the Turkish business community which were primarily oriented towards the 
lucrative internal market opposed liberalization.432 Forces of resistance were the Kemalist 
bourgeoisie composed of relatively large industrialists and traders.433 Those benefitting from 
the new policies were the pious conservatives in the periphery who were the disadvantaged 
under the import-substitute development strategy. Members of this new group established 
their own financial networks, organized themselves outside the control of the state, and 
challenged the pre-eminence of state-supported industrialists.434 Slowly but assertively, a 
new bourgeoisie and a new middle class came into being. These new classes are usually 
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treated as the ―symbol or carriers of change‖ in Turkey as well as ―the most significant 
support base‖ for conservative politicians.435 
 
The clientele of these new classes supported free market competition and exposure to the 
world because they achieved economic power independently of state patronage.436They 
preferred liberal policies and minimal state intervention.437 Thumann underlines that this new 
group, adapting skilfully to the requirements of time-space compression (globalization), 
considered itself far more progressive than the secular (military) officers, judges and civil 
servants (in foreign service) that have one way or the other ruled Turkey since 1923.438 
 
The newcomers in economic power were extremely critical of the secular establishment and 
increasingly involved in shaping economic policy and asking for a voice in external affairs.439 
Their regional and global interests diverged significantly from that of the big industrialists. As 
an outward looking class and far more eager to interact with places in Turkey‘s close vicinity, 
they demanded peaceful relations in thesespaces. Thus they demanded regional security 
and stability.440 In other words, they pressured Turkish policy-makers for a lebensraum where 
they could seek new markets, raw materials, finance and energy resources with a view to 
enhance their interests. This motivated Turkey‘s conservative political leaders to take a much 
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more visible role in helping shape the peaceful and developmentalist territorial orders 
especially in the Middle East and Turkic-speaking world.  
 
 
Old Wine in New Bottles: Religion Resurfaces 
 
During the 1980s, crucial changes also took place in the social and ideological make up in 
Turkey. The speed at which population and urbanization grew far exceeded the rate of 
economic growth and industrialization.441 Rapid urbanization and unequal industrialization 
further deepened the inherent centre-periphery divide as urban centres attracted huge 
immigration flows. This has gradually eroded confidence of many Turks in the ―state‖, its 
institutions442 and the established policy positions locking the direction of their country to the 
west in seeking solutions.  
 
Under these circumstances, the coup-makers of 1982 who visualized Turkey‘s place in the 
western ―free world‖ against a rampant communist threat, once again relied on the 
functionalist perspective on religion. Justifying their intervention by unstoppable clashes 
between right (nationalist) and left (socialist) wing groups; they thought Islam could play a 
gluing role in overcoming ideological cleavages. Religion was thus rebranded as a force of 
social unity, harmony and stability. 443  This facilitated association of official ideology 
(Kemalism) with Islam but by not doing this at the expense of depreciating or ignoring the 
                                                          
441 Turkey’s population at its inception was approximately 12 million. By 1960 the figure was roughly 30 million. 50 million 
threshold was exceeded in 1985 and it reached over 70 million in late 2000s (Statistics are from the website of the State 
Institute of Statistics available at: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/Start.do (consulted on January 8, 2013). 
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443ÖNIS, Z. (1997). The political economy of Islamic resurgence in Turkey: the rise of the Welfare Party in 
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weight of westernist credentials.444―This was an attempt to exploit religion and mould it with 
national feelings as a common denominator for social order while preserving westernist 
outlook.445The ―Turkish-Islamic synthesis‖ was designed to reduce the appeal of radical leftist 
ideologies (communism) and also to diminish the influence of non-Turkish strands of Islamic 
thinking from Pakistan and the Arab world.446 It was also hoped that such a synthesis would 
block the impact of Kurdish nationalism and Iranian revolution surpassing Turkey.  
 
In the following years, religion began to reshape the socio-cultural, socio-economic and 
political aspects of life in Turkey through tariqahs, Sufi orders (Nakshibendi and Nur 
movements), flourishing pious economic structures (business communities organized under 
MUSĠAD (Müstakil ĠĢadamları Derneği - Independent Businessmen Association), TUSKON 
(Türkiye ĠĢadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu - Businessmen and Industrialists 
Confederation of Turkey), TÜMSĠAD (Tüm Sanayici ve ĠĢ Adamları Derneği - Association of 
All Industrialists and Businessmen), etc.) and its offshoots in politics (the National View 
Movement of Erbakan and lately AK Party). Religion was gradually transformed into a 
mechanism of social solidarity and became a core component of network groups.447  In a 
way, religion regained influence as a multifunctional peg, this time determining not only the 
shape of values, culture and identity but also economy, politics and power. Besides, it served 
not only as a core component of personal identification but also a source of collective identity 
calling for a repositioning of Turkey‘s global standing.  
 
One peculiar aspect in the rise of Sufi orders such as the ones led by Fethullah Gülen 
(Nurcular), Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (Süleymancılar), Nakshibendi leaders Zahit Kotku and 
                                                          
444BORA, T., & CAN, K. (1991). Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket . (State, Hearth, 
Convent;  Nationalist Movement from September 12 to 1990’s) Cağaloğlu, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları. p.139. 
445 RUBIN, A. (2012). p.176. 
446KARAKAS, C. (2007). Turkey: Islam and Laicism between the Interests of State, Politics, and Society. [Frankfurt 
am Main], Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, PRIF. p.17-18. 
447 KESKİN, T. (2012). Market Oriented Post-Islamism in TURAM B. Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in 
Play in Turkey, Palgrave Macmillan.p.138. 
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later Esad CoĢan (Ġskenderpasha community) was that they were far more business-oriented 
and outward looking than those in the early republican era. Their activities were not confined 
to spiritual preaching, religious solidarity or divinity studies. To the contrary, they have turned 
into a powerful transnational network of people controlling financial, economic, cultural and 
educational activities worldwide. 448  They controlled financial institutions, newspapers, 
schools and other economic activities that were increasingly of transnational character with 
the object of integrating Turkey with the world.449Avcı gives a list of religious media out of 
which it is possible to identify Samanyolu TV, Samanyolu Haber TV, Ayna TV, Bugün TV, 
CHA (World News Agency), dailies Zaman and Bugün as well as magazines Aksiyon and 
Sızıntıbeing associated with Gülen movement; a newspaper (Türkiye), two TV channels 
(TGRT and Akra FM), and a news agency (IHA) being associated with Naqshbandisect 
whereas one cable (Mesa), one local (Ege), and two main TV channels (Mar and Kadırga) 
can be linked to Qadiri branch.450In the field of education, Gulen‘sfollowers operatearound 
1,200 international schools in more than 150 countries as of 2000s(mostly in Central Asia, 
Africa and Balkans).451 They also ran hundreds of preparatory courses for Turkey‘s university 
entrance exam.The movement controlled financial institutions such as Bank Asya, the 
country's largest "interest-free" bank, and Asya Finans.452 Nakshibendis on the other hand 
operated Ġhlas Finans.The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists 
(TUSKON),linked to Gulenists, was incepted in 2005 which became Turkey‘s largest private 
business-related organization engaging in business activities towards Africa, Central Asia 
                                                          
448 KESKİN, T. (2012). Market Oriented Post-Islamism in TURAM B. Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in 
Play in Turkey, Palgrave Macmillan.p.124. 
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and the Balkans.453Menzil group created another association, TÜMSIAD, the same year with 
a membership base of 15,000 with a view to help forge business ties with Muslim countries. 
As noted by Svante and Kay, the movement of Süleyman Tunahan too gradually evolved into 
anorganized group in Turkey and Europe –controlling several hundred mosques and Quranic 
schools in Germany alone.454 
 
The message of Turkish Islam as a vibrant ideological force also seems to have undergone a 
substantial transformation. It was no longer merely geared towards enhancing Islamic 
solidarity or an ―umma‖ type of trans-boundary cooperation among Muslims. It was equally 
about easing the perceived tensions between Islam and Christianity, eastern and western 
civilizations, and hence promoting an agenda of inter-cultural/inter-faith dialogue, tolerance 
and harmony.455 This was particularly true for the congregation of Fethullah Gülen, a disciple 
of Said Nursi (the founder of Nur movement in Turkey). Ending state monopoly on media 
ownership in the post 1993 period simply magnified the leverage enjoyed by religion as a 
source of social power. Religious groups gained access to media outlets, which allowed 
them to reach a broader audience. Yet their activity and impact was largely dwarfed in 
comparison to Kemalist mainstream media.  
 
Nonetheless, thanks to increased interaction with various people in the Middle East, the 
image of Arabs began to incrementally change in Turkish people‘s perception.456 As the 
opportunity space was enlarged at home, these religious communities wished the Turkish 
state be more supportive of their activities abroad rather than acting as a force of hindrance. 
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454Ibid. p.14. 
455 For a more detailed analysis see BRODEUR, P. C. (2005). The Ethics of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi's Dialogue with 
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Turkey under conservative politicians in a way accommodated the demands of religious 
movements as well in trying to connect Turkey with far away (physically or mentally) 
territories.  
 
The response by Kemalists to the revival of religion was a process of securitization in which 
the object of security was laicism and integrity of the Republic.457 This was a partial success 
during February 28 process in which the military helped forge a broad societal basis to force 
the elected conservative government to resign. Ousted and shut down was not only RP of 
Necmettin Erbakan. Pious businessmen and religious orders also came under attack. The 
unexpected yield of this bold intervention was gradual erosion in the confidence to the 
military‘s true motivations as the whole event was perceived a greedy act to grasp power 
from elected politicians. Besides, it soon became controversial that a strong clique within 
military pushed for such an action at the expense of undermining the overall command 
structure.458 
 
The Crisis of Kemalism 
 
The rise of Islam as an outward looking, pro-business and pro-dialogue ideology coincides 
with another trend in Turkey, i.e.the crisis of Kemalism. The crisis became apparent once 
some of Kemalist prerogatives did not come true, contradictions emerged among its basic 
tenets and some of principles lost its contemporary relevance.  
 
Going in reverse order, introduction of neo-liberal economic policy based on export-led 
growth made ―etatism‖ by and large redundant. Secondly, making a choice between Kemalist 
principles of ―populism‖ and ―republicanism‖ versus ―etatism‖ and ―revolutionism‖ created a 
moral dilemma. In other words, the modernist democratic ideals of Kemalism which relied on 
                                                          
457BILGIN, P. (2008). The Securityness of Secularism?: The Case of Turkey. Security Dialogue. 39, p. 593-614.  
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the popular will of people contradicted with its revolutionary, top-down, statist and 
authoritarian tendencies.459 The illiberal stance on interpreting these principles created a rift 
between the westernized rulers and conservative people. On the one hand lied a strong and 
centralized state structure with a repressive and intolerant elite while on the other was 
alienated masses. Thirdly, Kemalism failed to forge a common unifying identity for all its 
nationals.460 Put differently, as Kemalists tried to oust religion from the social texture, they 
could not present a civic ideology to replace the old religious and social bonds.461 Instead 
they tried to assimilate ethnic and religious differences under the supposedly melting pot of 
Kemalist ideology and ―Turkishness‖.  
 
The crisis of Kemalism was not felt earlier because Atatürk‘s charismatic persona managed 
to disguise its inherent flaws. His cult, resembling the Mahdi/Saviour notion in Turkish-Islamic 
tradition succeeded in uniting a war torn nation.462 With sweeping transformations in political, 
economic, social and ideological make up in the 1980s; imperfections about Turkish 
democracy, problems related to Kurds, Alevites and Christian minorities as much as Islamic 
revival emerged as outstanding issues. Thanks to the interpretation given to Turkey‘s 
geography at the centre of eternal conflict, turmoil and tension, these pervasive domestic 
problems motivated Kemalist leaders to adopt an insular and rather allergic tone towards 
Kurds, devout Muslims and to a lesser degree non-Muslim minorities. This uncompromising 
attitude was coupled with an inward looking geopolitical discourse and risk averse, defensive 
and aloof stance in regional affairs. This cyclical pattern not only failed to help solve Turkey‘s 
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democracy deficiency and its minority problems but also virtually locked the country in from 
the spaces surrounding Turkey.   
 
Lastly Kemalism's promise to make Turkey an equal partner in the western community of 
nations did not materialize. Even as a NATO member, Turkey had to endure deep 
disappointments. Most concretely, the unrealized bid to join the EU after 50 years further 
exacerbated such perceptions. Not offering any viable solutions, as an ideology and a 
geopolitical blueprint, Kemalism‘s appeal to foster social and economic development, 
enhance democratic participation and civil rights and guide foreign policy came under serious 
criticism.   
 
To sum up, post-1980s witnessed a process through which prerogatives of the Kemalist 
establishment increasingly came under attack. Until the late 1990s, the new networks of 
power comprising of conservative politicians, the pious commercial and industrialist 
bourgeoisie, religious orders and movements gradually gained the upper hand. Thus, the 
existing power relations that the Kemalist establishment normalized until the 1980s went 
under extreme strain by the combined force of these extensive transformations. This posed a 
serious challenge to the 50 years old social order shaped by the iron triangle of army-
bureaucracy-intelligentsia backed by big business.  
 
The relative shift in the domestic distribution of power accounts in part for the change in the 
tone, style and orientation of Turkish foreign policy which reflects the interests, agendas and 
preferences of emboldened conservatives. This gradual shift however was not an absolute 
transfer of power from one network to another. It was, as was ever, an ongoing competition 
between the two camps to determine the shape of the Turkish state, society, politics and 
159 
 
economy in which geopolitical thought and foreign policy becameareas of further 
contention.463 
 
 
 
 
Two Contradictory Trends in Foreign Policy-Making: Post-1980’s 
 
The last thirty years of Turkey is characterized by two reverse trends in foreign policy-
making. During the 1980s and 2000s, the military and its civilian collaborators steadily 
strengthened their grip on power. The 1990s in particular were the high time for the military‘s 
influence not only in foreign policy but also anything with a visible political connation. The 
only exception was how Özal handled the external relations portfolio. The second period 
starting in the 2000s on the other hand bore witness to a gradual decline in the weight of the 
military, yet not amounting to the point of total extinction.  
 
a) The Rise and Rise of Foreign Policy Establishment: 1982-1999  
 
Since the 1960s, the dichotomous relationship between weak government versus strong 
bureaucracy manifested itself starkly in the making of Turkish foreign policy. As noted by 
critical scholars, ‗foreign policy decision-making within coalition governments, together with 
the involvement of multiple autonomous actors, has always been very challenging in Turkish 
politics compared to situations in which decision-making power is less dispersed.‘464 In the 
absence of strong governments to bring fresh stimuli to the existing westernist geopolitical 
                                                          
463 For a detailed account of the impact February 28 process had on Turkish political and economic life and decision-
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the February 28 Process. South Atlantic Quarterly. 102, p.309-332.  
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discourse, the heavyweights in foreign affairsremainedthe military and MFA until the 
2000s.465 Turkish foreign policy reflected the core interaction between these institutions.466 
The first was believed to enjoy an unequal weight in determining policy outcomes. The latter 
served as a major source of expertise on issues pertinent to external relations and ran daily 
errands in policy implementation.467 Consequently, ―foreign policy remained one sphere of 
politics where consensus among the traditional decision-making elites seemed strongest, to 
the extent that foreign policy was often regarded as ‗state policy‘‖.468 
 
As in every foreign service, the many functions performed by the Turkish MFA included 
collecting data on international relations, giving policy-makers an informed picture of world 
affairs, providing input for policy-making, drafting talking points and foreign policy speeches 
as well as taking part in implementation. These functions elevated the upper tier of the MFA 
to the privileged status of Turkey‘s geopolitical storytellers. Together with the military brass, 
Robins calls them ―high priests of Kemalism‖. 469  They were the ones giving shape to 
perceptions of what the international political space is, and what course of action to follow. 
These functions in themselves were sources of power. This is because the MFA made a 
claim of having expertise and authoritative knowledge on the discipline of foreign affairs, 
which was defined as an act beyond the grasp of ordinary citizens and politicians. Thus, it 
tried to establish itself with a reputation of professionalism, expertise, observing state 
traditions and risk-averse judgement. 
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By making sense of international relations, almost invariably with resort to the westernist 
imagery, the MFA exercised diffused power. It laid down the parameters within which 
―national interest‖ could be evoked. By also monopolizing the means (talking points, policy 
speeches and recommending policy positions) through which ―national interest‖ is reflected in 
the discourse, the MFA aimed to function as the watch-keeper of Turkey‘s overall foreign 
policy. In this respect, the role it played in framing policy and reproducing westernist 
geopolitical discourse proved greater in the absence of strong, charismatic and 
knowledgeable political figures with a challenging geopolitical narrative.470 
 
This is probably why President Özal chose to conduct foreign policy without much 
consideration to the advice from the bureaucracy. For him, this was breaking away with 
bureaucratic tutelage. He tried to spare authority back to the elected government by 
challenging the sanctity of state traditions.471 Yet, as Robbins makes the authoritative claim, 
‗it is better to treat the rise in Özal‘s personal style as an exception rather than the rule since 
the foreign and security establishment made a notable come back after his death.‘472 
 
In this context, the 1990s were arguably the golden years of the Turkish army. If Turkish 
diplomats can be named stewards of Turkey‘s western oriented foreign policy, the army‘s 
perception of itself was the guardian of (secular and nationalist) domestic order and strategic 
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parameters of ‗state policies‘. 473 Thus the MFA and the military shared a consensus in 
imagining Turkey an integral part of the Western/European world. In other words, these two 
were bounded together in complying with the westernist geographical imagination. As a 
result, their perceptions of national interest largely converged to the point that General Çevik 
Bir is quoted saying that ―governments are like hats. One goes off and another comes in. 
What remains truly is the state‖.474 
 
Throughout republican history, the army, just like the MFA, could secure a fairly established 
institutional and political autonomy. Relying on the self-styled military education, it achieved a 
fairly autonomous corporate identity among the officer corps. In this respect recruiting, 
promotion, discharge and assuming commanding positions in hierarchy remained a practice 
of the military‘s internal affairs.475  As a result, those who did not subscribe to Kemalist 
worldview, imagination and ideology were either outright denied recruitment or barred during 
promotions. The military‘s closed circuit education system also provided harmony and 
conformity around the westernist imagery. Thus, the army stood ready to protect the 
Kemalist state if necessary from both its own people and against external enemies.  
 
The power of the military, in the post-1982 coup until the 2000s, was both coercive and 
diffused, deriving from formal and informal structures of power. The diffused power of TAF 
stemmed from its strict subscription to Kemalist ideology and coupling this concept with 
―national security‖. The coercive basis of the military‘s power crystalized around the 
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474 General Bir is quoted saying this to Turkish reporters in 1996 in defiance of PM Erbakan’s foreign policy overtures in 
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institutional mechanism called the National Security Council and by its reputation of not 
hesitating to interfere in the political process.476 
 
Surprisingly military interventions in Turkey in general enjoyed considerable popular 
support477 due to a deep seated feature of Turkish geopolitical culture. As an extension of 
Sevres-phobia, Turks prioritized order at the expense of temporary interruptions in 
democracy. The belief that ―the worst order is better than a situation of complete chaos‖ 
loomed large in the collective memory of Turks. In this cognitive inertia, the experience of the 
anarchy-like situation in post-World War I Ottoman Empire was reproduced generation after 
generation. The military in this perspective was seen as the ultimate order-provider at times 
of crisis, economic distress and political insolvency.  
 
Secondly, by defining what constitutes a threat, danger and challenge to Turkey‘s ―national 
security‖, the military used to effectively dominate policy agenda in almost every dimension 
of governance. As Öztürk acknowledges, ―thanks to the broad way in which national security 
was defined, the military was able to subsume all aspects of domestic, foreign, and security 
policy under it‖.478 Such an interpretation gave the statements and recommendations issued 
by the military a powerful influence on the political process‖.479 This in turn helped the military 
to promote its own legitimacy and perpetuate virtually veto power in politics with foreign 
policy being no exception during this period.480 
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One should emphasize here the command the Turkish military used to enjoy over the 
discipline of geopolitics as a scientific method of strategy which went hand in hand with the 
authority to shape national security discourse.481 A deep sensitivity on national security lay 
beneath this military-minded geopolitical perspective,482 which produced an inward-focused 
geopolitical understanding that prioritized internal concerns.483 The argument can be taken 
further in stipulating that the Turkish military also successfully exaggerated security threats 
coming from the outside. Accordingly, the military produced a strong national security 
discourse in which it claimed to be authoritative and expert while normalizing its above-the-
politics influential position.  
 
In this process, Turkey‘s so-called exceptional geography (in the sense that its south and 
east was doomed with instability, turmoil, secessionist, irredentist and fundamentalist 
regimes and ideologies)was used as a means of securitizing the discourse on foreign policy. 
As a result,a fear of loss of territory,484 an over-zealous attitude towards sovereignty and 
territorial integrity485 and seeing Turkey in the midst of great power rivalry to divide and 
disintegrate 486  loomed large in Turkish security discourse. Going hand-in-hand with this 
enduring perception were threats from within i.e. Kurds, political movements with Islamic 
motives and also fears that Greek, Armenian or other Christian minorities are colluding with 
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foreign powers to divide and destroy the country. 487  Such perceptions in turn made 
sentiments of insecurity grow stronger.Consequently, as argued by YeĢiltaĢ, geopolitical 
discourses produced by the military on the one hand tried to consolidate and normalize its 
institutional role (safeguarding the homeland and the bastion of Kemalist regime) while 
simultaneously merging this institution‘s conception of the ―imagined (western) identity‖ with 
the official state ideology.488 
 
Regardless of whether perceptions were commensurate with actual threats or if they bear 
any justifiable ground, creating a heightened sense of geographical insecurity served an 
undeclared agenda of enhancing cohesion, obedience and submission within society. The 
mythicized conception of Turkish geographical exceptionalism in the sense that it called 
Turkey a victim of its geographical embeddedness, supported existing structures of power. In 
the words of Aras, such a discourse helped policy-makers create a strong sense of 
defending the homeland, mobilize support at home and preserve their hold on power.489 By 
the same token, this also fitted well with the increasing role of the military in reflecting a 
mirror image of domestic national security discourse onto foreign policy.490 This is particularly 
important with regards to the Middle East because the boundaries of plausible action for any 
elected government were pre-framed within the threat perceptions of the military. 
 
The institutional coercive mechanism by which foreign policy strategies were formulated was 
the National Security Council (NSC), which was established in accordance with the 1961 
Constitution. Originally it was composed of 10 members equally divided between the military 
and civilian government. The NSC Secretary General came from the ranks of the military as 
well. Albeit being dissipated of voting rights,he enjoyed considerable power in setting the 
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agenda. The Council through the powers vested in it by the 1982 Constitution (the extinct 
Article 118) played a leading role in defining the internal and external threats, national 
security priorities and hence taking over the primary responsibility to formulate security policy 
(hereafter read synonymous with foreign policy).  Article 118/3 of the 1982 Constitution also 
stipulated that the Turkish government had to give ―priority consideration‖ to its decisions. By 
the token of this clause, it was inadequately answerable to the Parliament on matters of 
defence, foreign and security policy. Its Secretary General had also the power to monitor the 
executive decision-making by following up the implementation of NSC decisions. 491  The 
oversight task vested with the Secretary General in practice brought about immense 
executive privileges in instructing foreign, interior and justice ministers and overseeing the 
intelligence services on matters of national security. This drew the analogy that with such 
vast executive powers, he was like a shadow ―Prime Minister‖ running a ―parallel 
government‖. All in all, thanks to the considerable coercive and diffused power this institution 
wielded for the military, during the 1990‘s the NSC was transformed into the principle 
decision making mechanism in Turkey.       
 
Emboldened by its leading role and with an attempt to retain control over security-minded 
discourse, the military also formulated a National Security Policy Document. This classified 
document reintroduced in 1992 was prepared by the General Secretariat of National Security 
Council in coordination with the MFA and National Intelligence Agency. Basically it set the 
strategic priorities and enumerated domestic and external threats. Turkey‘s foreign and 
security policy needed to conform to this document. No law or decree could be acted, and no 
international treaty or agreement could be signed which would contradict with the basic 
principles of this document.492 It must have been approved by the Turkish government but 
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not introduced to the parliament since it was not a law itself.493The document was yet another 
instrument setting the limits of bounded rationality for Ankara in dealing with the external 
affairs portfolio. In the post-Cold War era for instance, the document identified Iraq, Iran and 
Syria as threats to Turkey‘s security since these were deemed supporting Islamist groups 
and Kurdish secessionists.494 Therefore, it was no easy job for Turkey‘s elected politiciansto 
go beyond what was made possible, plausible and legitimate in Ankara‘s relations with these 
countries.   
 
On the other hand, the Office of Turkish President was also reserved to a military figure until 
Turgut Özal was elected to this post in 1989.  Albeit being largely symbolic in terms of 
executive powers,the President was nonetheless a crucial actor in the larger system of 
checks and balances. Having a military-minded figure in this high post was important in 
preserving the westernist outlook of the country as well as in overseeing daily errands of 
foreign policy. On the other hand, up until the late 1990s the director of the National 
Intelligence Agency (MIT) was also drawn from the files of the military as well as half its 
personnel.495 Therefore, it can be argued that the 1990s were the golden age of the Turkish 
military‘s engagement with domestic and foreign policy.496 
 
Given this background, it is obvious that the military and the MFA enjoyed a disproportionate 
advantage in framing practical geopolitical discourse and thus a westernist discourse heavily 
entangled with the military‘s vantage point of ―national security‖ prevailed. Thus, ―foreign 
policy‖ and ―national security‖ was inextricably linked. William Hale, in this entwinement, 
notes that ―defence (security) policy (presented as foreign policy) was regarded as the 
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(military‘s) private preserve, outside the control of the elected politicians‖.497To challenge 
these established parameters, as in the case of Özal, one had to not only develop an 
alternative geopolitical discourse but also play around existing structures of power and 
decision making.  
 
 
b) Empowering the Elected Government vis-à-vis the Foreign Policy Establishment 
 
A most decisive dynamic helping gradually change the domestic power relations in Turkey 
was the single party government since 2002. Winning 34,3 % of the total vote in 2001 (and 
hence securing 362 seats in a Parliament with 550), the AK Party became the new beacon of 
hope for Turks who longed for political stability, clean politics and business-friendly 
government. Its initial strong pro-democracy, pro-human rights and pro-EU rhetoric with a 
traditionalist and conservative scent was alluring for millions whose experience a decade ago 
was fraught with fragile coalition governments that were largely opportunistic and lacked 
clear principles and policy vision. In contrast to the deep political fragmentation in the 1990s, 
the new millennium thus signalled a period of political stability and strong government for 
Turkey. So far as that what Turkey had afterwards was a single party government which kept 
strengthening its political mandate after each general election.498 Relying on such a strong 
political mandate, the AK Party was able to gradually reclaim the domestic landscape which 
during weak and fragmented coalition governments in the 1990s had fallen under the 
influence of a strong military. Enjoying landslide electoral victories one after the other, AK 
Party government was able to expand its area of manoeuvre in putting into practice its own 
geopolitical agenda as republican establishment was incrementally deprived of its role in the 
system.  
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A major strength was the AK Party‘s ability to bring in its own breed of charismatic leaders to 
Turkish politics. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül and Ahmet Davutoğlu enjoyed 
popularity only comparable to previous conservative figures like Adnan Menderes and Turgut 
Özal. In terms of personal ratings, they remained for so long far more popular than any of the 
existing political leaders in Turkey.499Many of the qualities, in the Weberian sense, expected 
of charismatic leaders such as charm, self-confidence, attraction and appeal500 were present 
in their personalities. Hence, they did not shy away from taking risks in order to challenge 
conventional behaviour patterns anticipated of Turkey in the international arena. In so doing, 
the theatrical oratory skills in articulating a new geographical imagination for Turkey proved a 
crucial asset. The ability to persuade, sway and direct public opinion was extremely crucial in 
galvanizing support behind preferred courses of action in foreign policy. As noted by Kendal 
& Carter, “by means of (creating an image of) possessing exemplary and exceptional 
personal qualities and demonstration of extraordinary insight and accomplishment‖, the 
power and choices they had were made legitimate and acceptable.501 Thus, their self-styled 
patterns of action attractedTurkish public as well as the Muslim world. This inspired loyalty 
and obedience from the followers and some degree of admiration from the opponents in the 
conduct of foreign policy.   
 
The relative power of political actors vis-à-vis foreign policy establishment (the military and 
the MFA) was enhanced in two ways. On the one hand, this has been instrumental in setting 
the foreign policy agenda by taking into consideration expectations and preferences of those 
who lay at the core of the AK Party‘s electoral success, i.e. Turkish conservatives; the rising 
pious bourgeoisie, neo-liberal entrepreneurs and intellectuals as well as religious orders and 
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tariqas.502On the other hand, the presence of charismatic figures running the foreign affairs 
portfolio with a strong political mandate made it easier to take over the role of geopolitical 
―storytellers/priests‖. Having developed an appealing geopolitical narrative (Turkey the 
centre), elected politicians thus reclaimed control over foreign policy discourse. As a result, 
political leaders were transformed into the new Shamans in scripting the international political 
space, Turkey‘s global position, what it means to have the geographies around Turkey and 
how Ankara should behave. Enjoying simultaneously sweeping electoral success gave 
credibility to the holders of political power to re-assert control over the definition of concepts 
like ―national security‖, ―foreign policy positions (as opposed to ‗established state policies‘) 
and hence what constitutes ―national interest‖. In the end, charismatic leaders virtually side-
lined foreign policy bureaucracy and turned it into a subordinate mechanism.  
 
The second crucial development is the structural changes facilitated by EU-led reforms that 
challenged the primary positions of the military/bureaucratic elite by undermining the basis of 
their coercive and diffused power. Turkey was officially granted candidature for EU 
membership at the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Accordingly, accession negotiations 
commenced in October 2005. In this vein, a series of reforms, some of which well surpassed 
the reign of the AK Party, were initiated. The decision to limit the powers of the NSC was 
particularly critical since it triggered a comprehensive transformation in the domestic scene. 
The first wave of reforms in 2001 altered the status of NSC decisions by stipulating that the 
government would no longer ―give priority consideration‖ but rather ―assess‖ the 
recommendations by NSC.503In accordance with constitutional amendments in 2003,the post 
of Secretary General was given to a civilian.504 In this process, selection of the Secretary 
General was left to the discretion of the PM in contrast to the old practice whereby the 
                                                          
502 For an analysis of AK Party’s rise and its electoral core see DALMIŞ, İ & AYDIN, E. (2008) in The Social Bases of 
the Justice and Development Party CIZRE, U. (2008). Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey the Making of the Justice 
and Development Party. London, Routledge, p.201-223.  
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504  The first civilian to assume the post of NSC Secretary-General was Ambassador Yiğit Alpogan (2004-2007). 
Succeeding him were two serving Ambassadors and now the position is filled in by a former Governor.  
171 
 
military chose the candidates. Besides, the Secretary General‘s ―coordinating and 
overseeing‖ task in the implementation of NSC decisions was transferred to the Deputy PM. 
Additionally, the number of military working at his office was reduced by not renewing the 
contracts of staff with military backgrounds. Besides more civilians were recruited. 
Furthermore, the composition of the NSC was redesigned in a way to increase number of 
civilian members. As a result, the NSC was transformed into a truly consultative organ. The 
Turkish military‘s grip on issues of foreign and security policy was thus significantly relaxed, 
depriving it of a crucial institutional mechanism to impact foreign policy.  
 
Another change was about the National Security Policy Document (NSPD), known as the 
Red Book. One of the latest versions of this document was prepared in 2005 amid criticisms 
over continuation of ―military tutelage‖ and lack of transparency since the Turkish Parliament 
and the elected government wasexcluded from its preparations.505 In due process, passages 
from the supposedly confidential document were leaked to the press. Particular attention was 
drawn to the part which stipulated that ―the military could take control (of power) in 
addressing internal and external threats to national security if necessary‖. 506  This was 
interpreted as a further basis to legitimize military interventions and was demonized by liberal 
circles. The established practice according a primary role to the military in setting the tone of 
security (and foreign) policy was thus increasingly questioned. Liberal NGOs such as Ġnsan 
Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Foundation) and ÇağdaĢ Hukukçular Derneği (Foundation of 
Contemporary Jurists and Barristers) were among the harshest critics. As a result, the AK 
Party went ahead in adopting NSPD-2005 by a Prime Ministerial decree. Yet criticisms from 
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the ranks of the AK Party were not absent. Remarks by Deputy PM Arınç in the Turkish 
Parliament which likened the NSPD to ―the covert constitution of Turkey‖ were the fiercest.507 
 
Such wide spanned criticisms could not achieve nullification of the document. But they 
prepared the ground for amore civilian-led updated version.As a new revision was underway 
in 2010, the reports appearing in the Turkish press emphasized that it was the elected 
government and not the military that gave the document its ultimate shape. Reportedly, 
Islamic fundamentalism (irtica) was no longer named a domestic threat. In instigating a 
process of comprehensive ―de-othering‖; Greece, Syria and Iraq were removed from the list 
of hostiles.508 Hence, the NSPD was streamlined in accordance with the new foreign policy 
posture of Turkey.509 
 
One of the latest attempts by the military to retake influence came amidst the furore over 
electing the new President in 2007. The military top brass, which considered the AK Party a 
threat to the secular domestic order, issued the famous ―e-coup‖ with a view to block the 
transfer of what was perceived as the last bastion of Kemalist establishment to 
conservatives. The ―e-statement‖ by the Turkish General Staff in brief read as follows.  
 
“The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) is watching the Presidential election process with 
concern. It should not be forgotten that TAF is a party to these discussions and is the 
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absolute guardian of secularism. Moreover, TAF... will demonstrate its attitude and 
actions in a clear manner when the time comes. Nobody should doubt this”.510 
 
Despite having a relatively less influential status in the Turkish political system, the 
symbolism around the Office of President as a force in broader checks and balances was still 
strong. The Turkish military felt alarmed by conservatives‘ taking over this post in addition to 
the executive and the legislative branches of government. It was a fear that the President 
under a conservative figure like Abdullah Gül would turn into another centre of power which 
would further undermine the authority of the military.  
 
The military‘s move was regarded by many as a veiled soft coup which aimed to restore 
confidence in the country‘s Kemalist credentials (laicism in particular) and keep the tradition 
of military tutelage. Reactions, however, were diverse. Staunch Kemalists instantly embraced 
it and went on to publicly justify it by clinging to a quote from Mustafa Kemal which says ―if it 
is a matter about the homeland, the rest (the means) are of no significance‖, pretty much re-
invoking the securitization and militarization discourse with a view to stimulate a heightened 
sense of insecurity and danger. This was followed by mass rallies organized under the 
auspices of Atatürkçü DüĢünce Derneği (ADD-Association of Ataturkist Thought).511  The 
trouble this time was AK Party government took a bold step in publicly condemning the e-
coup by calling it unconstitutional, anti-democratic and grossly inappropriate.512 This was the 
very first time in modern Turkey that an elected government stood against a plot by the 
military. Besides, the AK Party at the time was seen a much more of modern, western, liberal 
and progressive force thanks to its pro-EU, pro-democracy and business friendly record. The 
neo-nationalist (ulusalcı) backlash by the Kemalist establishment was therefore conceived 
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unbecoming.  Conservative, liberal and pro-democracy segments of Turkish society found 
the attempt abhorrent and an act undermining institutionalization of Turkish democracy.513 As 
noted by Kaya, some critics condemned the military for doing the job of opposition parties in 
removing elected governments from power. They emphasized that by doing so, the military 
had caused political opposition to remain weak, fragmented, ineffective and lazy.514 Thus, the 
attempted intervention largely backfired.  
 
The next move by the Kemalist establishment (under the leadership of CHP) was to file a 
case at the Constitutional Court against the vote in the Turkish Parliament which elected 
Abdullah Gül as the country‘s new President on the grounds that a necessary quorum was 
not met. In response, the Constitutional Court with a controversial decision, rendered the 
vote null and void. The snap election called afterwards resulted in an enhanced political 
mandate for the AK Party, further consolidating its legitimacy, which went ahead in electing 
Abdullah Gül as the new President. This added further fuel to an already continuing process 
that began to shake the authority and credibility of the Turkish military in affecting politics, 
decision-making and official foreign policy discourse since it was increasingly viewed as a 
counterproductive force.515 
 
The civilian side of the foreign policy establishment was not immune from disempowerment 
either. Firstly, during the AK Party‘s reign, promotions and postings overseas in the MFA 
were more strictly observed. Talent and hard work kept being rewarded but also a workable 
team of foreign service professionals were chosen. This has arguably created the first crack 
in its institutional autonomy. Secondly foreign policy is opened to systematic input from non-
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MFA experts. The first part of this effort was keeping an academic figure as the Chief Foreign 
Policy Advisor to the Turkish PM since 2003516 and a separate team of speech-writers at the 
Office of the Prime Minister. The second part is related to the increase in the number of non-
career Ambassadors. 517  This had a dual function. Through such arrangements, the 
government not only ensured a stronger hold on the policy-making procedure but also on 
discourse and execution. In the very same manner, it also aimed to de-establish the MFA as 
the sole source of expertise on foreign affairs. Thirdly, the entry requirements to the MFA 
were re-arranged which resulted in the enlargement of the pool of eligible candidates for 
appointments.518 This was coupled with a growing eagerness to admit new diplomats in 
unequivocal numbers since 2009 with backgrounds far more diverse to overturn 
homogeneity and cohesion around the westernist imagery and uniform Kemalist ideology.519 
This move is usually interpreted as an investment for the future as it is hoped that with the 
large number of new recruits, the future shape of the MFA will not be as monolithic as it 
currently is. Lastly, a new legal arrangement has been enacted to allow bureaucrats from 
other public institutions (from the rank of Department Head upwards) to be placed within the 
files of the MFA by an administrative act. In other words, the road for Turkish bureaucrats 
from other public institutions (who do not necessarily share the same conventional 
academic/professional background and expertise) to be transferred to the MFA without the 
entry standards and examinations is opened. This last step is perceived in the MFA corridors 
as a blatant attempt to break the institutional autonomy of the Ministry which takes pride in 
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professionalism and expertise. It is also criticized as an attempt to ensure the MFA‘s total 
surrender and pacification by making it open to easier political manipulation.520 
 
All of these measures were accompanied by the emergence of an increasingly powerful pro-
government media in Turkey from 2005 onwards.521 In addition to the already conservative 
media outlets such as Yeni Akit, Yeni ġafak and Kanal 7; the state television TRT was also 
used as a legitimizing tool by the government. As argued by Kaya & Çakmur, with the 
seizure of the assets of the second biggest media conglomerate ATV-Sabah and its ultimate 
sale to a pro-government conglomerate, as well as with an ―entente cordiale‖ established 
between the party and the mainstream media‖, a clear pro-government slant was displayed 
across the press spectrum.522 Enjoying a robust media backing hitherto not present for any of 
the previous conservative political parties,523 the government‘s ability to project justification 
for its policy choices was thus unprecedentedly enhanced.   
 
On a final note, the military and the MFA continue to be important institutions in Turkey, 
among the relatively most organized, respected and influential. The net impact of political 
gerrymandering in the MFA‘s institutional structure is yet to be seen. The somewhat rattled 
MFA keeps providing expertise, input and recommendation regarding the foreign affairs 
portfolio but the degree to which these are taken up by political decision-makers is not the 
same as before. Similarly, the legal backdrop which in the past was used as a means of 
legitimization and justification for the Turkish military‘s intervention in the political process is 
still intact. In particular, article 38 of the Armed Forces Internal Service Act (calls on the 
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military to protect and safeguard Turkish homeland and the Turkish Republic as prescribed 
by the Constitution against internal and external enemies) continues to have de jure, if rather 
much limited de facto, relevance. Besides promotion and placement of army officers up to 
the rank of colonel still rests with the top brass which in a way predetermines who Turkey‘s 
future generals will be.  
 
It is nevertheless safe to argue that the last decade of affairs in Turkey tipped the civilian-
military balance in favour of the elected civilians.This is probably why the symbolism around 
how the Turkish PM has established himself as the sole chair at the head table of Supreme 
Military Council meetings instead of the old tradition of both the PM and the Chief of General 
Staff presiding over the gathering was given with great excitement in the Turkish press in 
2011.524 It is therefore clear that the military‘s influence in shaping domestic politics as well 
as foreign and security policy has been significantly curbed.525 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to offer an analysis of ―power‖ in Turkey using Mann‘s 
quadri-partite model with a particular emphasis on how it serves to enable certain geopolitical 
schemes, as guides for foreign policy action, over the others. The dynamic and multi-causal 
framework of social networks of power is applied to Turkish case in order to provide a critical 
understanding of not only Turkish politics and foreign policy but also how such policy is 
made. This allowed an in depth analysis of the evolution in the decision making process with 
regards to foreign and security policy. Keeping the critical geopolitics optic, it is hoped that 
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this chapter provides a rich, contextual, historical and comprehensive understanding that 
goes beyond dichotomous simplifications such as secular vs. religious, civilian vs. military, 
progressive-modernist (ilerici-modern) vs. traditionalist-reactionary (gelenekçi-gerici), etc.   
 
A major conclusion to draw is, as in every society, Turkey has transformed a lot in its nearly 
ninety years of history. The Turkish state, which started its life thanks to a joint military-
bureaucratic effort, has been a scene for constant struggle by competing social forces. The 
Kemalist establishment bringing together political parties (most notably CHP and defunct 
DSP and SHP), the military, foreign policy bureaucracy, judiciary and its own breed of 
intelligentsia, bourgeoisie and middle class aimed to shape the direction of the Turkish state 
and its foreign policy as well as to consolidate its hold on power. Even when the Kemalist 
camp lost control over the political government, by relying on the joint power of the military, 
Kemalist ideology and bureaucracy, it sought to keep the shape of the Turkish state and its 
foreign policy orientation intact. Therefore, a substantial change in Turkish foreign policy was 
not possible without the emergence of alternative centres of power in which alternate 
geopolitical agendas carrying new blueprints for action were put in place.  
 
The shifts in the domestic landscape facilitating such a change were numerous and 
intensified in the neoliberal mood of the post-1980s. In addition to political power changing 
hands, the empowerment of conservative bourgeoisie with a strong religious scent, the rise 
of religion as a progressive and outward looking ideology wedded with neo-liberalism, the 
crisis of Kemalism as an all-encompassing and fulfilling ideology as well as an erosion in the 
authority, credibility and influence of the military power in decision-making come to the fore. 
Sitting on the driver seat of change, however, was geopolitics as ever, and the competing 
geopolitical agendas that the well-established geopolitical traditions kept pursuing, as 
elaborated thoroughly in the previous chapter.    
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CHAPTER 4 - THE MIDDLE EAST IN TURKISH FOREIGN 
POLICY: WESTERNISM SUPERSEDES (1923-1982) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter and the following is to offer an analysis of Turkish foreign policy 
behaviour in the Middle East. Geopolitical inquiry through the glance of Turkish culture keeps 
lying at the core of these chapters. As such, this chapter and the next are an outline of the 
evolution of Turkish geopolitical culture in external action. It is hoped that the lingering impact 
of geopolitics on the practice of foreign policy in Turkey will be effectively demonstrated by 
highlighting the dominant geopolitical mentality in each period and the respective operational 
imageries produced.  
 
The chapters are not organized to cover a strictly chronological time span as the purpose is 
to indicate which geopolitical tradition carries the strongest imprint on each period as well as 
the practical implications of the dominant imagination(s) brewed. The idioms used in the 
headings of each section aim to hint at that.  
 
With brief exceptions reserved, there are two broad generalizations to make. The interval 
from 1923 to 1982 bears witness to the heavy influence of Kemalist westernism. It is also the 
period in which the seeds of Conservative geopolitical mantra are sewed (1950-1960). The 
dominance of westernism in this period is a deliberate policy choice as political parties 
overwhelmingly observant of Kemalist dispositions (including DP) ruled Turkey. At times 
when not-so strict followers of Kemalism held political power, their adherence is assured 
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either by ideological supremacy and social networks of power (foreign policy establishment in 
particular) or by the geopolitical placements and practices of other (more powerful) actors in 
the international arena.  
 
II. WESTERNISM PAR EXCELLENCE (1923-1950) 
 
From the very start, the world through a civilizational optic was distinctively bipolar in the 
Kemalist mantra. There was the civilized, developed, scientifically superior and modern West 
and its Eastern antithesis. The Ottoman legacy of Turkey was closely matched with the 
civilizational space called the East where Islam posed a difficulty for the new Turkish state. 
Although practical implications were incremental, the geopolitical positioning of Turkey in the 
West started the day the new republic was incepted. In substantiating this claim, Mustafa 
Kemal is quoted as having said the following to the French daily ―Revue Des Deux Mondes‖ 
on October 23, 1923, the same day the new state is proclaimed a republic.  
 
“The fall of Ottoman Empire started on the day the links with Europe were severed. 
We will not repeat the same mistake. For centuries, we have been moving towards 
the West. Even though our bodies were in the East, the West has always been the 
direction towards which our ideas (minds) have been oriented. Our policies, traditions 
and interests are making leeway to a European Turkey, a Turkey that is headed 
towards Europe. All our efforts are to establish a modern, western administration in 
Turkey. Is there a single nation that did not turn to the West in its quest for civilization? 
As a real person who wishes to march towards this direction breaks his/her chains, so 
will we.”526 
 
                                                          
526 DÜNDAR, C. (2009).  
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In this imagination, a sense of disregard, ignorance and superiority loomed large over Arabs, 
the Arab culture and civilization in collating representations around the East as these 
espoused the exact opposite of the West. An awareness of cultural and civilizational 
difference as well as spatial and temporal distance, separation and segregation 
characterized Kemalist thinking. The level of disdain with the geography symbolizing Arabs 
was so strong that Atatürk placed a strong reservation in not getting involved in their affairs 
by saying ―for centuries our people have been compelled to act in accordance with this 
absurd point of view. And what happened? Millions of them died, in every land they went to. 
Do you know how many Anatolian boys perished in the sweltering heat of the deserts of 
Yemen?‖527 As observed by William Hale, since then, the message that Turkey should keep 
out of the Middle East has sunk deep into the Kemalist consciousness.528 Turkey‘s relations 
with the Middle East were thus reduced to nothing but an extension of its pro-western 
orientation.529 In other words, under the Kemalist mantra at large, Turkey did not have an 
independent Middle East policy as this was inextricably linked to its relations with the western 
states system.  
 
The Early Republican Era 
 
Three things were absent in the external relations of Turkey in the first interval. First is the 
non-existence of post-imperial impulses. In other words, Turkey did not pursue post-imperial 
territorial claims but rather slight adjustments to fit in to the homeland envisioned in the 
National Pact. This has indicated itself in the form of a firm dismissal of pan-Ottomanist, pan-
Islamist and pan-Turkic agendas. Second, Turkey rejected the idea about a federated 
partnership with potential Arab states which was highly praised during the Turkish liberation 
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effort.530 Third, ‗Turkey did not support nationalist independence movements in the Arab 
territories in the hope of creating independent states, which would be susceptible or 
receptive to Turkish influence.‘531 Instead a rather cautious, non-interventionist, aloof and 
hands-off approach to the region was adopted.532 This is because it was around this era that 
the Middle East in the Kemalist imagination was equated with the notion of a backward land 
marred with turmoil in which Islam introduced an element of irrationality to politics.533 The 
Middle East reminded Kemalists that ―it was factionalism and the un-governability of the 
region‖ that brought the end of the Ottomans 534 It was thus perceived an uneasy and 
unattractive neighbourhood only to be dealt with if Turkish security concerns demanded it.535 
That is why Ankara tried to avoidbecoming embroiled in regional politics.   
 
As Turkey deliberately distanced itself from the Middle East, the early years of Turkish 
behaviour were characterized by ―detente without engagement and by deliberate neutrality 
without being isolated‖.536 A strong motivation for Turkey‘s elite to distance from the Middle 
East was to ensure ―peace at home‖. Put differently, Turkey was trying to enhance 
legitimization for the new secular domestic order which was at the time highly centralized and 
timid. As part of the prevalent geographical imagination, the abolition of the Ottoman 
Caliphate in 1924 was a strong move for consolidating the domestic order. At the same time, 
the move signified Turkey‘s voluntary ceding of the leadership role it used to play in the 
Muslim world. Coupled with the decision to send members of the Ottoman dynasty away, not 
only was it aimed to curb pro-monarchy, religious and ethnic (Kurdish) sentiments at home, 
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and cut the possible links they might have across borders but also to de-couple Turkey from 
its Ottoman Muslim past, neighbourhood and identity. Thus, the common link of Islam 
between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours was severely weakened by introducing 
an element of temporal separation.   
 
To put its house in order, Turkey needed ―peace abroad‖ too. Atatürk stressed on November 
1, 1928 that ―it is quite natural and therefore simple to explain the fact that a country which is 
in the midst of fundamental reforms and development should sincerely desire peace and 
tranquillity both at home and in the world‖.537 Aiming to consolidate the territories constituting 
its ―new homeland‖ and the new domestic order, Turkey‘s reluctant interest with Middle 
Eastern affairs was first and foremost guided by an impetus to delineate its borders. To infer 
its difference from and establish cultural and civilizational superiority over this backward 
Islamic land, Turkey under Atatürk first sought demarcation. The outstanding problems were 
the status of Alexandretta (Hatay) in French-controlled Syria and Mosul/Kirkuk in British-ruled 
Iraq. Both provinces were considered integral parts of the homeland envisioned in the 
Turkish National Pact. This made France and Britain Turkey‘s two key counterparts in the 
Middle East.538 
 
The dilemma for early Turkish leaders was that on the one hand they were still suspicious of 
the true intentions of the Europeans in the region539 but on the other hand these countries 
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were from the civilizational space they wished Turkey to join. Consequently, the geopolitical 
code in dealing with the problems in the Middle East was much less antagonistic towards 
France and Britain as dialogue, negotiation and engagement were identified as the best 
strategy. The code defined by Mustafa Kemal was aimed at reducing the number of Turkey‘s 
enemies and increasing its friends and allies. The purpose was to consolidate territorial 
integrity, control over borders and curb possible threats to regional peace and security which 
could directly reflect on the fragile state of affairs in Turkey.  
 
The record of events with regards to the solution of territorial disputes shows not only the 
effects of westwards geographical imagery but also a high degree of political pragmatism. 
With regards to the Iraqi border, Turks initially wished today‘s Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleimaniah 
would be part of their homeland. The UK, which kept control over the region after World War 
I, did by no means favour this idea.540 As the parties could not reconcile their differences, the 
matter was referred to the League of Nations in June 1924 by the British government. 
Following a line of earlier Kurdish uprisings, a sizable revolt was started in February 1925 by 
(Kurdish) Sheikh Said who saw the abolition of the caliphate as against Islamic principles. 
The upheaval took place in south eastern Turkey, right across the Iraqi border, at a time the 
heat over the dispute over Mosul was mercurial. Ankara interpreted the revolt as a British 
plot to discourage Turks to make any military attempt at Mosul.541In the meanwhile, the 
League declared the region Iraqi territory in December 1925. 542  Pending some initial 
hesitation, Turkey recognized the decision via a bilateral agreement signed with Britain in 
June 1926 whereby it conceded Mosul to British-ruled Iraq while retaining 10% of oil 
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revenues for the next five years. With a total sum of 500 thousand British Pounds 
transferred, the oil aspect, too, was permanently settled.543 
 
With regards to Alexandretta (Hatay), the issue arose as France decided to transfer 
sovereignty to Syria and Lebanon in 1936. Turkey asked France to grant Alexandretta 
separate sovereignty on the basis of Turco-French Friendship Agreement of 1921 which 
foresaw a sui generis status to the area.544 As the mandatory power, France argued that the 
proper authority to decide on the fate of Alexandretta was the League of Nations. French 
proposal to rest the issue with the League was accepted by the Turks in December 1937. By 
the end of January next year, the League recognized Alexandretta as a separate political 
entity though its external relations would be handled by Damascus.545 Local elections held in 
May brought 22 Turkish delegates in the Assembly of Alexandretta which contained a total of 
40. In September, the Assembly declared independence with the name ―Hatay Republic‖.546 
In June 1939, a Franco-Turkish agreement endorsed the next move by the Assembly which 
voted for integration with Turkey.547 Once the dispute regarding Hatay was settled, Turkey‘s 
borders in the region were largely in shape. To Turkish elite‘s satisfaction, this achievement 
was not smudged by any sort of contact with the indigenous people of the land, Arabs and 
Kurds, which was of no favour at that time.  
 
The impact of integration of Hatay to Turkey was profound as it triggered greater distrust and 
resentment toward Turkey in the Arab world. For Turks dealt with the issue with the French, 
and not the Arabs, that led Damascus to never accept the move. Hatay was thus translated 
into a hotbed of contention in the following years between Turkey and Syria. In the broader 
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scheme of Turco-Arab relations, the incident was pictured as the last conspiracy by Ankara 
in collaboration with the colonialist West to undermine Arabs.548 The two places, the land of 
Turks and of Arabs, were thus further alienated from each other.  
 
Closer to World War I, the Turkish elite had by and large completed many of the westernizing 
reforms at home and made Turkey part of the League of Nations in 1932. Accession to the 
League was reflected to the public as an affirmation of Turkey‘s western positioning and an 
act of recognition by the West.549In this atmosphere, a wave of accomplishment, pride and 
self-confidence stirred in Ankara. Thanks to the success of Turkish reformation which was 
guided by western values and positive science, Turks were now prescribing the ‗Atatürk 
solution‘ to their troubled neighbourhood, i.e.westernisation, secularisation and collaboration 
with the West.550 Therefore, as much as they were disinclined to meddle in Middle Eastern 
affairs, a growing disinterest by western powers in the face of an imminent war led Turks 
believe that they could save the region by their own example. 551  Capitalizing on its 
geographic position, Turkey believed that it could act as a go-between in the relations 
between the West and the Middle East which boded well with its propagated international 
image as a Western state.552 
 
This paved the way to the Saidabad Pact of 1937. Signed in Tehran on July 8, with the pact 
Turks distastefully attempted at the role of regional saviour. Bringing together Turkey, Iran, 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the parties pledged friendly relations, consultation on matters of 
common interest, non-interference in domestic affairs and respect for each other‘s 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity.553 For a country that had already indexed its strategic 
orientation westwards, the initiative was in line with the larger goals of territorial 
consolidation, regional stability, recognition as a (western) model and as a bridge between 
the two worlds. The crucial pillar of the pact was ‗rather than being an example of regional 
cooperation and collaboration, as it is sometimes claimed, the principles of non-interference 
in each other‘s affairs' 554  that made it in line with the Kemalist mantra. To Turkey‘s 
misfortune, the expected World War did actually break out before the ink on the protocol was 
dry. The war not only caused great battlefield destruction across Europe but also left Turkish 
dreams to set an example and serve as a bridge in European-Middle Eastern affairs in 
tatters. The experience was a solid reminder of the risky nature of the region for Turks.  
 
Wartime Strategy  
 
Between 1938 and 1945, Turkey‘s operational geopolitical code was redefined by arch-
Kemalist Ġsmet Ġnönü, the second Turkish President, to be characterized by impartiality, non-
involvement, caution and risk averseness. Seeing the destruction and hazards of World War 
I, he was not eager to get Turkey involved in the second. Thus, Turkey tried to walk straight 
on a slippery slope with frowning eyes on Ankara from each direction. Carrying Atatürk‘s 
legacy, Ġnönü, who singlehandedly formulated foreign policy, did not wish the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Turkey to be questioned. Busy with staying away 
from the war, Ankara had no appetite to look beyond its southern border and have any sort of 
entanglement with Middle Eastern affairs.555 
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The Advent of Cold War 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, a different picture of the world was incrementally brought 
about. The global geopolitical paradigm moved away from civilizational lines with the advent 
of the Cold War. Old metaphors around the West (the First World) vs. the East (the Second 
World) were still in circulation but the political criterion according to which these spaces were 
defined and represented had substantially transformed. The new perception was bipolar and 
strictly coloured with ideology. The capitalist western democracies represented the ―liberal 
free (western) world‖, and from a western perspective, the socialist Soviet (eastern) world its 
dark totalitarian antithesis.  
 
The Turkish response in the form of adaptation to this new picture of global affairs took a lot 
of emphasis on security and being part of the ―free world‖ but without much change in the 
civilizational discourse. The ideological geopolitics of the Cold War provided Turkswith the 
opportunity to readdress some of the old themes in Turkish geopolitical culture. In 
responding to foreign policy crises, they not only sought hard security assurances but also 
answers to their permanent insecurities between the east and west. Did Turkey need to 
reinvent itself in the face of the transformations taking place in the global political space or 
keep redressing its western orientation? Had Turkey successfully turned Western as their 
forefather had prescribed? Should the West reliably cater for Turks‘ needs now? Would there 
be any merit in reconnecting to the East, i.e. the Arabs, Persians and the Muslims in the 
(Middle) East? What strategy to follow against the new beast in the land, Israel? Would Turks 
reproduce the newly created republican myths or the myths of the olden days of the lost 
empire? As such, should Turkey stick with the minimalist, risk free, calculated and reserved 
approach in foreign dealings or act boldly, assertively and ambitiously to bring back the 
glories of the golden age? These were all, one way or the other, appertaining to definition of 
Turkey's place and belonging in the world. In finding answers to these lingering questions, 
foreign policy was the one area where the Turkish elite could toy around with some of the 
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geo-cultural traits of their country. It was also the theatre through which the ruling elite had to 
tastethe image, placement, role expectations and foreign policy practices of other actors in 
the system. The combination of all these factors createdTurkish foreign policy behaviour in 
the new era. 
 
At the conclusion of the War, Turkey had a new set of problems as the USSR refused to 
renew the 1925 Treaty of Friendship. The Soviets via three diplomatic notes from March 
1945 to September 1946 demanded territorial concessions from Turkey (return of eastern 
provinces of Kars and Ardahan to the U.S.S.R), a Soviet base in Turkish Straits and revision 
of the Manteaux Convention.556 As a result, the most existentialist threat for Turkey was no 
longer from Kurds or devout Muslims at home or their akin in the Middle East but more so 
from its Soviet neighbour.557 This required a change in the operational geopolitical code of 
impartiality and neutrality. The assurance was sought, and later received, from the west (the 
US). Turks therefore deemed being a founding member of the United Nations in June 1945 
no simple business as this was interpreted as a means of reaffirming Turkey‘s acceptance in 
in the western world. It was also a means of attracting attention to Turkey‘s hard security 
problems.  
 
After the UN membership, the political assurance came with the Truman Doctrine (1947) 
which pledged support to countries like Turkey threatened by communism. Military aid worth 
of 100 million Dollars followed shortly as part of the Marshall Plan (1947). It was indeed this 
injection that later paved the way to the development of Turkey‘s conservative middle class 
and entrepreneurs. As a result, the new security threat pushed Turkey towards the western 
world, of which the Turkish ruling class had already had an adamant longing all along. To 
further reinforce its western positioning, Turkey became a member in the Council of Europe 
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in 1949. Ġnönü characterized the move as an indication of Turkey‘s safe placement within the 
West European community and talked about the monumental progress his country achieved 
as a rising star in the western civilizational family. 558  To move further on, Ġnönü‘s CHP 
applied for NATO membership in 1948, and getting no feedback renewed it in May 1950.  
 
In the post-war priorities, the non-attractive Middle East under CHP governments did not fare 
as a matter of urgency. The only exception was the creation of an independent Israel. On this 
account Turkey fluctuated considerably. Wary of the complexities of the Middle East, at first 
Turkey wished to remain committed to the regional status quo. Ankara thus voted against the 
UN resolution creating Israel in 1947. It also appears that Israel‘s arms deal with the socialist 
Czechoslovakia caused Turks to suspect that the new state was Soviet-backed.559 AkĢin 
takes the opinion that ―Ankara was apparently trying to avoid antagonizing the influential 
Jewish community in the United States, which could have jeopardized American aid to 
Turkey‖.560 What is clear is that Turkish action was not grounded on any sympathy toward 
the Arab cause as the distasteful region was still a source of utmost disdain. A couple of 
years later, perceiving the steps taken to build stronger ties with the Euro-Atlantic defence 
community (Truman Doctrine, Marshal Plan, application for NATO membership and 
membership in the Council of Europe) as confirmation of the progress achieved en route its 
western future, Turkey recognized Israel as the first Muslim country ever. This time the 
confident arch-Kemalist Ġnönü remarked that ―Israel would be a beacon of peace and stability 
in the Near East‖.561With the turn of events in a relatively short period of time, Ġnönü came to 
the conclusion that Turkey and Israel simply belonged to the same camp. Ġnönü therefore 
was convinced that a new regional status quo wasestablished. Apart from this late move, the 
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region for Turkey had long transformed from being in the ―middle‖ to ―far‖ in the East562after 
the bitter memories of Saidabad Pact.  
 
III. THE MILD CONSERVATIVE SHOCK: WESTERNISM BUT? (1950-1960) 
 
In the aftermath of the first genuine multiparty contestation bringing Democrat Party (DP) to 
power in 1950, there was little doubt on which direction the Turkish state would proceed. In 
this context, literature abounds in seeing DP era a continuation in Turkey‘s western march. 
Some authors even claim that DP leaders simply kept doing everything to re-energize 
Turkey‘s orientation towards the West.563This is not without merit. Seeing through DP‘s party 
and government programmes, one can find ample evidence to support the argument that 
there was much rhetoric of continuity in terms of Turkey‘s western positioning. For example, 
it was declared in Democrat Party‘s election manifesto that ―let everyone, friend or foe, be 
reassured that our party will not instigate any change in foreign policy‖.564 PM Menderes 
gave traction to what was meant in his speech to the Parliament in May 1950 by reaffirming 
Turkey‘s commitment to the UN, the alliance with France and Britain, and the cordial ties with 
the US.565 Speaking to the press in Brussels, Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü reiterated a 
similar sentiment by emphasizing that ―after the last elections, Turkish foreign policy which 
has been oriented towards the West since the World War II will continue with utmost 
dynamism in the very same direction”.566 
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The fact that immediately after assuming power the Democrat Party dealt with the request by 
the UN Secretary General in June 1950 to send troops to the Korean War in an auspicious 
manner appears to confirm that the new leadership was trying to put such words into action. 
In deliberating the matter with FM Köprülü, Menderes even argued for speedy action at the 
expense of bypassing a parliamentary debate.567 Against a rampant Soviet threat, a sense of 
impatience seems to have brewed in Ankara to make Turkey part of the ―western free world‖. 
Expecting security assurances against Soviets as well as more military and economic aid,568 
with the Korean War, Turkey was trying to gain leverage to ensure its membership in 
NATO.569  But as Turkey renewed the application in August 1950, the North Atlantic Council 
convened to reject its bid.570 The fiercest opposition came from states like Norway, Denmark, 
Belgium and Netherlands, commonly voicing concerns that Turkey simply did not fit into the 
value system the westerners shared as part of their collective civilizational cluster.571 The UK 
also opposed as it held measures short of NATO membership (such as the Mediterranean 
Pact and the Middle East Command) to keep Turkey in the western orbit.  
 
It was therefore not before the US policy of military containment against the Soviets that 
Turkey‘s Cold War westernist positioning was accepted by western powers. With the 
communist threat on the rise in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Southeast Asia in the 
early 1950s, the cultural and civilizational complexities of Turkey‘s bid were subordinated to 
the bigger struggle between ―freedom‖ and ―totalitarianism‖.572 Thenceforth, Turkeybecame a 
member in the Alliance in 1952. The hope was that Turkey could play a key regional role, as 
a barrier, in the Middle East and the Balkans to keep the Soviet influence away. 
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An act as simple as Turkey‘s NATO membership which was a strictly security-wise decision 
from a western perspective held a different meaning for Turks. In this case, Turks‘ primordial 
civilizational perceptions associated with the West gave the event unmatched historical 
symbolization. NATO was represented as the bastion of Turkey‘s ‗Western‘ identity.573 FM 
Köprülü dubbed NATO ―not a simple military defence structure but a broader solidarity and 
cooperation pact that aims to foster spiritual and material excellence‖.574 He therefore did not 
hesitate to draw attention to the commitment of Turks to freedom, independence and 
democratic principles now represented by the Alliance. 575  CHP delegate Barutçu also 
emphasized that accession to NATO was in line with the republican ideals.576 Likewise the 
CHP‘s last Foreign Minister, Necmettin Sadak, wrote in his column that ―the Atlantic Pact is 
not only a military and political cooperation forum but also a community of democratic 
civilizations, and by subscribing to the deal, Turkey will subsume both military and 
civilizational duties.‖577 Thus, NATO not only helped cover Turkey‘s hard security needs but 
also addressed its long standing civilizational insecurities. A decision taken with strategic 
geopolitical calculations guided by ideological polarisation of the world was interpreted as a 
means to confirm Turkey‘s placement within the same flow of history, culture and civilization 
as that of the West.578 Turks, through NATO, wished to get rid of the stereotypical European 
image of Turkey as ‘the oriental other (―the enemy at gates‖)‘ or ‗the sick man of Europe‘. 
Besides, it served well as part of the strategy for outreach to the (Muslim) East via the 
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West579 as Turkey projected itself as the only country to provide for peace dividend in the 
Middle East.580The short term yield of Turkey‘s NATO membership was Soviets‘ renunciation 
of territorial claims as early as July 1953 and an offer to renew the dépassé Turco-
SovietTreaty of Friendship.581 
 
The Exception: A Different Geographical Imagery Vis-à-vis the Middle East 
 
Despite being formed by former delegates of CHP and whilst not challenging Turkey‘s 
western orientation, the founding fathers of the Democrat Party were nonetheless much 
more receptive to modes of representation in the conservative tradition. In domestic politics, 
it was manifested in DP‘s willingness to reverse those republican reforms which were 
considered not having taken root.582With regards to foreign policy, DP leaders were first of all 
extremely unhappy with the CHP‘s minimalist, cautious and modest approach. Toying with 
common conservative themes instead, FM Fatin RüĢtü Zorluvoiced the ambition to make 
Turkey ―a great, powerful and respected state‖583 while President Bayar promised Turks to 
make their country a ‗little America‘. The propensity to act assertively and ambitiously, which 
is a historically naturalized notion in the conservative tradition, was uttered sharply by DP 
deputy Sıtkı Yırcalı in the wake of the decision to send Turkish troops to Korea with the 
following.  
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“As has always been the case throughout history, Turkey has to serve as the 
cornerstone, the leader of the line-up in the Middle East as well as the world with an 
active foreign policy”.584 
 
The difference was nowhere else more evident than towards the Middle East. For once the 
Democrat Party ―abandoned the aloof attitude toward the Middle East‖.585The DP leadership 
was very much eager to move away from the status quo 586  and saw greater good in 
engagement in order to elevate the international stature of Turkey. Turkish policy towards the 
region was non-doggedly ambitious, sometimes even bordering an overt bellicose discourse 
which is not understandable with a mere reference to Turkey‘s westernist orientation. This is 
because the way Turkey placed itself in the Middle East as well as the role and mission 
Turkish leaders earmarked to their state were in clear contrast to the Kemalist paradigm. PM 
Menderes gave Turkey‘s key geographical location as a major reason to play a bigger role in 
the Middle East.587 The region in fact from the very outset held a different meaning for DP 
leaders. Gone was CHP‘s rhetoric of ‗the bog of the Middle East.‘588 A sense of civilizational 
and spatial contiguity, shared values and historical-cultural commonality loomed large. DP 
leaders not only refused to draw hard lines against the region but also embraced the security 
concerns of the newly established Arab states.589 
 
The Middle East now was the land of brotherly Arabs who were threatened by the evil nature 
of the godless communists, re-inscribing Turkish conservatives‘ perceptions of the ‗Soviet 
other. That‘s because the Soviets symbolized a mutual threat to a core element of the 
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common culture, Islam itself. In DP leaders‘ view, Muslims simply should not have bend 
down to the dangerous Soviet system. It is therefore no surprise that DP‘s first government 
programme committed Turkey ―to forge close relations with the Middle Eastern states, and 
mutually assist and secure each other‟s interests, a.k.a. a necessity both for the region and 
global peace and security”. 590Turkey thus attempted for the second time at the role of 
regional saviour, this time not from an imminent war but from the atheist and expansionist 
Soviets who were seen as a threat to the community (umma) of Islam and common Muslim 
identity. Menderes indicated how close they held the region to Turkey with his following 
statement: 
 
‗We are firmly connected to all Arab nations (of the region) with historical and social 
bonds of fraternity. (Today) there are real and serious reasons to remain so. It is our 
sincere goal to see each and every nation in the Middle East, our Arab brothers in 
particular, to their freedom, welfare and happiness. This is the (strongest) guarantee 
for our own national survival.‘591 
 
In this context, Turkey was ready to reinstitute some other reflexes embedded in the 
conservative tradition. In this regard, an eagerness to lead the region towards what the 
Turkish ruling elite perceived as the free democratic world against its godless communist 
alternative appeared strong.592  As Turkish PM Menderes used to say, Turkey aimed at 
serving as the bulwark in the defence of the region against communist expansionism.593 
Right before NATO membership, FM Köprülü pledged that ―Turkey would play the role 
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attuned to it in the Middle East with the most effective and vigorous manner‖.594  Some 
accounts cite FM Köprülü stipulating that Turkey would be a bridge, both culturally and 
geographically, between the East and the West,595 hence employing for the first time the 
―bridge‖ metaphor in articulating a foreign policy strategy. The Middle East was thus arguably 
the region where most of Turkey‘s foreign policy dealings took place during the decade, 
bearing it witness to the second ever wave of intense regional activism.  
 
Trying to reconcile two imageries, one that foresaw a strong western vocation and the other 
scripting the Middle East as a land of opportunities and brotherly Arabs; developing friendly 
relations with Israel at the initial phases was no source of allergy for DP leaders. They were 
convinced that closer ties with Israel would be ―one step closer to the West‖.596 On this score, 
Menderes government aimed at acting carefully with self-restraint for the fear of being 
labelled as pro-Israel by the brotherly Arabs.  
 
The New Imagery in Action 
 
The most cited policy practice whereby Turkey is depicted as an agent of the West in the 
Middle East is the Baghdad Pact. Having the American endorsement to Turkish ambitions to 
lead the region towards the West,597 PM Menderes embarked on his ambitious agenda by 
pushing for a NATO-like regional security organization. To sell the idea to Arab states, 
Menderes took on a regional tour comprising Syria and Lebanon with a prospect to pass to 
Cairo in January 1955. His conversations in Damascus and Beirut were with no avail while 
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Cairo turned Menderes down by arguing that the Egyptian public was not ready for a visit.598 
Moreover, Jordan and Saudi Arabia joined ranks with Egypt on January 30 during the Cairo 
Conference by claiming that ―it would be betrayal to the Arab world to enter into alliance with 
Turkey which was friends with Israel‖.599 In between these overtures, Abdal Nasser of Egypt 
expelled Turkish Ambassador, Hulusi Fuat Tugay, and publicly denounced Turkish policy as 
anti-Arab.600 Turkey‘s special relations with Israel thus came to haunt its affairs with the Arab 
world as early as 1950s.   
 
Shortly after seeing these disappointing signs, the Pact signed in Baghdad on February 24, 
1955, between Turkey and Iraq was quite a surprise. The deal later on brought together 
Pakistan, Iran and Britain. Contrary to conventional explanations stipulating that the initiative 
was a purely western design to curtail Soviet regional ambitions and naming Turkey simply 
its executioner, Menderes reflected a different mentality as he uttered the following to one of 
his close aides (Sebati Ataman, DP deputy and later Minister of Industry) in Baghdad on the 
day of signature. 
 
―Of course the Ottoman Empire cannot be resuscitated. But we can always look for 
ways of bringing the countries in the (ex-Ottoman) geography closer with due 
consideration to the contemporary circumstances.…”The order previously established 
in this region in line with Islamic principles is gone with the Ottomans fading away. 
The region is now in full tatters as evidenced by the situation of Muslim countries. 
There is a need to re-establish a regional order in accordance with new principles so 
that peace and stability can be re-introduced to the region…Why wouldn‟t it be 
possible to conclude an accord on the (common) basis of Islam and bring all Muslims 
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of the Middle East together?Turkey could lead such an effort.601This is why we came 
here.”602 
 
His son, Aydın, further states Menderes‘ vision as ―behind the visibly anti-communist rhetoric, 
the Baghdad Pact in fact aimed at bringing Muslims closer. The real purpose wasto get the 
Muslims in the Middle East as close as possible‖.603  In this context, Menderes did not 
hesitate to publicly emphasize the need to resolve the Palestinian issue and declare that his 
government would lead the efforts for a solution.604  It thus appears that helping build a 
regional order based on cultural similarities that Turks and Arabs in the Middle East shared 
was, from the very start, a strong motive for Turkish action.  
 
This was no doubt facilitated by the expectations of Western powers of Turkey. The 
Americans‘ willingness to supress Soviet influence in the northern tier of the western alliance 
was a key factor. In the American perception, Turkey would be well suited for the role of 
regional leadership with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and secular regime. Besides, 
the long history Turkey had with Arabs would hopefully prove to be an asset.605Concerns for 
an unhindered flow of Middle Eastern oil to western markets and the security of Israel were 
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Relations: Beyond Security). İstanbul, TESEV Yayınları. p.18. 
605 ALBAYRAK, M. (2012). p.593.  
200 
 
 
equally crucial.606As of January 1950, a Turkish diplomatic legation was already inaugurated 
in Israel with Menderes strongly arguing that ―Arabs too should recognize Israel‘s right to 
survival‖ because for him the lingering Arab-Israeli conflict distracted the urgency of the 
threat from the Soviets.607In a nutshell, the western perception and expectationsof Turkey in 
the Middle Eastwere a firm enabler for DP leaders‘ self-ascribed regional leadership role. 
Thus, Turks‘ image of the regional position of their country and the American placement of 
Turkey in the Middle East initially overlapped to a great degree.  
 
Yet it would be ill-fated to see Turkey a mere enforcer of the western agenda in the region as 
the British and American documentary records reveal that Turks were no complacent ally on 
countless occasions.608 More so, Turkey did not hesitate to pursue an agenda of its own at 
the expense of falling at odds with western allies. Cases in point are numerous. The first 
came when Egypt and Syria, both of which did not sign in for the Baghdad deal under 
Turkish leadership, contracted for a pact of their own in March 1955. Suspecting that it was 
Nasser‘s Egypt that led the effort, Turkey pressured Syria to ensure defection and lure it to 
the Baghdad Pact. 609  Via diplomatic notes exchanged between Damascus and Ankara, 
Turkey declared that if Syria insisted on the rapprochement with Egypt, it would thwart 
bilateral relations. 610 The move however further pushed Syria towards Egypt which was 
already embroiled with the memories of Hatay‘s integration to Turkey. Saudi Arabia shortly 
followed suit by joining the Syria-Egypt pact.611 Besides a wave of protests took place in the 
Arab streets which made the Americans and the British question whether Turkey was 
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overplaying its hand. The next round was Turks‘ determination to take Jordan in to the Pact 
in the fall of 1955. Turkish President Bayar visited Amman between 3 and 4 November, 
urging his Jordanian counterparts to side with the initiative with a promise that ―Turkish 
armed forces would come to Jordan‘s aid if an unjust assault occurred‖, implying an Arab-
Israeli clash.612 Yet with American fears of antagonizing Israel and further alienating Egypt, 
Turks had to endure protests in the Jordanian streets encouraged by Nasser.613 
 
Overtaken by the heat of the developments, an opportunity for damage control had arisen 
when Nasser announced nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. Protested by Britain 
and France, the act triggered military action by the two in addition to Israel against Egypt. 
This prompted Turkey‘s withdrawal of its Minister (the chief of Turkish legation) to Israel and 
downgrading of diplomatic relations to the level of Charge d‘Affaires in November. 
Simultaneously Ankara announced that the Turkish representative would not return to Tel 
Aviv as long as the Palestinian question was not solved in compliance with the UN 
resolutions.614 As Menderes hinted to the Turkish parliament, the central motivation was to 
show solidarity with Arab Egypt and block a possible Soviet take-over of a region of brotherly 
akin.615 Another calculation in Ankara‘s siding with the Arabs rather than Israel, just like the 
US did, was the hope to enhance the value of Turkey for Washington. 616  Even more 
importantly, Feroz Ahmad writes ―Turks were hoping to replace the British in the Middle 
East‖617 in a quest to take over the regional leadership. However, it was not for Turks but 
thanks to the decisive position of the US in the form of economic measures against Britain 
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and political pressure on other parties that put an end to the debacle.618 More strikingly Cairo 
would not forget Ankara‘s alignment with the American position which foresaw ―an 
international impartial regime for the Suez Canal‖. As a result, Turkey not only failed to win 
back a favourable position in the region but also saw its regional ties deteriorated. As 
Menderes was keen on preserving the relevance of the Baghdad Pact, relations with Egypt 
remained cool. Full normalization of diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv also did not take place 
since Ankara dragged its feet in elevating the level of representation from legations to 
resident embassies.619 
 
In the aftermath of the Suez crisis, Turkey held onto its ambition of keeping the salience of 
the Baghdad Pact. In this respect, the possibility of Syria turning into a Soviet satellite in 
August 1957 led Turkey to push for solid American reaction620 The US avoided direct military 
intervention and advised Turks to act ―in the requested reinforcement of Arabs‖.621  Yet 
Turkey had massed troops on the border the next month with fearful reports reaching 
Washington that ―Turks wanted to go it alone in Syria whereas there were doubts and 
hesitations on the part of the (Turkish) military‖.622 According to some accounts, even small 
scale military skirmishes were reported on the Turco-Syrian border.623 Just as the matter 
approximated to the character of inter-block rivalry in early October with Soviets and Syrians 
bringing it to the UN, Khrushchev‘s surprise attendance to the 34th birthday celebrations of 
Turkey on October 29, at the Turkish Embassy in Moscow, toned the tension down. The 
whole saga eventually slipped away.624 
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Encountering the External Actors  
 
It was around this time that Turkish leaders had to endure the Arab recoil crystalizing around 
Nasser‘s Egypt. The effort culminated into concrete form on February 1, 1958, as Egypt and 
Syria declared a federation under the rubric ‗the United Arab Republic (UAR)‘. To counter 
weight, Turkey put its support behind the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan on February 14. 
Furthermore, Ankara threatened to use force against the UAR.625 To deter Turkey, American 
Secretary of State Dulles had to warn that ―if there is any reaction, it must be initiated by 
Arabs and not by Turkey or Western powers‖.626 
 
Against this backdrop, it was an unbecoming development for Turkey to see a military coup 
by General Abdalkerim Qasim ousting the regime in Baghdad with the lives of King Faisal 
and Premier Nuri Said claimed as collateral in early July 1958. Having a friendly regime 
whose PM was educated in Turkey faltered at the hands of coup-makers, Turks perceived 
the region in pieces. Therefore, an unhesitant Menderes ordered Turkish Armed Forces en 
mass the border with a prospect to move towards Baghdad alongside a similar order for 
deployments around the Syrian border to overturn possible counter reaction. 627  The 
calculation in Ankara was that with Iraq out of the equation in the Baghdad Pact, Turkey‘s 
regional leadership ambitions would be shelved permanently. Determined to go alone, 
Menderes only hoped moral support from the US, which to his dislike, did not arrive. Under 
American and British pressure to wait for the Iraqi opposition to do the job against Qasim, 
and reluctant about the position of the Turkish foreign policy establishment (the military and 
MFA), Menderes finally caved in.628 But when President Chamoun from Lebanon which was 
practically in a state of civil war since May and King Hussein of Jordan requested western 
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intervention, Turkey showed no hesitation to let American troops to station at NATO bases in 
Adana.629 
 
After seeing the weight of the Baghdad Pact lightened after the coup in Baghdad, Turkey and 
Israel tried engagement around the concept of the Periphery Pact (bringing together Iran, 
Sudan and Ethiopia as well).630 Tel Aviv and Ankara found enough motive in late 1958 to 
conclude a number of agreements in order to create an alternative centre of gravity in the 
region.631 Among the things agreed, military and intelligence cooperation, secret political 
dialogue and technical cooperation in defence industries come to the fore.632 Failing to enlist 
American support to their initiative because Washington believed that Nasser and his pan-
Arabist agenda was the most credible force to curtail the communist spread over Iraq and 
Syria, the parties could not see through the full yields from this initiative.633 
 
These events indicate that Turkey was not simply acting as an agent of the West 
(Washington in particular) in the Middle East.634 Within the confines of Cold War geopolitics, 
Turkey was testing with vigour the degree of independence it could enjoy in pursuing some 
of the conservative leanings in foreign policy. Even to the extent that US President 
Eisenhower complained ―Turkey went beyond Soviet containment to a vision as a regional 
power pursuing its own interests‖.635 Turkey‘s decisive return to the Middle East therefore 
was not a mere response to the compelling external threat but the result of a deliberate 
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policy choice in pursuit of power and prestige.636 The exercise was guided by a distinct 
geographical imagery vis-à-vis the Middle East which portrayed it as a land of opportunities 
and brotherly Muslims craving for Turkey‘s leadership/saviour ambitions. Few months before 
being overthrown by a military coup in 1960, Sebati Akman reports Menderes saying that ―I 
think the most robust political agreements fail to pass the test of time. They last only a few 
years…. whereas the actual reality rests on „the words of God‟…. (Therefore) why shall not 
we conclude long lasting agreements among nations and countries that share the same 
religion and culture?”637This was hoped would turn Turkey into a regional power and unleash 
the process towards a resurgent Turkey just like in the good old days of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
The trouble was the gap between the geopolitical imageries of Turkish leaders and both their 
Arab and Western counterparts. For once, US President Eisenhower came to the quick 
conclusion that Ottoman rule of the region was ―too unfavourably remembered‖.638 Soviets 
were funnelling a similar image that ―the military block lead by Turkey in the Middle East 
made Arab nations think that Turkey is trying to get them under its own sovereignty again‖.639 
By acting too ambitiously, Turkey also antagonized the leaders of the Arab world, Egypt in 
particular. The leadership in Cairo clearly had ambitions of its own. The imageries and 
positioning of Nasser, which was portraying Egypt as the leader of the Arab world with the 
Arab League (1945) as its core instrument, was able to make strides towards not only a pan-
Arab but also pan-Islamist agenda. The two countries were after prestige, power, influence 
and regional leadership on the same terrain with competing impulses. The interventionist 
courses of action Ankara took during the crises in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan 
contributed to a growing Arab discontent which resurrected (for real or imagery) enmities vis-
à-vis Turkey.  The key factor that kept Turks at bay was the cordial relations established with 
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Israel. For Egypt propagating the view that ―the state of Israel was a dagger at the heart of 
Arab territories‖,640 Turks‘ attempts to penetrate the world of Arabs with firm American and 
British backing and strong ties with Israel was a liability. The problem was not necessarily 
Turkey‘s unchallenged western orientation per se but rather the perception that ―cast Turkey 
in the image of docile tool of Western power‖ 641 or ―the running dogs of Western 
imperialism‖.642 
 
Thus, despite the initial determination to get closer to the Middle East by assembling the 
Arabs around Turkey against a common threat (Soviets), Ankara‘s project failed. Thanks to 
the expectations gap and the seemingly irreconcilable difference in the geopolitical imageries 
of dominant actors, Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours found themselves drifted away 
from each other. As a result, an initiative promulgated to unite and lead the region ended up 
with further fragmentation.643 Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen remained on the one 
hand, and Turkey, Iraq and Iran on the other. Jordan and Lebanon stayed neutral, and Israel 
was further isolated. Iraq finally withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in 1958, leaving the 
Eisenhower Doctrine as the only tangible initiative that all parties could give their broad 
commitment to.644 Even on that score, Egypt, Iraq and Syria defected by establishing closer 
ties with Moscow. The bitter experience of the Baghdad Pact taught Turks another lesson 
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about the hardship of penetrating the Arab world and the difficulty of meaning real business 
in the Middle Eastern region.  
 
IV. THE BACKLASH: WESTERNISM THE CROSS-CUTTING IMAGERY (1960-1982) 
 
The Turkish military‘s takeover in 1960 had no doubt a variety of motivations. As indictments 
against President Bayar, PM Menderes and FM Zorlu indicate, unhappiness about being 
excluded and marginalized in foreign policy decision-making is crucial.645 One can add a 
dominant suspicion as to whether Democrat Party leaders had attempted at derailing 
Turkey‘s orientation. The vigour and boldness with which the relations with the Middle East 
are handled was a central theme in accentuating such suspicions. From this perspective, it 
was no surprise that Turkish military started out with putting in extra checks into the system 
with a view to ensure republican continuity. The creation of the National Security Council 
(NSC) as a means of overseeing security affairs, and with it almost anything relating to 
internal and external affairs portfolios, was a key decision. Furthermore, the first elections 
held under the junta‘s supervision brought Ġsmet Ġnönü back in 1961 this time as the PM. The 
calculation was with the NSC and through the Kemalist networks of power (the MFA and the 
military), western orientation of Turkeycould remain unchallenged. The aim was to ensure 
the primacy of the West, and the non-interventionist, non-presumptuous and risk free attitude 
in the external dealings of Turkey.  
 
On keeping the western orientation and Kemalist inscription of the Middle East intact, the 
record was largely a success. In terms of timidity; the following two decades can also be 
characterized mostly with perseverance, with Cyprus being the biggest exception. Ġnönü was 
quick in reverting to his risk-averse stance towards foreign entanglements and initial 
disenchantment with the Middle East. Coming to power in 1965, Demirel whose conservative 
tendencies were the strongest, did not follow DP‘s line in foreign policy. To him, what 
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mattered in the affairs of state was continuity.646 Therefore, with little to no particular interest 
in foreign affairs, Demirel deferred the portfolio to his long time FM Ġhsan Sabri Çağlayangil. 
Ecevit posed no exception in the central direction of Turkey but only in style. Besides, the 
Turkish military once again directly intervened in the political process in 1971 removing 
Demirel from office which fed into his ambivalence. From then on, coalition governments 
were the rule which further strengthened the role of the foreign policy establishment.     
 
Turkey the Geographical Barrier 
 
The novelty about Cold War geopolitical placement of Turkey is discursive construction of the 
concept of ―barrier‖. With it, the Turkish elite portrayed the country as an indispensable 
partner in the containment of Soviet power.647 Double assurances were sought with this. On 
the one hand, it served to re-confirm a sense of (cultural and civilizational) belonging to the 
Euro-Atlantic family of nations. The security studies scholarship emerging in the 1950s 
considered states under the Alliance‘s umbrella a ‗security community‘. The term coined by 
Karl Deutsch basically referred to common values, norms and principles centring on a 
common ‗way of life‘ which the security community strivesto preserve.648 Depicting Turkey as 
a (western) barrier against the threatening ―Soviet other‖ fitted well in this framework. In the 
event, the feelings of insecurity and danger emanating from the Soviets for Ankara were 
instrumental not only in supressing domestic ethnic, sectarian and ideological differences 
(hence peace at home) but also differences of opinion on alternative impulses that 
Conservatives had earlier propagated. It also covered well the sensitivities associated with 
the Kemalists‘ primary instinct of survival, independence, and insularity.  
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On the other hand, ―the barrier‖ metaphor provided an external justification for Turkey‘s 
western positioning through an argument of functionality. More precisely, Turkey used the 
geopolitical script that Ankara represented and defended the western values (of democracy, 
rule of law, free market, free enterprise, etc.), culture and security amidst the toughest of 
geographies 649  Turks imagined their country the geographical extension and cultural 
outgrowth of the West, and wished to align their policies accordingly. The westernist imagery 
re-invented though the "barrier" metaphor thus enjoyed wide support across the political 
spectrum, helping ensure clarity of goals in external policy as well as homogeneity, cohesion, 
unity and obedience within Turkish society. The terminology used in instrumentalizing this 
function was quite rich. Concepts such as ―flank, front, outpost, frontline, bulwark, gateway, 
gatekeeper, etc.‖ were all employed to describe the insurmountable role of Turkey. 
Metaphors such a ―buffer‖, ―bastion‖ or ―fortress‖ that were used to describe Turkey‘s location 
also served to foster such an image. That the size of the Turkish army which was only bested 
in sheer numbers by the US was cited one of the most critical factors in the barrier function 
Ankara performed. On top of Turkey‘s strategic geographical location, this was used to 
consolidate the strong position of the Turkish military in domestic and foreign politics650 in so 
far as that foreign and national security policy was perceived to be one and the same 
thing.651 
 
Such a geopolitical positioning did not develop in vacuum. Externally the perceptions and 
expectations of Turkey by the US and European allies in safeguarding the southern flank of 
NATO served as a means of mutual re-constitution. Westerners by and large subscribed to 
the pragmatic notion of seeing Turkey as a barrier, too, beyond which it would be difficult for 
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the communists to stray. The strategic geography of Turkey could also be used as a 
springboard of action against the Soviets over a tripod of terrain covering the Balkans, the 
Caucasus and the Middle East had the circumstances so required. In practical terms, as 
Aybet argues, Turkey was ―both an important asset in the defence of the Middle East, and an 
essential component of the defence of Western Europe thanks to its geostrategic location 
and because of its (large) armed forces‖.652 Having the longest border with the Warsaw Pact 
of any NATO member as a front/flank state, the mission and roles expected of Turkey were 
―to counter balance the military imbalance in Europe against the Soviet threat‖653. Time 
magazine cartographically described this mission as ―to button down the ‗free world‘s 
southern flank.‖654 These expectations were so deeply internalized across the Atlantic that 
even when the Cold War approached to a close, ―the critical role Turkey played in the Middle 
East in helping defend the vital sea and land lanes of communication which cross the region 
as well as providing a potent barrier to the region‘s enormous oil reserves‖655 were still 
emphasized.  
 
In this context, the Europeans‘ cultural way of seeing Turkey at the periphery of the continent 
did not cause much worry for the Turkish elite as the latter seemed confident in having 
proved their country‘s strategic significance in the midst of a bad neighbourhood. This is 
because Turkey‘s geography which was instrumentalized in a security discourse gave Turks 
the impression that their country was accepted not only to the security community of NATO 
but also to the cultural zone called the West. As a result, propositions on Turkish 
geographical uniqueness and cultural/civilizational images of Europe could mostly enjoy a 
working relationship under the banner ―Turkey the barrier‖. The trouble was the over 
premium Turks placed on the significance of Turkey‘s geography and its role as a fence. The 
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degree of independence and pragmatism of Western powers did not work to Turks‘ 
advantage. This intrinsically ran counter to the logic of Cold-War geopolitics. Because just 
like everything else the relative significance and particularities of any geography during the 
period were simplistically subsumed within the perceptions around the bigger struggle 
between the two blocks.656 
 
Phase I. The Faithful Ally of the West (1960-1965) 
 
Turks‘ initial perception of their country‘s geopolitical standing was firm as evidenced by 
many steps taken during the period. For starters, the military junta expressed continuation of 
the commitment to NATO and CENTO (the name given to Baghdad Pact in 1958 after Iraq 
withdrew).657 Selim Sarper, a seasoned Turkish Ambassador, was the junta‘s choice for the 
position of FM who would keenly observe Kemalist predispositions. The leader of the coup, 
General Gürsel rejected an invitation from the Soviet leader Khrushchev for neutrality.658 PM 
Ġnönü reiterated a likewise overture by assertively stating that Turkey was committed to the 
Western system and therefore neutrality was not an option. In return, Ankara was hoping to 
rely on the US and NATO for financial aid in order to correct its ailing economy as well as 
strengthening its military capacity.659 Besides Turkey became a founding member in the 
OECC (later OECD) in 1961 and the signed a partnership document with the European 
Economic Community (the nucleus of the EU) in 1963. It was hoped that placement of 
Turkey in the West would be acknowledged, institutionalized and consolidated in the 
economic field with the OECC, 660  which was regarded as a framework for Turkey‘s 
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659FIRAT, M. (1997). 1960-71 Arasi Türk Diş Politikasi ve Kıbrıs Sorunu (1960-1971: Turkish Foreign Policy and the 
Cyprus Question). Cebeci, Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi. p.107-108.  
660 YANIK, L. (2012). p.36. 
212 
 
 
integration into Europe and the civilised world.661 The ECC on the other hand symbolized the 
endpoint in Atatürk‘s vision of reaching the same level of progress with western civilization.  
 
Against this background, Turkish foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East was nothing like 
the Menderes era. The region was initially reduced to a vehicle through which Turkey could 
prove its added strategic value to the West. The days of boldness, ambition, zeal and near 
bellicose discourse were over. Turkey was no longer the initiator of regional schemes or 
policies of its own making. It simply was responding to external stimuli. Put differently in 
order to distance from the Democrat Party era, Ankara turned much more reactionary. The 
behavioural patterns were highly timid, reluctant and cautious; seeking balance and limited to 
small scale engagement, if at all necessary.   
 
In this vein, there was no hesitation for Ankara in the early 1960s to act in line with western 
interests in the region. Turkey was prompt (the second after Jordan) to recognize Syria when 
it declared independence from the UAR in September 1961. Turkish action was grounded on 
the perception that Egypt and Syriawere ruled by the most anti-western regime in the Middle 
East. The decision added further fuel to already soured relations with Cairo which cut all 
diplomatic relations with Ankara.662 The voting record of Turkey during 1961 when serving as 
a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council was also in line with western 
expectations.663 Capitalizing on the positive atmosphere of the Periphery Pact, Turkey also 
kept Tel Aviv on a positive footing. During the eight years the Pact lasted, agricultural 
cooperation as well as dialogue and joint planning in the military field took root. 664The 
exchange of visits between Chiefs of General Staff was accompanied by a 1964 meeting in 
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Paris with PMs Ġnönü and Eshkol in attendance.665 Until the second half of the 1960s, air 
force training and participation in military exercises were of regular occurrence.666 
 
Phase II. The Confused Ally: Measured Westernism (1965-1983) 
 
What Ankara did not anticipate at the time was the degree of pragmatism western powers 
could enjoy in relations with Turkey. This was manifested most astutely on two occasions. 
First was during the Cuban missile crisis (1962) and the second over the issue of Cyprus 
(1964). On the first, the US struck a deal with the USSR to withdraw Jupiter missiles from 
Turkey in return for the Soviets‘ reciprocal action in Cuba.667 During the negotiations between 
Washington and Moscow, Turkey was not consulted tat-e-tat but debriefed at NATO later 
on.668 Nevertheless Turkey was not completely left alone as President Kennedy pledged to 
replace Jupiter missiles in Turkey with American Polaris submarines deployed in the 
Mediterranean. 669  The incident anyhow showed how vulnerably Turkey‘s interests were 
indexed at the mercy of Washington. Second and more critical was the famous Johnson 
letter saga.670 At a time when inter-ethnic tensions on the Cypriot island were on the rise, PM 
Ġnönü made it clear to Washington that Turkey was determined to act unilaterally based on 
the Guarantee Agreement of 1959. US President Johnson‘s letter telling Turks to simply 
ward off or face the Soviets alone was a slap of utmost frustration for Ankara.671 Ġnönü 
immediately called his planned US visit off and stated to Time magazine that ―if (our) allies 
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do not change their position, the Western alliance can go dissolved…‖ and ―...asa new world 
(order) is established according to new circumstances, Turkey would no doubt find its 
(proper) place in this new world”.672 In assessing the incident, Bülent Ecevit who became 
CHP‘s leader in 1964 argued similarlythat ―Ankara realized that its one-dimensional national 
security approach did not cover all contingencies‖.673 
 
The net fallout was erosion in the authority of the West (the US in particular) as a reliable 
partner. A growing suspicion that the West would not come to Turkey‘s aid if a real threat 
emerged resurrected the insecurities emanating from the Sevres-phobia. Consequently 
Turks drew the lesson that they should ―never become so dependent on anyone again‖.674 
Equally disturbing for Ankara was that most Arab states either due to non-aligned solidarity 
or suspicions over the use of the island as a forward staging base by Western powers to aid 
Israel did not lend their support to theTurkish thesis (the British bases on the island, to the 
continuation of which Turkey had no objection, were already used in the 1956 Suez Crisis 
against Egypt675).676 On December 18, 1965, Egypt, Iraq and Syria voted in favour of the UN 
resolution reaffirming the sovereignty of Greek-dominated Cyprus and the illegality of any 
external (Turkish) intervention.677 Only Iran and Libya supported Turkey. Hence the rhetoric 
of diversification of Turkey‘s external relations that started in the late 1950s gained visibly 
more strength. It was a time when there was almost unanimous consensus in Ankara that 
Turkey needed to revise its policy options and turn multi-dimensional.678 
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Discouraged by these developments, a change in the geopolitical code was a must. 
Therefore, the notion that dominated Turkish foreign policy behaviour until the early 1980s 
can be called ―measured westernism‖. Whilst Turkey‘s strategic orientation remained solid, a 
faintly roughed up Ankara believed that some distance vis-à-vis its relations with the West 
(the US) was the right strategy. This was, however, nothing beyond a tactical measure which 
was assuredly declared by the initiator of the policy, Hamit Batu, a senior diplomat from the 
ranks of the MFA.679He articulated the refined strategy with a call for closer ties with Europe 
(as opposed to the US), a rapprochement with the USSR (even to the point of concluding an 
aid and credit agreement in 1964680 and an industrial assistance agreement in 1967 which 
were used to finance a number of heavy industry plants681) and closer ties with the non-
aligned movement (Third World).682 The expectation was that Europe would become the third 
force vis-à-vis the Soviets and the US, and Turkey‘s position in Europe would only be 
secured if Ankara could establish itself with some prestige in the non-aligned world including 
the Middle East.683 
 
The three dominant political figures, PMs Ecevit and Demirel and their coalition aide Erbakan 
developed different discourses in operationalizing this vision. In the 1960s and 1970s Ecevit 
became famous for ―Third Worldism‖, Erbakan for ―Easternism‖ and Demirel, as the most 
pragmatic of all, ―managing fine-tuned relations with the Arab Middle East and the West‖.684 
In all three accounts, the Middle East fared fairly high. The oriental region thereafter was 
translated into one of the central pillars upon which Ankara could base its measured 
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response to the west (the US foremost). Furthermore, it was translated into a vehicle through 
which Turkey could seek an alternative, yet not necessarily substitutive, web of relations.  
 
The overall scripture of the Middle East was much like the dominant Kemalist storyline, one 
that is risky, unattractive and dangerous. Yet it was the area Turks sought relative autonomy, 
greater freedom of action and support for its foreign policy priorities. Turkish leaders thus felt 
hesitantly compelled to relate with the region but never to the point of genuine identification 
with. As a result, the main tenets of the new regional strategy were equality among state 
parties, non-interference in the domestic affairs of Middle Eastern countries and in inter-
country disputes.685 One could add guided neutrality to the list as Turkey had to make some 
tough choices during the period in the conflicts between Israel and its Arab neighbours as 
well as in the Palestinian dispute. In practical terms, this notion was operationalized as an 
affirmation of the Palestinians‘ right to statehood while recognizing Israel‘s legitimacy to live 
as an independent state.686 
 
In this regard, Ankara also saw CENTO whereby Turkey had earlier contemplated itself as 
the chief state of western forward defence posture, as a proper instrumental tool. CENTO‘s 
headquarters had already moved from Baghdad to Ankara in 1959 following Iraq‘s exit. The 
fact that ‗the principal attraction of the organization for other parties was the machinery which 
it afforded for obtaining military and financial aid687 helped Ankara‘s hand. In this context, it 
was not business as usual for the Turkish and Pakistani Presidents and Iranian Shah to 
convene in Istanbul in June 1964688 as the meeting resulted in the establishment of an 
organization to promote economic, technical and cultural cooperation with the name of 
‗Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)‘. It was different from CENTO but assuredly 
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not to belittle it. 689  Expectations were economic collaboration as well as attracting non-
committed countries in the region, e.g. Afghanistan, Kuwait and even Iraq. 690  The new 
organization was in line with Turks‘ desire for broadening their freedom of manoeuvre which 
caused the British and the Americans to suspect whether the Turks would be drifting away.691 
In the subsequent years, the initiative was marred with small achievements due to insufficient 
funds, divergent interests and agendas, and administrative difficulties albeit an initially 
ambitious agenda. RCD remained in operation till the end of 1978, but a state of dormancy 
subsumed from 1979 to 1984, making its function as a useful lever for Ankara vis-à-vis its 
relations with the West questionable. 
 
When AP won a majority ticket in 1965, very little was known of its foreign policy convictions 
aside from the fact that Demirel rose on the legacy of Menderes‘s defunct DP. It soon 
emerged that as a pragmatic politician, he was of very little foreign affairs interest. During the 
nine years Demirel served as the PM from 1965 to 1980, he never employed a strong 
geopolitical discourse nor ever challenged the overall policy direction. It has to be noted that 
Demirel was the subject of overt and covert interventions by the Turkish military in 1971 and 
1980 which in part accounts for his reluctance. The bigger part remaining he simply was not 
a man of grand vision or change but rather continuity.692 With Anatolian conservatives lying 
at the core of his constituency, Demirel heeded only selectively to the sensitivities of his 
people toward the Arab Middle East. That‘s why he started with a pledge in 1965 that ―it 
would be a priority for Turkey to establish genuinely close and multifaceted relations of 
friendship and fruitful cooperation on various areas with the brotherly countries in the Middle 
East and Maghreb‖ and that ―Arab states could rely on Turkey‟s sympathy and support for 
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their legitimate causes‖.693 However, this was accompanied by a commitment to develop 
friendly relations with the non-aligned countries in Africa and Asia without challenging 
Turkey‘s westernist anchor. On clarifying how this would fit in to the relations with Israel, FM 
Çağlayangil authoritatively declared in February 1967 that ―good relations with Arab 
countries would not take Ankara‟s ties with Israel hostage‖.694 
 
This last point seemed in contradiction with the foreign policy establishment‘s position as 
Ankara had already signalled how it hoped to operationalize Middle Eastern politics as an 
instrument of measured distancing vis-à-vis the relations with the West in 1966. The Turkish 
military at that time decided to end the Periphery Pact with Israel which was on-and-off for 
the last eight years.695 Besides the Turkish Director of Military Intelligence told his Israeli 
counterpart that Turkey was going to freeze bilateral relations because the US supported the 
Greek Orthodox Church‘s claims over historical ties to Istanbul.696 By slightly guiding the 
balance toward Arabs, the establishment hoped to break with the utter international isolation 
suffered on the issue of Cyprus697 and prove Ankara‘s nuisance value to Washington. To see 
upon which impulses Turkey would act and who would steer the policy, i.e. Demirel‘s elected 
government or the emboldened military, one has to consider the turn of events in the 
following years. 
 
The opportunity presented itself as the tensions rose between Israel and its Arab neighbours 
in 1967. In clear contrast to the position Turkey took in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the guided 
neutrality policy led Demirel not to side with Israel and the US in the armed conflict. Turkey 
carefully refrained from actively engaging in the war and Ankara rejected Washington‘s 
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request to use airbases in Adana to resupply Israel.698 The same meticulous approach was 
displayed in not condemning Israel as the aggressor.699 Anxious about the infringement of 
the regional status quo, Turkey even allowed Russian aircrafts to use its airspace to deliver 
humanitarian aid to the belligerent Arabs, i.e. Syria, Egypt and Jordan.700 During the conflict 
PM Demirel announced that he was against forceful acquisition of territory.701 Similarly when 
the issue was brought to the UN, FM Çağlayangil declared that ―Ankara would not recognize 
Israel‟s territorial gains achieved in fait accompli by use of force‖.702 He also uttered the 
sensitivities of Turkish people on the holy sites in Jerusalem.703 The choices Turkey made 
during the conflict partly reflected the preferences of Turkish conservatives who were much 
more sympathetic to the Palestinians and the Arabs‘ cause, 704  and in larger part the 
establishment‘s guided neutrality doctrine. To strike a balance, Ankara supported the UN 
Resolution 242 which demanded Israel withdraw from territories occupied in the recent 
conflict but acknowledged the right for all states to live in secure and recognized 
boundaries.705 Turkey‘s limited, cautious and rather rhetorical engagement in the conflict 
therefore did not necessarily mean a break away from the established non-interference 
clause toward a region where a disavowed sense of distaste and resentment prevailed.   
 
The same scenario repeated itself in 1973 when Arabs and Israel clashed once more. The 
guided neutrality on both occasions worked to the advantage of Arabs backed by Moscow 
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while infuriating Israelis and Washington.706 Ankara‘s neutrality in each case was established 
later on by a strong call on the acknowledgement of Israel‘s right to survival within secure 
borders. The military conflicts were a chance for Ankara to show that the West was not the 
only option there was. Thus, Turks aimed to achieve an independent, elastic and diversified 
approach regarding the Middle East.707 Additionally Turkey favoured a risk-averse policy that 
sought a speedy return to status quo ante bellum. The non-interference and guided neutrality 
characterizing such behaviour was later defined as ‗traditional Kemalist policy‘708 albeit it was 
Demirel‘s conservative government in power in 1967 and an interim administration in 1973 
that commenced such policy. For Turkey zigzagged considerably vis-à-vis the Jewish state 
since its establishment in 1948, PM Ben Gurion‘s statement in the 1950s that ―Turkey treated 
Israel as its mistress (Arabs being its wife)‖709 was further strengthened by the course of 
developments in the 1960s to 1970s.  
 
Regardless of the true intentions of the political elite, the foreign policy establishment was 
adamant that Turkey's engagement with the Muslim Middle East would not amount to 
anything more than a tactical measure. It was simply beyond conception that any deviation 
could be incurred on Ankara‘s steadfastly pro-Western foreign policy. The issue rose up 
when an invite was sent to the Turkish President for the first Islamic Summit Conference in 
Rabat in 1969. The proposed agenda was to discuss the fire at the Al Aqsa Mosque and the 
status of Jerusalem following Israel's occupation of the eastern part of the city in 1967.710The 
first question in Ankara was whether Turkey should participate at all. The problem for the 
Kemalist establishment was twofold. First of all, it was an issue of contention whether 
laicism, a core principle in the Turkish constitution, would fit in well with Ankara‘s participation 
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710 SOYSAL, I. (1991). Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Siyasal BağItları (Turkey’s International Political Commitments) II (1945-
1990). Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi. p.732. 
221 
 
in a gathering of Muslim states. Demirel who represented the conservative tradition argued 
that it was a political and not a religious meeting711 and so Turkey should participate. An 
equally crucial worry for the establishment was to keep the western orientation of the Turkish 
state unquestioned. In other words, Ankara‘s participation in the Summit by no means had to 
prejudice Turkey‘s geopolitical positioning as a member of the western community and an 
ally in NATO.712 The last question was at what level Turkey should attend had it so been 
decided. Here the preference of the government was attending at the level requested, i.e. the 
President. The firm opposition by the foreign policy establishment paved the way to the 
following formula; Turkey would participate but only as an ―observer‖ and at the level of FM. 
As a result, Ankara participated with a delegation headed by FM Çağlayangil.713 
 
The OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) Declaration regarding the issues of Palestine 
and Israel was accepted with a reservation stipulating that Ankara‘s concurrence was 
conditioned in so far as the declaration was compatible with the UN resolutions (where 
Turkey applied guided neutrality) and with the fundamental principles of Turkish foreign 
policy (westernism).714 Ankara‘s reluctance to take sides infuriated the Arabs (Egypt and 
Algeria) and caused criticisms at home. The unconvinced Abdi Ġpekçi, the editor of a major 
Turkish paper, opined that Demirel‘s government had only participated in the Rabat Summit 
to woo conservative voters in advance of the approaching general elections in Turkey.715 
Ankara‘s hesitancy on how to relate to the activities of the OIC continued in the early 1970s 
with a rather uncommitted stance. The Ministerial meeting held in Jeddah in 1970 was 
attended at the level of the MFA's Secretary-General who did not participate in 
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deliberations.716In the following years Ankara avoided regular participation in OIC meetings 
whilst supporting the proposal to establish a Secretariat.717 When a Charter was drafted in 
1972 during the OIC Summit in Jeddah, Ankara held back on the grounds that the general 
principles of its foreign policy (westernism) and the secular constitution were not quite 
compatible.  
 
Close to the mid-1970s, a number of factors begged Ankara‘s immediate attention. The first 
was the violent crackdowns in Baghdad and Damascus in 1968 and 1970 which resulted in 
pro-Soviet regimes. With the Baath Party taking over control of the government in Iraq and 
Syria, the new ideological colouring of the region was a serious challenge for Ankara. The 
second was the oil shock of 1973 in the face of an already deteriorating economy. The fact 
that Arab countries started using oil as a political weapon began hurting Turkey in two ways. 
Firstly, a net increase in the price of Turkey‘s oil exports for which Ankara relied 
overwhelmingly on foreign producers was incurred. To help it remedied, Ankara established 
credit lines with oil-producing Arab countries.718 Secondly, the oil shock ultimately caused 
European markets with which Turkey had established majority of its commercial ties to 
shrink. 719  Coupled with a decline in the remittances from Europe, 720  PM Demirel drew 
attention to the growing current account deficit and the shortage in foreign currency reserves 
in his idiosyncratic style that ―Turkey was in dire need of 70 cents‖.721 Therefore, Ankara 
needed to diversify the external markets for Turkish consumer goods and workers in which 
the Arab world seemed vastly suited.722 
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That Ankara‘s unilateral intervention in Cyprus in 1974 triggered an arms embargo by the US 
lasting for three years (1975-1978) further deepened the economic crisis and the 
international isolation Ankara suffered.723 When Turkish action was debated at the UN with 
resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus, most Western nations 
either voted against them or abstained. Neither the Soviets nor the non-aligned world or 
Muslim countries backed the Turkish position, all of which fed into a deep sense of 
loneliness, frustration and resentment.724 
 
The inclusion of the MSP in the coalition government formed in 1973 lent an extra motive to 
mend fences more quickly with the Muslim world despite the fact that Erbakan‘s net imprint 
on the overall foreign policy strategy was rather limited. The somewhat besieged Ankara was 
therefore forced to show a growing eagerness to strengthen ties with the Arab world.725 
Turkey‘s reluctant return to the oriental region thus gained a somewhat accelerated pace 
without impeding the established principles.  
 
To this end, Ankara struck deals with Tripoli in the second half of the 1970s to send Turkish 
workers in thousands to Libya and receive a continuous oil flow in favourable terms.726 Via 
similar favours established with Iraq (with the pipeline carrying oil from Kirkuk to the Turkish 
port of Ceyhan constructed in 1977) and Saudi Arabia, the net share of Arab states in 
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Turkey‘s overall trade volume increased from a mere 5% prior to 1973 to 34% in 1981 thanks 
in large part to Turkish oil purchases.727 
 
In this context, Turkey supported registration of the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in the UN in 1973.728 Ankara 
shortly began contributing to the OIC budget in 1974 and by injecting Turkish capital became 
a full member of the Islamic Development Bank the next year.729 In the very same line, 
Turkey voted in 1975 for the UN resolution that equated Zionism with racism.730 During the 
period, Ankara‘s stance can neither be characterized strictly pro-Arab nor anti-Israel as the 
main concern for Turkey was to register its neutrality as a western state in the form of 
benevolence in the affairs of a region of utmost distaste. In line with this strategy, Ankara 
vigorously resisted calls from the Arab states after the wars in 1967 and 1973 to cease 
diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. For instance, once a resolution was tabled in the OIC 
Summit in Lahore in 1974 calling all states to break relations with Israel, Turkish FM Turan 
GüneĢ was quick to put in Ankara‘s unwavering reserve that it would not follow suit.731 
 
In May 1976, Ankara under the threat by Necmettin Erbakan of MSP to dissolve the coalition 
government 732  unenthusiastically hosted the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign 
Ministers in Istanbul. It was perhaps one of the moments Erbakan made his limited influence 
felt as strongly as possible in getting Turkey closer to the Arab world. During the conference, 
Ankara proposed establishment of a statistical, economic and research centre (SESRIC) as 
well as a research centre on history, art and Islamic culture (IRCICA) in Turkey. The centres 
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were established in Ankara in 1978 and Ġstanbul in 1979.733 Turks also promised the PLO an 
office in Ankara in 1976 but there was no hurry after the conference to act on that. A number 
factors were crucial in the delay. The PLO‘s support to Greek Cypriot theses and the 
subsequent failure to endorse OIC decisions, the fact that Turkish left-wing radical and 
Kurdish separatist groups got training in PLO camps in Lebanon, Ankara‘s belief that the 
PLO supported Kurdish secessionist movements and provided refuge to Armenian terrorists 
in Bekaa Valley, the Organization‘s tendency to resort to violence and Turkish fears that 
aclose engagement with the PLO would adversely affect Ankara‘s chances of receiving 
economic aid from the West seemed to have all played a role.734 
 
The overriding circumstances were created with the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 
Egyptian-Israeli agreement. In 1978, there was a conservative Demirel-Erbakan government 
in Ankara.The bigger coalition partner supported Cairo‘s move but Erbakan advocated that 
Egypt simply was selling off the Palestinian cause.735 When ardently Kemalist Ecevit formed 
a coalition government next year, he was convinced that the accords would have no positive 
impact on the solution of the Palestinian dispute. In order to balance the scale, Ecevit hosted 
PLO leader Yasser Arafat in Turkey in October 1979. During the visit, the PLO‘s Office in 
Ankara was inaugurated with a quasi-diplomatic status at the level of Charge d‘Affaires just 
like the diplomatic representative of Israel in Turkey.736 Turks were trying to strike a balance 
between the Arabs and Israelis as Ankara was suspicious that the PLO was still harbouring 
terrorist groups (Kurds, left-wing radicals and Armenians) of whose training activities the PLO 
never promised an end.737 
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On the other hand, Ankara had voiced a declaration of intent to formally approve the OIC 
charter (the Founding Agreement of 1972) during the Seventh Conference in Istanbul. That 
the document included a resolution calling on the participants "...to preserve Islamic spiritual, 
ethical, social and economic values" and to "...promote Islamic solidarity among member 
states‖738 in particular was a source of great worry for Ankara. Unsure about how the foreign 
policy establishment would react, successive Turkish governments did not keep the promise 
and postponed the parliamentary debate to see if the laicism clause in the Turkish 
constitution bode well with the charter.739 Due to such deep-seated insecurities, it was not 
until 1981 that a Turkish PM was present in an OIC Summit as the military coup after 1980 
was more accommodating towards the role of Islam in Turkey.740 
 
By the start of the 1980s, the Turkish economy was still deteriorating with great difficulty in 
covering the cost of oil exports. The fact that the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran brought 
about skyrocketing oil prices in addition to a potential unfriendly regime in Tehran simply 
accentuated the impetus to pay more respect to Arab sensitivities. In this regard, when the 
Israeli Parliament passed a bill in July 1980 declaring Jerusalem in its entirety the eternal 
capital of Israel, Ankara‘s reaction was harsh. Turco-Israeli relations deteriorated quickly with 
Ankara‘s decision to shut its Consulate in Jerusalem down.741 Furthermore, Turkey decided 
to withdraw all personnel from its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv except for a second 
secretary who would serve as the Turkish Charge d‘Affairs by the end of August.742 
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The general posture of Turkish policy did not change under the military junta in the aftermath 
of September 12. Diligent of not veering too far, Ankara did not allow the debacle to escalate 
to the point of severing diplomatic relations with Israel as Arabs suggested when Tel Aviv 
adopted a bill to extend the jurisdiction of Israeli law to the occupied Golan Heights in 
December 1981.743 In this line, Turkey was careful in not totally undermining its western 
credentials when a draft resolution was voted at the UN General Assembly in February 1982, 
condemning Israel‘s occupation of the Golan Heights, calling Israel an non-peace loving 
country, criticizing the ―no‖ vote of the US in the Security Council a month earlier on the 
same matter asking for appropriate measures against Israel, and called on U.N. agencies 
and international organizations to tailor their relations with Israel to punitive terms.744 
 
By the end of the period, the share of Middle Eastern states in Turkey‘s trade volume was 
increased but Ankara‘s overall relations with the Arab world remained in limbo. Relations with 
Israel were sour. The non-partisan approach of Ankara proved unsuccessful in satisfying 
most parties in the region.  New dimensions were added to regional affairs which factored in 
the perceptions by and of Turkey. On top of the Baath takeovers in Syria and Iraq, continuity 
of opportunism and Soviet-friendliness in Cairo further coloured Ankara‘s preoccupations 
about the region. Kurdish, Armenian and radical Turkish groups getting trained in the PLO 
camps in Lebanon was yet another factor. In addition to the conception that equated Turkey 
with being an agent of the West in the Middle East and a constant reminder of Ottoman 
hegemony, Ankara‘s willingness to undertake construction of big dams on the Tigris River 
from the mid-1960s onwards strengthened Ankara‘s image as a hostile country for Arabs.745  
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With varying degrees, all were influential in setting the respective imageries parties 
developed in the following decades while dealing with each other.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The first sixty years of the Republic bears testimony to the pervasive influence of 
civilizational geopolitics. Turks, either Kemalist or Conservative, saw the world through 
civilizational binaries that crystalized around positive or negative symbolizations associated 
with the West or the East. Between these binaries, two geopolitical traditions contested in 
determining where Turkey is as well as how to construe the Middle East. In the process, 
westwards orientation of the state was elevated to the status of prevalent norm. This affected 
domestic and foreign policy alike. So strong was the impact of westwards positioning that 
aside from Necmettin Erbakan and his disciples, nobody practically challenged it.  
 
Nonetheless when it came to the Middle East, it was not only the legacy of Ataturk but also 
the opposing conservative mantra that shaped Ankara‘s geopolitical practices. A competing 
geopolitical scripture of the region preponderated as to how Turkey should place itself in the 
Middle East and how it should ultimately behave. As long as the region remained a beacon 
of distasteful bitterness, risk and danger, as Kemalists propagated, policy-makers in Ankara 
approached it with caution, reluctance and extra diligence. Based on this geographical 
imagination, Turks chose to be timid and reactionary, trying to avoid unnecessary volume of 
intensity in regional entanglements. But at times when foreign policy figures in Ankara 
identified themselves more easily with Islam and traditional values, perceptions of the region 
diverged significantly. As the power of the Kemalist establishment remained the strongest, 
conservative influence in Ankara's geopolitical practices was rather limited in scope but 
nevertheless profound. During the 1950s, a sense of genuine care for the countries in the 
region led Turkey to act much more confidently and boldly as compared to what Kemalists 
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would have preferred. This was not, however, always gentle as Ankara was in the first place 
after its own interests.  
 
The way Turkey acted throughout the period was no doubt conditioned by the geopolitical 
imageries and practices of other state actors as Turks were always watchful of how their 
somewhat romanticized western partners approached Turkey and the Middle East. As such, 
they never pursued regional policies in isolation from the dealings of western powers. In 
practice, Turks learnt with due price that in addition to the western powers‘, the practices, 
ambitions, perceptions, imageries, modes of representation and visions of the regional actors 
had also to be factored in.  
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CHAPTER – 5 TURKEY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE SEARCH 
FOR ALTERNATIVES (1983-2010) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Whereas the first 60 years of the Turkish Republic has enjoyed an almost unquestionably 
robust westwards direction in which the Middle East was reduced to an icon of deliberate 
non-identification and mostly a subject of Turkey‘s reluctant foreign policy entanglements, the 
era starting with Turgut Özal in the early 1980s symbolizes increasing levels of association 
with the region while Turkey‘s singlehanded placement in the West is approached with more 
unease. This chapter therefore signifies a rupture, with brief exceptions reserved, in the 
perceptions around the place, identity and orientation of Turkey as well as the modes of 
representation around the Middle East. That such questioning did start during the Cold War 
stands testimony to the impact of domestic determinants at the expense of systemic 
imperatives in influencing Turkish foreign policy.  
 
II. RE-IMAGINING TURKEY’S PLACE IN THE WORLD (1983-1993) 
 
A New Conception of Civilizational Space 
 
Özal‘s ANAP (Anavatan Partisi - Motherland Party) was under heavy influence of the 
conservative school. Yet as a catch-all party, ANAP was where conservative, religious, 
nationalist and liberal tendencies met. The challenge for Özal was to develop a foreign policy 
design that wouldfit all. He came up with a discourse of (geo-cultural) synthesis with a view 
to reduce what he perceived as Ankara‘s overdependence on the West. In the process, he 
kept toying with civilizational geopolitics.  
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At first, Özal criticized Europeans for exercising ethnocentrism and a racist collective 
subconscious against Turkey.746 For Özal, the Europeans claimed superiority of the West, 
and hence simply tended to bestow all things regarded as just and good on themselves and 
attributed everything unworthy to others whom they considered inferior.747 He was convinced 
that Europeans considered the Aegean Sea not an extension of the Mediterranean but an 
insuperable demarcation line between the West and rest.748 To him, such a tormented image 
of superior European self by creating mental barriers before geographies called for disaster.  
 
Against this grotesque image, Özal tried to evidence how deeply Muslims, Turks and Turkey, 
by harnessing a civilizational space of their own, were involved in the evolution of western 
civilizational cosmos.749  He argued for a unity of human civilization and space in which 
ancient Greek, Roman, Judaic-Christian and Islamic-Turkish cultures all partook.750 Özal did 
not accept the East and the West as ―self-enclosed‖ geopolitical entities in the structuring of 
civilizations but rather called for a singular space in intermingled continuities. It was an 
attempt to go beyond simplistic conceptions of geo-cultural typology (East-West) as spaces 
of difference, temporal separation and inequality towards an understanding of a common 
space of hybridity. The present day reflection for Özal had to be harmonious existence of 
Eastern (Muslim-Turkish) and Western (Christian-European) civilizations as both owed much 
to each other with mutual barrowing and adaptation being ordinary practice for 
centuries.751He foresaw the ultimate re-joining of these two locales in Turkey‘s accession to 
the EC752 as this would resolve the ages-old tension between the West and East.753 
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Turkey: The Land of (Geo-Cultural) Synthesis 
 
By reducing the distance and difference between the East and the West to almost none, one 
of the aims for Özal was to rid Turks' mind of binary oppositions. He claimed that throughout 
the republican history, Atatürk‘s motto ―peace at home, peace in the world‖ was interpreted 
rigidly as a means of self-contained identity that precluded any active involvement outside 
Turkey‘s borders.754 It thus restricted the limits of bounded rationality for external action 
around Turkey's bounded and stable territoriality against the spatial and cultural "otherness" 
of Muslims. Özal believed that republican policies of timidity and non-interference had 
produced a state of insularity by constructing (mental) walls around Turkey with a sacrosanct 
conception of borders.755In the sense Rose stipulates, Özal ―challenged (existing) oppressive 
definitions of identity by rethinking the spatialities which give both material and symbolic 
structure to those definitions‖.756 Thus not only Europe/West was constructed as a familiar 
space that is ―ours‖ in the reconstitution of Turkey's new identity but also Eastern and Muslim 
spaces which were considered as ―theirs‖ and beyond reach in the Kemalist mantra. 
Reconstructing Turkey's spatial position and identity this way obliged it to come to terms with 
many of the geographical and cultural influences in the production of a new cross-boundary 
identity. This goes in both directions, the East and the West (Islamic and Judeo-Greco-
Roman-Christian757). By overriding the Kemalist conception of spatiality and identity, Ozal 
posed to get Turkey rid of mental barriers and make it great again.  
 
From this sprang how Özal imagined the place of Turkey in a hybridist notion of space; a 
land of synthesis that combines in itself two meta places and many cultures that predates 
                                                          
754ARAL, B. (2001). p. 78. 
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and permeates over opposing binaries in the construction of the Eastern and the Western 
geographies.758 With a foot in Europe and Asia, Turkey was presented as a living example of 
hybridity of space. Thus, Turkey was deemed Asiatic and European, Easterner not less than 
Western, oriental as well as occidental. Such a synthesis was what Özal hoped would ―put 
anend to the identity crisis of Turks‖.759In this vein, the location of Anatolia as the centre 
stage for many civilizations was given as evidence that it serves as a melting pot of 
spaces.760 For Özal, the fact that Turkey went through an extensive process of westernist 
reformation did not render the indigenous features of Anatolia (religion, traditional customs, 
and other cultural values) any less relevant since they were extremely resilient in the face of 
alien civilizational intrusion.761To the contrary, such diversity and richness were used as a 
means to justify active pursuit of national interest.Foreign policy, which was touted in a spirit 
of economic liberalism, was once again the area to discursively and practically construct the 
new identity. In this context, Özal argued that ―Turkey should be an indispensable power for 
both the East and the West. This is only possible through a dynamic, active and honest 
foreign policy that does not hastily change its orientation and zigzag haphazardly.‖762 
 
Conservative Reflexes Re-Emerging: A Different National Mission 
 
Özalbrought back greater level of ambition, self-confidence and zeal to Turkish foreign 
policy, comparable only to but far exceeding the DP era. His style reflected utmost 
dynamism, boldness, unorthodox style and adaptability. 763  Özal harboured ambitions to 
transform Turkey into a regional power hub, a common theme in the conservative school, 
which found its most astute expression in his own dictum ―again great Turkey‖, implying 
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enhancement of Ankara‘s international stature.764 To mark his broader ambition, Özal was 
also associated with the rhetoric of ―jumping an age (çağ atlamak)‖. Regional cooperation 
based on economic incentives was a central pillar in order to resuscitate a ―great 
Turkey‖.What characterized Özal‘s foreign policy handling was ―to depart from established 
policies, to take calculated risks, and to search for new alternatives and options.‖ 765 
Therefore, the Özal era in Turkish foreign policy bears witness to the third genuine wave of 
intense activism in Middle Eastern politics.  
 
The Synthesis as a Guide to Foreign Policy 
 
In re-establishing Turkey‘s global placement, Özal was unhappy with the notion that saw 
Turkey as an appendage of Europe. The West was no longer seen as the ultimate direction 
of Turkish foreign policy but rather just another dimension.766Particular importance was paid 
to Turks‘ Ottoman and Islamic roots as these were perceived what would provide Turkey the 
basis for giving Ankara a greater say in world affairs.767 For Özal, ―the greater the weight of 
Turkey in the (Muslim) East, the greater it would be in the West‖.768 Put differently, the 
Muslim world was instrumentalized as the space to elevate Turkey‘sglobal standing. Hence, 
Özal championed closer ties with Muslim states, which were justified through a civilizational 
discourse. He stated that ―the reason why we approach to the Muslim world is because we 
have cultural and religious ties with these brotherly countries.‖769The novelty was Özal‘s 
refusal to part ways with the West. With a legacy covering both the Western and Muslim 
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civilizations and cultures, he was ready to give up neitherthe east nor the west.770 As he 
usually humorously questioned ―why should not Turkey make use of the advantages of 
both?‖771 Thanks to his dual outlook, Lawday called Özal ―a statesman whose mind is in the 
West yet whose heart belongs to the East‖. Özal‘s therefore was not an attempt to change 
Turkey‘s orientation altogether but rather to reduce its dependence on the West and diversify 
its options772for a multidimensional and multifaceted foreign policy.773 
 
The Conservative Image of the Middle East Re-Visited 
 
In practical terms, connecting more closely with the Middle East was what Özal thought 
would constitute ―spreading out the weight of Turkish trade and political power‖.774When 
gently challenging Ankara‘s firmly established westwards location, Turkey‘s Muslim roots 
thus became much more visible and pronounced. This stemmed from an express sympathy 
for the Muslim world which was no less than towards the West.775 Foreign policy was, alas, 
the area to discursively reconstruct the new state identity. In the act, the rigidly established 
boundaries between "in" and "out", "us" vs. "them" were flexed to allow room for additional 
dimensions and areas of manoeuvre. A closer identification with the Middle East as a token 
of Turkey's Ottoman and Islamic heritage simply served to this purpose. Ozal therefore was 
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774ÖZAL, T. (1991).21. Asir Türkiye’nin ve Türklerin Asri Olacak (21st Century will be Turkey’s and Turks) in 
Konuşmalar (Speeches). Ankara, Başbakanlık Basımevi. 
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vocal in emphasizing Turkey's placement and sense of belonging to the Middle East in 
addition to the West. 776 The oriental region no longer was a cursed geography that Turkey 
had the unfortunate fate of having had to live with but the land of people with whom Turks 
shared a common geography, history, religion and culture. Likewise it no longer was a 
symbol of permanent turmoil, danger and threats but rather a zone of strategic significance 
with promising prospects of economic cooperation. Justifying Ankara's engagement with the 
Middle East through such a geopolitical discourse, the region was elevated to the status of a 
land of opportunities and not merely challenges.777 
 
The Practice: The Early Özalian Epoch (1983-1989)  
 
As part of the new geopolitical imagery, countries in the Middle East were not seen as 
foreigners but friends and potential allies.778 As Eralp argues, this was a deliberate policy 
choice by the new ruling elite which strived to develop an easy-going and pragmatic 
relationship with the Arab and Muslim world.779 Fuller interpreted Ankara‘s rapprochement 
with the Muslim world as a mere reflection of Özal‘s personal interest to promote Islamic 
lifestyle at home.780In fact the re-definition of Turkey‘s geopolitical positioning amidst two 
spaces, the East and the West paved the way for greater interest in the Muslim world. 
Coupled with a fresh and non-fouled image of the region, Turkish policy towards the Middle 
East, by means of discourse and practice, took a visible upturn. Consequently political, 
economic and social interaction and high level visits proliferated.  
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In this context, Turkey was brought back to the centre stage of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) by permanently undertaking the chair of the COMSEC (Committee on 
Social and Economic Cooperation) in the 3rd Islamic Summit in 1984, three years after the 
inception of the committee. At the Summit, Turkey was for the first time represented by its 
President, Kenan Evren upon Özal‘s persuasion. Thereafter the OIC, which used to be a 
venue of reluctant participation by Turkish leaders, was transformed into an area of regular 
high level attendance.781 Ankara‘s expectation was, in addition to soliciting Muslim states‘ 
support to its foreign policy priorities, to stimulate joint investments and boost cooperation in 
trade, industry, finance and energy.782 
 
Reducing restrictions before economic cooperation served as a prelude to the eradication of 
mental borders between Turks and its Muslim neighbourhood. 783  Once economic 
interdependency was established, in the words of Özal, these countries ―would inevitably 
think twice before doing anything to harm each other‟s interests‖.784  With an attempt to 
solidify this vision, Turkey took the lead in the establishment of regional cooperation 
schemes. The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which rose on the legacy of inept 
Regional Cooperation for Development, was inaugurated in 1986 by Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan in order to promote economic, technical and cultural cooperation. The economic 
utility of ECO remained marginal until the wave of enlargement in 1992 which took in 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
as members.785 Even after that, creating a common trade area by establishing a preferential 
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trade regime remained far from sight. The symbolism from Ankara‘s perspective, however, 
was high since it signalled a growing eagerness to do business with the Muslim world.  
 
These were all linked to the new model of economic development Ankara adopted which 
aimed at integrating Turkey with the international capitalist economy.786 This required capital 
inflows, foreign direct investment, export markets and continuous flow of energy and raw 
materials.787 Economic factors thus began to have a growing role in Turkish foreign policy. In 
the process, owners of Turkey‘s baby industries in the avidly conservative Anatolian 
heartland insisted on better relations with those geographies with whom they shared a similar 
culture, civilization and traditional values, i.e. the Muslim world.788 In the face of a wave of 
protectionist measures engulfing Europe,789 the Middle East fared high as the hydrocarbon-
rich Muslim countries in the region constituted an important link and market.  In this context, 
Yavuz opines that ―the aim of Turkey was buying oil, paying the money for this oil as late as 
possible, attracting foreign (direct) investment and increasing Turkey‘s exports to those 
(Arab) countries.‖790 This boded well with the synthesist notion of spaceto guide external 
policy. As a result, many representatives from the Turkish government and business 
community visited Middle Eastern countries, signing agreements and concluding deals.791 
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All of these considerations weighed heavily during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). Despite the 
western pressure to isolate the Islamic Republic of Iran and the growing uneasiness from the 
Turkish foreign policy establishment over Tehran‘s ―regime export‖ rhetoric, Özal chose to 
remain neutral in the conflict.792 Turkey‘s geographical location as a commercial conduit 
towards the West was instrumentalized for foreign policy objectives.793 The calculation paid 
off. The level of trust by both parties to Ankara initially was strong. Iran and Iraq chose 
Turkish Embassies in each other‘s capitals to represent their interests. Ankara‘s economic 
relations with Tehran and Baghdad flourished too. Turkish goods were exported to both 
countries in increasing volumes. In return Turkey purchased 60% of its oil exports from Iraq 
and an additional 100.000 barrel per day from Iran.794 As of November 1985, Ankara and 
Baghdad agreed to build a second pipeline running parallel to the existing Kirkuk-Yumurtalık 
line with a capacity of 1.4 million b/d,795the second line becoming operational in 1987.Both 
ran in full capacity thereafter since the Gulf route for Iraq was effectively closed.796 
 
Economic relations with the rest of the Middle East also flourished.797 Turkey‘s exports to the 
region rose from 15 % in 1979 to a solid 35 % until the mid-1980s, and remained around 20 
%.798 Turkish companies won 18.3 billion Dollars of construction contracts from the Middle 
Eastern countries in the period 1974-1990.799 Libya became the biggest market for Turkish 
contractors followed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Likewise investment capital began flowing 
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from the Arab world, making Saudi Arabia and Iran the biggest investors in Turkey during 
1984-1986.800  In addition, Kuwaiti and Bahraini banks opened branches in Turkey. 801  A 
sense of economic and commercial euphoria prevailed.   
 
The boom in economic and commercial relations gradually faded away after 1986, the date 
declining oil prices caused the Middle Eastern markets to shrink on top of the destructive 
effect of the on-going war between Iraq and Iran.802 Nonetheless when Iraq failed to pay the 
bill for Turkish exports, Ankara was adamant to issue export credits, which by the end of the 
war amounted to 2.5 billion Dollars in Iraqi debt (of which Baghdad paid 600 million Dollars in 
1990).803 Trade volume with Iran fell to 350-400 million Dollars by 1989 from a record high 2 
billion Dollars, and Ankara ran out of patience to freeze credits to Iraq around the same 
time.804  To compensate, Ankara‘s attention was once again reverted to Europe. By 1989, the 
share of European Economic Community reached 48 % of Turkey‘s total foreign trade.805 Yet 
Turkey‘s interest in getting involved in Middle Eastern affairs did not disappear.  
 
In addition to the economic yield, Ankara found another impetus to remain close to the 
region. A common concern, Kurds, relating to four countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) 
made Ankara‘s entanglement enticing. As observed by Pellitiere, the worry for Turkey ‗which 
was home to some 10 million Kurds and faced an active Kurdish separatist movement on its 
own territory‘ was that ‗both Iran and Iraq by arming the Kurds to fight a proxy war in northern 
Iraq risked destabilizing the whole Turkish-Iraq-Iran triangle‘.806 That promises for regional 
autonomy being mentioned several times during the overtures including Baghdad, Tehran, 
Damascus and Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Jalal Talabani and Masood Barzani, caused Ankara 
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worry. The Syrian regime, which was at the time embroiled in a dispute with Ankara because 
of the latter‘s ambitious scheme to build major hydroelectric dams on the Euphrates river, 
calculated that it could use the PKK as a trump card.807 With Alexandretta‘s integration to 
Turkey still not accepted, Damascus thus decided to harbour the Kurdish Workers Party 
(PKK), which used Syria and its protégé Lebanon as a safe haven.808 Baghdad‘s decreased 
authority in northern Iraq provided another free sanctuary for the PKK to carry out its violent 
cross-border assaults in Turkey. The common interest between Iraq and Turkey prompted 
renewal of the 1978 agreement in October 1984 by allowing each side to pursue Kurdish 
factions some 18 km into the other‘s territory.809 From 1983 onwards, the first date of such 
cross-border operations mounted by Ankara in northern Iraq, the PKK and Kurds 
transformed the image of the region to one in which the fate of the two geographies, Turkey 
and the immediate Middle East, seemed linked.  
 
Özal‘s two grand schemes of regional cooperation, Peace Pipeline (1986) and GAP (1983), 
were thought inter alia as a means of addressing the Kurdish problem and developing 
economic ties with the region. Through these projects, he wished to achieve ‗peace through 
dependency‖810. The former, a 21 billion Dollarsproject, was envisaged to pump in water from 
Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers of Turkey to hydrocarbon-rich Arab countries that would in return 
transfer crude oil to Turkey.811 One of the water pipelines would run from Turkey to Syria, 
Jordan, and Israel and the other through Iraq to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.812 
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GAP (South Anatolia Project), on the other hand, with a cost exceeding 32 billion Dollars813 
was about construction of a series of dams on the Tigris and Euphrates in the southeast of 
Turkey in order to boost agricultural cultivation, electricity generation and water 
management. Özal thought of GAP as means of transforming the region into the ―bread 
basket‖ of the Middle East and allowing regular water flow to downstream Arab countries. 
This was hoped would help create an additional impetus for Arabs and Turkey to get rid of 
their historical grievances and cooperate.  
 
In this context, as Özal visited Damascus, Turkey signed a protocol with Syria in 1987 
ensuring 500 cubic metres/second water flow as well as economic cooperation in return for 
the latter‘s renouncement of its support to the PKK.814 What Ankara received, however, was 
not full surrender of PKK leader (Öcalan) but rather a denial that he was in Syria and his 
temporary replacement in Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.815 A dismayed Özal in 1989 accused 
Syria of breaching the protocol and threatened Damascus to reduce water flow and annul the 
1987 economic cooperation scheme.816 
 
Turkish governments throughout republican history approached Iran with scepticism since 
Persians were of a different culture and sect of Islam. The Pahlavi dynasty‘s westernizing 
reforms, Shah Reza‘s utter appreciation of Atatürk, and the fact that the Cold War strategy of 
Iran was aligned with the Western bloc somewhat clouded such perceptions and led to 
cooperation (Saidabad and Baghdad Pacts, CENTO and RCD). Yet a competitive as well as 
cooperative détente presided over the character of Turco-Persian relations.  
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Whilst Özal was trying to re-position Turkey in global affairs, Iran after the Islamic revolution 
was pursuing a ―neither West, nor East‖ policy in the 1980s.817 The relative thaw in bilateral 
ties during the period therefore largely stemmed from both countries‘ ability to de-couple 
ideology from benefit, leaving aside historical rivalry for the sake of economic cooperation. 
During the period, the forebears of the Islamic Revolution in Tehran spared no effort in 
voicing regime export rhetoric, attacking secular symbols of the Turkish state (the 
controversy about the use of veil/headscarf in Turkey around 1989 caused a diplomatic crisis 
during which Ankara came to the brink of expelling the Iranian Ambassador), trying to 
manipulate the Turkish Alevite community and even supporting ultra-religious figures like 
Cemalettin Kaplan, an anti-regime preacher living in Germany with a sizeable followers 
group.818 Likewise they accused Turkey of providing shelter to Iranian dissidents.819 But as 
Tehran fought a war against Baghdad, the new regime needed Ankara as a commercial 
outlet. Turks also criticized Tehran for being too soft and not so forthcoming vis-à-vis 
Ankara‘s struggle against the PKK, and with regards to the calls for autonomy in northern 
Iraq.820 Tehran‘s intrinsic sympathy towards religious groups in Turkey and Kurds, the two 
persistent threats to the republican order, no doubt agitated the Turkish military which still 
enjoyed considerable influence in Ankara,821 but not so much for Özal. Iran was a large and 
important neighbour that had to be managed rather than contained or confronted.822 Turkey 
thus did not shy away from engaging with Tehran. Economic ties kept flourishing and trade 
volume reached a solid 2 billion Dollars. Iran became a major operator in the Turkish finance 
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sector with a total capital investment of 2,1 billion Dollars in 1986.823 The two countries also 
joined forces in establishing the ECO in 1986 with a view to boost economic incentives. The 
general mood of bilateral relations, however, under the Turkish military‘s shadow, remained 
tense, measured but still non-belligerently cooperative.  
 
While Ankara moved towards Arabs and kept Persians at bay, relations with Israel remained 
low key well until 1985. 824 The Israeli occupation of Lebanon in 1982 was a crucial 
development to this effect. Israel, however, was the mirror image for one of the two worlds 
Turkey wished to remain part of. Özal therefore argued that relations with Israel were 
necessary for Turkey to play a role in the solution of Middle Eastern problems.825 Ankara 
therefore welcomed Tel Aviv‘s invitation to participate in the elimination of the ASALA826 
camps in Lebanon and acted neutral at the UN on a resolution about Israeli occupied Golan 
Heights.827  Besides, Turkish Airlines started direct flights to Israel in 1986. The Foreign 
Ministers of both countries met in New York the next year on the margins of the UN General 
Assembly, which was followed by an increase in the number of diplomats in the Israeli 
Embassy in Ankara.828  This was a tough position to maintain when the first intifada in 
December 1987 caused public outrage in Turkey. Ankara‘s policy then turned much more 
pro-Palestinian. The Turkish Parliament officially condemned "the violent actions of the 
Israelis against the Palestinians living in the occupied territories and the inhuman violation of 
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Palestinians' human rights.‖829  Turkey was also quick to recognize the Palestinian state 
declared by the PLO in Algeria in 1988. It was not until December 1991 when Israelis and 
Palestinians launched a new phase of negotiations by Madrid Conference on October 30 that 
Turkey and Israel could reinstate normalized relations by reappointing Ambassadors to both 
capitals. In this context, Israeli President Herzog visited Istanbul in July 1992 to attend the 
celebrations for Turkey‘s acceptance of Jewish refugees from Spain five centuries ago.    
 
The Late Özalian Era (Post-Cold War): Turkey the Bridge  
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union not only relieved Ankara of its decades-old primary 
security imperative, but also caused suspicions about Turkey‘s western credentials. The 
Turkish republican elite and people, which had rationalized Turkey's placement in the West 
during the Cold War thanks to its geopolitical location and function as a geographical 
flank/barrier, were confused. A diminished sense of geopolitical significance stirred in Ankara 
which was accentuated by similar concerns in Europe and across the Atlantic.830Turks then 
felt obliged to refine, or redefine, their country's geopolitical standing in an attempt to prove 
continued relevance and value. Even before Huntington‘s ―Clash of Civilizations‖ article and 
Fukuyama‘s ―End of History‖ which revived civilizational geopolitics in the new era, Turks 
were trying to make sense of their geography by re-branding some of the old geo-cultural 
and civilizational discourses in Turkish geopolitical culture.   
 
One response came from Özal himself. In an attempt to consolidate his vision for a 
functioning hybrid out of Turkey‘s Muslim-eastern qualities and western vocation, Özal gave 
metaphorical traction to relocation of Turkey as a geo-cultural blend at the intersection of the 
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East and the West. Sitting atop two continents, Asia and Europe, and adjacent to a 
geography stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East, Caucasia and Central Asia, Özal 
re-presented Turkey as a bridge not only between these physical geographies but also 
cultural and civilizational spaces. 831  It was therefore Özal who popularized the bridge 
metaphor in Turkish geopolitical culture.832 Moreover, Turkey‘s location by possession of 
Anatolia (Asia Minor as Özal calls it) at the heart of Eastern Mediterranean, which was 
pictured ―as a historically cultural framework common to the Middle East and Europe‖833 was 
given as proof that it could serve as a bridge in north-south relations (between the ―haves‖ 
and ―have-nots‖). In this vein, ―occupying a peninsula which joins two continents, extending 
from the east to west at the north-eastern end of the Mediterranean and being the sovereign 
of the Straits and a neighbour of the Middle East”, wrote Özal, “gives Turkey strategic 
significance‖.834 
 
The ―bridge‖ metaphor by inspiring discourses that located Turkey at the ―crossroads of 
cultures‖, ―straddling civilizations‖ and ―intersection of continents‖ is later elevated to a 
pragmatic status above a mere geopolitical representation.835  As such, it was taken up by a 
variety of actors and leaders from right and left of the political spectrum. To distinguish in 
which geopolitical tradition one player is located, a rather simple question of ―which comes 
first for Turkey, the East (Muslim space) or West?‖ suffices. The answer to this question 
determines where the specific actor employing the bridge metaphor places Turkey‘s identity, 
cultural attachment and sense of civilizational belonging as well as indicating his/her own 
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833 ÖZAL, T. (1991). Turkey in Europe, the Europe in Turkey. p.315. 
834Ibid. p.342. 
835 For an elaborate analysis on the use of “bridge” metaphor in describing Turkey’s geopolitical situatedness by 
Turkish foreign policy elite, see YANIK L.K. (2009). The Metamorphosis of Metaphors of Vision: "Bridging" Turkey's 
Location, Role and Identity After the End of the Cold War. Geopolitics. 14,  p. 531-549.  
247 
 
cultural embeddedness within a geopolitical tradition. For conservatives like Özal, it was a 
handy instrument in helping justify Turkey‘s reconnection to the Muslim world without much 
fury from arch-Kemalists at home and proving continued significance as a geographical 
springboard for Ankara‘s traditional western allies.  
 
Turkey in the Bridging Act (1989-1993) 
 
The growing emphasis on Turkey‘s bridging qualities became visible as Ankara tried to forge 
closer ties with the newly independent Turkish republics and Balkan countries, and use 
Turkey‘s geography as a leverage to contribute to western interests in the Middle East. The 
events leading to the Gulf War was crucial. First it marks a period when Özal, now sitting in 
the Presidential Palace, started to go beyond the symbolic powers vested in this office. 
Secondly, the Gulf War was perceived as an opportunity for multiple gains (―gamble for one 
to get three‖ in the words of Özal). It was also a time when the Middle East was in the midst 
of irreversible change of which Turkey had to take full benefit from.836By firmly aligning with 
the US and its western allies, Özal wished to maximize the benefits from Turkey‘s strategic 
location as a bridge. He was thus adamant in proving Turkey‘s advantageous location in the 
efforts towards war despite the risks to Turkish economy and security. This, in turn, was 
hoped would improve Turkey-U.S. cooperation in defence and trade.837 A primary objective 
was to expand Turkey‘s political role and influence in the region.  
 
In this context, Ankara went ahead in shutting the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline in August 1990 
which had a combined capacity of 1.5 million barrel per day. All regular trade with Iraq was 
suspended. Turkey allowed the U.S. to use Incirlik airbase as part of the military campaign. 
The whole saga, however, was not a contention free exercise since Özal tried to solely steer 
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the policy.838 As he sought authorisation to invite foreign powers to Turkey and send Turkish 
troops abroad, Özal faced opposition from ANAP‘s backbenchers. In the end, these powers 
were granted only if Iraq strikes first.839 Likewise the request to send a Turkish contingent to 
join the forces amassing in Saudi Arabia was rebuked. The disagreement on the strategy on 
Iraq and feelings of unfair treatment in the decision-making process resulted in the 
resignations of Ali Bozer, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Safa Giray, Minister of Defence in 
October. Özal‘s instructions to deploy troops along the Iraqi border and to investigate the 
legal status of Mosul and Kirkuk had the impression that a Turkish invasion was on the way 
and thus alienated the military brass as well.840 Necip Torumtay, Chief of General Staff, 
followed suit in resigning in December. These did not, however, deter an eager Özal to let 
American airplanes use Turkish airspace and Ġncirlik air base to fly sorties over Iraq.  
 
It was clear that Turkey‘s foreign policy establishment and Özal were acting upon two 
different geopolitical mentalities. The military and political opposition as well as the MFA‘s 
higher ups pointed out what a swamp the Middle East was and the inflammatory nature of 
regional conflicts. In light of the Kemalist imagination, they all defended avoiding taking sides 
and not meddling in the region‘s affairs.841 Özal to the contrary saw a window of opportunity 
to make use of Turkey‘s location to this adjacent region for political, economic and security 
gains.    
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The same applied to relations with Israel. With the Arabs ceasing to exist as a monolithic 
bloc on the Palestinian issue after the Gulf War,842 Turkey was freed of the pressure to 
distance away from Tel Aviv. Israel was seen as a good alternative as a go-between in 
Ankara‘s relations with the West (Washington in particular). As the PLO and Israel made 
headway towards an agreement at the Madrid Conference in 1991, the Turkish government 
announced that the level of representation in Ankara of both the PLO and Israel was raised 
to the status of Ambassadors.843Real normalization of relations began with the visit of Turkish 
Tourism Minister Abdulkadir AteĢ (the first by a Turkish minister in twenty-seven years) in 
June 1992 and the signing of a Tourism Cooperation Agreement.844 Since then, Turkey took 
part in the multilateral working groups related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 
especially those dealing with economic development, water and arms control.845 
 
In closing the Özal episode in Turkish foreign policy, as argued by ÖniĢ, one thing is clear; 
―Özal‘s … influence was important in helping to transform a self-enclosed society, with a 
mediocre image of itself, to an outward and forward-looking society that aimed to participate 
and play an active role in the geographies surrounding Turkey‖.846 This was enabled by and 
justified through a civilizational discourse in the formation of a new geographical imagination 
both vis-à-vis Turkey‘s global spatial positioning and the image of the Middle East.  
 
III. WESTERNISM FILLING IN THE BLANKS (1993-2002) 
 
Özal‘s legacy was owned up by neither the new generation of leaders (Mesut Yılmaz) from 
his own party nor leaders from its conservative akin (Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller). 
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Yılmaz for once did not run an apparent geopolitical narrative while mildly pledging to 
integrate Turkey into Europe.847 SHP, under the leadership of Erdal Ġnönü (late President 
Ġsmet‘s son) and Murat Karayalçın, was merely a pro-western political force just like the 
reinvigorated CHP under Deniz Baykal and Hikmet Çetin. All of these political factions were 
much more conventional-minded when it came to foreign policy dispositions. Put differently, 
they were eager to keep what Turkey had since Atatürk, i.e. a strong western anchor and a 
fouled image of the Middle East. Demirel was no exception. Now the Turkish President in 
1993, he simply conferred to continuity while distancing himself from what he called Özal era 
adventurism.848 Tansu Çiller, leading DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi - True Path Party) after Demirel, 
appeared as the big coalition partner in the governments that run Turkey between 1993 and 
1996. She was an urban westernized woman upholding Kemalist predispositions, hence not 
harbouring alternative geopolitical convictions. The most likely contenders were RP of 
Necmettin Erbakan and DSP of Bülent Ecevit. The former represented Easternism par 
excellence while the latter carried positive images on the Middle East. Both parties 
challenged established parameters of Turkish foreign policy while they hang onto political 
power.  
 
Continuity along westernist preoccupations was ensured by the military. Özal‘s demise 
created a vacuum in political leadership that would only be filled in by the military amidst a 
decade of weak, fragile and ineffective coalition and/or minority governments which lasted 
until 2002.849The military was successful in steering a robust reversion to westernist imagery. 
It was backed by the MFA which was trying to re-establish itself as an influential actor 
observant of Kemalist principles. Kemalist media columnists, academics and Turkish big 
business were also aligned with the westernist establishment. As a result, the perception 
about the place and orientation of the Turkish state as well as the image of the Middle East 
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once again returned to status quo ante. The next ten years were, therefore, of no 
resemblance to Özal in terms of vision, modes of representation, imagination, zeal, ambition 
and practice in Ankara‘s Middle Eastern dealings.  
 
In this context, the poor record of the coalition governments in handling the economy and 
addressing the PKK‘s terrorist campaign in Turkey led to a militarized notion of foreign policy 
under strategic considerations. Foreign policy was reduced exclusively to an outpost of 
Ankara‘s security posture. The new discourse was dominated by the military which prioritized 
threats to the territorial integrity and Kemalist (western/secular) character of Turkey.850 A dual 
feeling of abandonment by the West and entrapment amidst a turbulent geography largely 
clouded foreign policy judgement in Ankara.851 Turkey, as a result, was transformed from the 
liberal cooperative actor of Özal years into ―a coercive regional power‖.852Consequently, 
Ankara employed an overtly bellicose discourse, either using limited force or other 
confrontational measures. The famous ―two and a half war‖ strategy penned by ġükrü 
Elekdağ, a veteran (R) Ambassador, stipulating that Turkey had to be prepared to fight wars 
against Greece, Syria and PKK simultaneously captured the general mood of the era.853 
 
The Image of the Middle East under National Security Considerations 
 
The PKK was the most existential security problem Ankara had to deal with since the early 
1980s. Yet except for the brief period Özal recognized Turkey‘s Kurdish question and tried to 
remedy it by hosting Iraqi Kurdish leaders Jalal Talabani and Masood Barzani in Turkey 
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between 1989 and 1993, and by seeing GAP as a further alleviating step to address the root 
causes of the problem; Ankara kept acting as if the PKK was merely a foreign breed.Ankara 
was in complete denial of the domestic political, socio-economic and cultural context upon 
which it was born and flourished.854 The period of coalition governments in the 1990s was 
years of denial. Hence, Turkey chose to address the PKK, arguably the single most clouding 
factor in Turkey‘s relations with the Middle East855 , as an external problem. As Ankara 
devised measures to counter the PKK, a rising Islamic current in domestic politics caused an 
increased military mindedness. It was suspected that RP of Necmettin Erbakan drew its 
ideological, financial and external support from the Middle East. Thus the region gradually 
lost its meaning as a normalized geographical terrain. Instead old notions of ―swamp‖ and 
―bog‖ were resurrected.It was once more translated into a region of utmost disdain against 
which Ankara‘s security policy entanglements had to be directed against.  
 
To set the stage in the new era, this was a time Ankara had to live with the repercussions of 
Iran-Iraq and the First Gulf wars. In the aftermath of the war, both Tehran‘s Islamic revolution 
export rhetoric and insensitivity against secular symbols of Turkish state continued. In Iraq, 
the Gulf War kept the job half-done as Saddam Hussein remained in power. The authority of 
Baghdad in northern Iraq waned thanks to the no-fly zone imposed in 1991. A geographical 
vacuum on the verge of Turkey‘s southern border where the PKK could reorganize and 
regroup emerged.856 Additionally, emergence of a self-ruling Kurdish entity in northern Iraq 
increased ethnic awareness among Turkey‘s own Kurds. Infuriating Ankara, northern Iraq 
effectively became a safe haven for the PKK with training camps and check points in 
abundance. Turkey thus became avocal supporter of Iraq‘s political unity and territorial 
integrity.Under these circumstancesAnkara and Baghdad tried normalizationof 
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relations.Turkey on its part worked through diplomatic channels to remove sanctions against 
Iraq.857Around the same time, Syria toowas playing the PKK card against Ankara. The PKK 
established training bases in Syrian-controlled Lebanon and was using Syrian soil to carry 
out violent attacks in Turkey.858 Iran was also believed to having been involved with the PKK 
by providing bases and direct logistical support.859 Ankara, Baghdad and Damascus were at 
odds on a different issue as well, i.e. share of water from the rivers born in Turkey, all of 
which re-coloured the Turkish elite‘s perceptions about the Middle East negatively.  
 
Turkish Security Policy in the Middle East  
 
a) From Demirel to Çiller and Yılmaz (1993-1996)  
 
Having successfully curbed the PKK‘s activities domestically in the early 1990s, the 
securitized minds in Ankara eyed on a new policy course which had basically two and a half 
tenets. First, to root the PKK out of northern Iraq by assuring collaboration of the two Kurdish 
factions, KDP (lead by Masood Barzani), KYB (under Jalal Talabani), and American troops 
stationed on Iraqi territory as part of the Northern Watch. Second, to force the Syrian regime 
to deport the PKK‘s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, and cut the logistical links the PKK enjoyed 
with Damascus, Bekaa Valley and Tehran. The half measurerelated to Ankara‘s long 
standing worries about its own disintegration. Fearing it would re-energize Kurdish 
secessionist sentiment in Turkey, curtailment of an independent Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq was a major motive.  
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Perceiving enemies more than friends in the Middle East, Ankara‘s republican elitewas 
forced to redefine the operational geopolitical code. They would no doubt have preferred 
going along with the non-involvement and non-engagement strategy but it was no longer 
tenable. Hence, Ankara adopted a much more antagonistic, belligerent and interventionist 
posture. Turkey, in the words of Kalaycıoğlu, ―drifted further into the politics of the Middle 
East vis-à-vis the influences of Iraqi and Syrian Baathist regimes of the 1990s‖860 out of 
feelings of insecurity and geographical entrapment.     
 
It was under these circumstances that the Turkish military launched an extensive cross-
border operation into northern Iraq in March 19, 1995, with 35,000 armed men, backed by 
heavily armoured vehicles and attack aircraft as combat support.861 The six weeks long 
operation aiming to destroy PKK camps was planned and executed solely by the military. 
Turkish generals informed PM Çiller and President Demirel at the last minute,862 a scenario 
repeating itself in similar incursions in the years to come. Whilst military operations were 
underway, the news about a meeting in the Hague on April 12, 1995, by participation of 
delegates from Turkey, Iraq and Iran to establish a ―Kurdish parliament in exile‖ infuriated 
pundits in Ankara. Following American efforts to bring the PUK and KDP around the same 
table in Dublin by August and September, and Iran‘s hosting of Iraqi Kurdish leaders for 
talks, Turks were stunned that things were getting out of hand. Therefore, in March 1996, a 
plan to create a secure zone in Iraqi territory along the Turkish border was aired. But it was a 
hard swallow 863  and drew criticismsof Baghdad, Arab capitals and Washington 864  which 
finally waned in the winds.  
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The fate of Turkey‘s engagement with another neighbour, Syria, was also heavily tainted by 
security perceptions. Now considering Damascus an adversary, Ankara was not hesitant in 
flirting with a confrontational rhetoric. By the fall of 1993, PM Çiller who had established a 
close relationship with the Turkish military, called Syria a source of terrorism.865 A National 
Security Council meeting in October called for tougher measures against Damascus which 
were materialized in the form of covert attacks on PKK camps inside Syria and Bekaa Valley 
of Lebanon in 1994 and 1995.866Syria on its part was worried about Ankara‘s return to the 
Middle East as a regional hegemon dominating Arabs.867 
 
In this context, the news about anti-aircraft missile sales to Greek Cypriots by Damascus in 
1991 outraged Turkish policy makers.868The Greek-Syrian defence agreement in March 1995 
which allowed for wartime use of each other‘s air bases also irritated Ankara. Turks not only 
felt encapsulated throughout their southern border but also surrounded by unfriendly 
alliances in the Mediterranean and the Aegean. Deputy PM Çetin accused Syrians and the 
Greeks for ―conspiring on a mission to encircle Turkey‖.869 As Damascus convinced Egypt 
and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in December the same year to support its 
position over the water dispute with Turkey,870 suspicions over Syria were voiced more freely 
in the Turkish media. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deniz Baykal blamed that Damascus was 
using the water card to wash the blood of terrorism off its hands. In January 1996, Ankara 
questioned the fair share of water flow from Syria-born Asi (Orontes) river to Turkey. It was 
the end of the same month that Turkey for the very first time demanded handover of PKK 
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leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria.871 By the end of February 1996, it was President Demirel 
this time who hinged on an antagonistic discourse by calling on Damascus ―to give up its 
support to terror as a means of foreign policy‖.872 
 
With regards to Iran, Turkish rulers were convinced that the PKK found refuge in the 
mountainous triangular area where the borders between Turkey, Iraq and Iran merged. 
Tehran was adamant in not allowing Turkey to pursue infiltrations into Iranian territory to root 
PKK terrorists out but turned a blind eye every now and then if Turkish military operations in 
the border area hit Iranian dwellers.873 The most drastic measure debated in Ankara against 
what was seen as Iran‘s short-of-satisfactory cooperation vis-à-vis the PKK was a short lived 
cross border raid to kill or capture some 300-400 terrorists. 874  On that matter, the 
deliberations among PM Çiller, FM Çetin, President Demirel and top military brass resulted in 
pursuing not a military but rather diplomatic course of action.     
 
It was under these circumstances that an increasingly insecure Turkey began searching for 
reliable partners in the Middle East. Utterly resentful and equally distasteful of the Muslim 
countries in its southern neighbourhood; Ankarathus rediscovered an old path, i.e. relations 
with Tel Aviv. From the perspective of the security-minded elite in Ankara, Israel and Turkey 
were very much alike in a geography doomed with nothing but trouble. Just like the 
republican Turkey, Israel too had a strong western anchor, identified with Europe and the 
West, had enjoyed close ties with the US, shared Turkey‘s disgraceful image of the Middle 
East as encircled by hostile regimes,875 upheld democratic values and was sensitive about 
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secularism.876 In the mental maps of Turkish decision-makers, Israel was the gateway back 
to the western community of nations.  
 
Military cooperation stood on  the primary axis of the Turkish-Israeli thaw. In this context, with 
its excellence in military sophistication, willingness for arms sales, and influence in 
Washington, the Jewish state could come handy in Ankara‘s fight against the PKK which 
exploited the sympathies of the countries in Turkey‘s immediate neighbourhood. Cordial ties 
with Israel were at the same time a means of reaffirming Ankara‘s western placement and 
preserving the Kemalist character of the Turkish state (unitary, nationalist and secular). 
Sharing this view, Turkey for Israel could provide access to the newly independent Turkish 
republics for political and economic ties.877 Cooperation against Iran, which Tel Aviv accused 
for its links with Hamas, was also a key theme. For Turkey, improved relations with Israel 
constituted an additional axis in response to what was perceived as Syria‘s provocations 
about the PKK and water issues.  
 
That embassies were now fully functional after a long halt, The Turkish-Israeli Business 
Council had been in place since March 1993 and the good memories of Israeli Foreign 
Minister Peres‘ visit to Turkey in April 1993 to attend Özal‘s funeral still fresh, there was a 
solid basis for Ankara to lurch forward. In July 1993, Israeli Tourism Minister Uzi Baram 
visited Turkey and signed a tourism agreement, the first ever public deal between the two 
countries.878 Turkish FM Hikmet Çetin took on his first ever visit to Israel on 13-15 November 
shortly after the Declaration of Principles in Washington sealing the Oslo Accord between the 
Israelis and Palestinians. The visit ended with a framework agreement on the future of 
bilateral relations. High level visits then proliferated. Weizman became the first Israeli 
President to officially visit Turkey in January 1994. Israeli FM Peres visited Turkey in April. 
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Çiller was the first ever serving Turkish Prime Minister to visit Israel in November. Demirel 
reciprocated Weizman in March 1996 by becoming the first ever Turkish President visiting 
Israel.  
 
But the real deal came in the military field. It was the Turkish generals rather than Israelis 
that precipitated this vector of the relationship 879  In June 1994, The Turkish Air Forces 
Commander became the highest level military official to visit Israel. He came back bearing 
fruit. The Security and Secrecy Agreement marked the beginning of a new era in Turkish-
Israeli relations. In the period afterwards, a number of military contracts and deals took the 
bilateral relations to new heights. An agreement worth 600 million Dollars to upgrade 54 F-4 
fighter jets in Turkey‘s inventory by Israel was the first of its kind.880Strategic dialogue was 
established between the Ministries of Defence in September 1995 with senior diplomats 
involved.881 A deal on joint military flight training was signed after the first dialogue meeting. 
In a secret visit Turkish General Bir (the military‘s number two) paid to Israel in February 
1996, a ―Military Training Cooperation Agreement‖ was concluded which foresaw strategic 
cooperation, intelligence sharing, and transfer of Israeli surveillance technology to monitor 
Turkey‘s borders.882 Holding regular air exercises and ground staff training was also part of 
the deal with further clauses allowing Israel landing rights in Turkey. Despite its secret 
nature, the Turkish military leaked details of the deal to press which was in Ankara a time of 
shaky coalition government. The leakage was both a sign to the domestic audience about 
who was in charge in controlling Turkish foreign policy and a warning to Syria to end its 
support to the PKK.883 As the political developments in Turkey prepared the groundwork for a 
notoriously religious government towards June 1996, relations with Israel had already grown 
                                                          
879GRESH, A. (1998). Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and Their Impact on the Middle East. Middle East Journal. 52, 
p.190. 
880 MUFTI, M. (2009). p.106. 
881 ROBINS, P. (2003). p. 258. 
882 MUFTI, M. (2009). p.107. 
883 ROBINS, P. (2003). p. 258. 
259 
 
in scope and depth under the military‘s strategic stewardship while Turkey‘s soured ties with 
the Arab world and Iran painted a bleakly distasteful image of the Middle Eastern region.       
 
b) The Exception: Easternism at Its Height (June 1996-June 1997) 
 
In terms of geopolitical discourse, the clearest exception in the decade was Necmettin 
Erbakan‘s short reign in power. Born into a prestigious familyof judges in Turkey‘s Black Sea 
region, Erbakan attended engineering faculty of Istanbul Technical University(ITU) until 1948. 
Being classmates with Demirel and Özal, he continued his studies in Germany where 
Erbakan received an MA and PhD in mechanical engineering. Upon his return to Turkey, 
Erbakan became a lecturer at ITU where he was later made a professor. Erbakan earned 
himself a political career by mobilizing Anatolian bourgeoisie and peripheral middle class 
under National View (Milli GörüĢ) movement from the 1960s onwards. The movement was 
built on the ideological foundations of the Sufi Naqshbandi order, and thus carrying strong 
imprints from the conservative tradition; first and foremost stronger links with the Muslim 
world where Turkey‘s identity, belonging and interests were believed to lie. With its anti-
Western, anti-Semitic and pan-Islamic views, Erbakan‘s movement was also in tandem with 
the trends in political Islam of the day- particularly the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.884 
 
Erbakan had managed to gain enough votes (8 to 11%) to appear in three coalition 
governments from February 1974 to January 1978 and adopted a rhetoric calling for the 
closure of NATO bases in Turkey, withholding Turkey‘s application to European Economic 
Community (EEC), breaking relations with Israel and turning completely opposite direction on 
matters such as defence, diplomacy, trade and commerce.885For him seeking Turkey‘sfuture 
in the west was so existential a trouble that Erbakan called such efforts ―treason to our 
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history, civilization, culture and sovereignty‖886. However, aside from labelling the EEC a 
Christian club trying to undermine the Islamic world and depicting pro-western Turkish elite 
as part of the Zionist plot to turn Muslim countries against one another,887 Erbakan did not 
leave a decisive mark on Turkish foreign policy in the 1970s. It was due to the fact that MSP 
was a junior coalition partner aligning with the centre left CHP of Ecevit and the centre right 
AP of Demirel back then. 1996 was different. Erbakan now sat at the office of Prime Minister 
and was very much eager to follow his erstwhile tendencies. He thus embarked on an all-out 
offensive against anything of western nature in the Turkish state. As Dağı notes, this was 
because ―Erbakan … was against all values represented by the west. …in terms of identity, 
discourse and policy, it was raised upon a foundation of anti-westernism‖.888 The ultimate 
objective was to cut Turkey‘s links to the West and reposition the Turkish state 
geographically, politically, economicallyand culturally in the Islamic world.  
 
Foreign policy was no exception. During this period, formal geopolitical reasoning of 
conservative thinkers was translated into practice through a purely easternist imagery. 
Erbakan thus kept promising withdrawal from NATO and revoking the Customs Union with 
the EU. He even propagated a Union of Muslim States under Turkey‘s leadership.889 In this 
context, Erbakan was very careful not to pay an official visit to any western capitals in his 
capacity as the PM.   
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This was a source of concern and worry in western capitals including Washington.890  For 
some of the countries in the Middle East, a change of government in Turkey was a welcome 
development. Hafiz Asad of Syria was the first congratulating Erbakan hoping to ease the 
bellicose discourse Turkey adopted against Damascus. Tehran too believed to have a like-
minded partner in Ankara whose pietywas an asset. These expectations did not go 
unaddressed as Erbakan sent formal and informal emissaries to Damascus, Baghdad and 
Tehran in order to remove the PKK and water issues as impeding factors in bilateral 
relations.891 This at the time fell in stark contrast to the established positionKemalists took.   
 
Foreign policy during the period was a major area of contestation with Erbakan on the one 
hand, his coalition partnerFM Çiller and the foreign policy establishment on the other. This 
was a time when rivalling geographical imaginations about the position of Turkey and the 
images about the Muslim world clashed. It was also a fight about who was in charge in 
steering the strategic direction of Turkey.  
 
In this context, Erbakan had won the ballot box with a promise to stop American flights over 
Turkish bases and improve relations with Iraq.892 Yet in spite of his anti-western discourse, 
Erbakan was forced to renew existing agreements on the US military bases in Turkey.893 
Reportedly, Erbakan played hard ball against Washington in extending Turkey‘s support by 
seeking assurances that the US would not undermine Iraq‘s unity, cease activities toward an 
independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, strictly follow UN resolutions, support Ankara‘s 
fight against the PKK, and increase Turkish troop presence in Zakho (the latter being not 
accepted).894 Regardless of the details, the perception in Turkey was that Erbakan simply 
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caved in to American demands. Frustrated but flamboyant was Erbakan‘s general mood. 
Solidifying Turkey‘s eastwards connections still was strong in his vision.  
 
Under these circumstances, Erbakan started on his mission to turn Turkey to the east. His 
official outbound visits were composed of two tours, against which the MFA had reportedly 
placed reservations against. The first leg from August 10 to 20, 1996, included Iran, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. In Iran, Erbakan signed a landmark natural 
gas deal worth 23 billion Dollars and the associated trade and pipeline agreements. The two 
parties also discussed measures to enhance economic and military cooperation as well as 
Ankara‘s rampant concern about the PKK. The pit stops in Asian Tigersreflected Erbakan‘s 
attempt to realize an old dream of re-injecting Turkey into the Muslim world. On the other 
hand, these countries represented the model of development Turkish conservatives had long 
been advocating, i.e. preserving the national character (eastern) while promoting modernity 
and development. A confident and triumphant Erbakan declared during the tour that he 
wanted Turkey be a ―Muslim Japan.‖895 
 
The euphoria was short lived as Turkish generals outmanoeuvred him to sign a 
comprehensive military cooperation agreement with Israel upon his return to Ankara. The 
Defence Industry Cooperation Agreement entailed clauses on technical expertise and 
technology transfer as well as modernization of fighter jets in the Turkish Air Force by Israel. 
Despite his anti-Zionist and anti-Masonic discourse,896 Erbakan found himself in a position to 
market the agreement to his audience as ―merely a business deal‖.897 Yet his firm opposition 
could not block a further deal in December 5 on modernization of Turkey‘s F-4 and F-5 
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fighter jets and M60 tanks by Israel. Likewise, he did not even know that Chief of Staff 
Karadayı paid a visit to Israel in February 1997. Besides, Erbakan was forced to give a green 
light to the ratification of a free trade agreement with Israel in April 1997 which was signed in 
March 1996. Ultimately Erbakan was shaking hands with the Israeli Foreign Minister in 
Turkey which stood a clear violation of his earlier election vow to cut relations with Tel 
Aviv. 898  Robins explains this by the behind-the-scene involvement of the military in an 
attempt to humiliate Erbakan in order to prove that he could not wield much of an influence 
on policy-making or change Ankara‘s overall approach to the Jewish state.899 
 
To reinvigorate his erstwhile tendencies, Erbakan‘s second outbound tour composed of 
Egypt, Libya and Nigeria occurred between 2 and 7 October. While the stops in Egypt and 
Nigeria were mildly successful, Qaddafi‘s disrespectful treatment of Erbakan in Libya 
resonated most resentfully in the Turkish media. That Qaddafi criticized in front of cameras 
Turkey‘s treatment of the Kurds, NATO membership, relations with ―Zionist‖ Israel, and 
asked for establishment of an independent Kurdish state simply exacerbated such 
sentiments.   
 
During these visits, Erbakan propagated establishment of D-8 (Developing 8 as opposed to 
G-8) with a view to create a Muslim common market and Muslim security community. He 
hoped that through D-8 (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and 
Pakistan), the power of Islamic states in world politics would be increased and Turkey would 
be relieved from its "dependence" on and "control" by the West.900 D-8foreign ministers 
convened on October 22, 1996, in Istanbul for the first time with the aim to enhance 
economic and trade cooperation. 901  Paralleling this, Turkey‘s presence in policy-making 
issues in the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) was increased. Both initiatives, however, 
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aside from a display of ambition, proved of limited value since perceptions and practices 
across the Arab Muslim world had to be factored in. D-8 was enthusiastically welcomed by 
ordinary Arabs but was equally regarded as unrealistic by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. They 
were not comfortable about Erbakan‘s effort to turn Turkey into a leading regional power and 
set the agenda of theArab world.902 
 
Ultimately the Turkish military took the boldest step in galvanizing broad support across the 
public to overthrow Erbakan‘s government via an ultimatum like memorandum in February 
1997 (soft/post-modern coup). The rise of an Islamic reactionary current (irtica) stood as the 
backbone of the de-legitimatization campaign the military undertook. The Jerusalem Night 
organized by the RP mayor of Sincan/Ankara in January 1997 was the last nail on the coffin. 
That the Iranian Ambassador Bagheri participated and called on his audience to fight for the 
re-imposition of Sharia Law in Turkey was quickly translated into an iconic event. The whole 
saga soon became part of a securitization discourse in which ―religion‖ and ―laicism‖ were 
objects of securitization. Erstwhile foreign policy choices simply fell prey to this controversy.  
 
As a result, this episode in Turkish foreign policycame to an abrupt end.903 Despite an overtly 
vigorous anti-western and erstwhile discourse, Erbakan‘s practice did not amount to a shift in 
foreign policy direction. What he achieved was to add an Islamic vector to Turkish foreign 
policy. As Robins puts it, Erbakan‘s foreign policy was rather characterized by continuity than 
change and his gestures towards the Islamic world were mostly seen complementary to the 
existing Turkish foreign policy orientation.904 
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c) Back to Square One (June 1997-January 1999)  
 
When Mesut Yılmaz returned to the centre stage of Turkish politics after the coup, 
privatization and liberalism became the defining features of his premiership. EU adaptation 
and pragmatic good-neighbourliness were the catch phrases characterizing the spirit of the 
era. At the same time, the westernist consensus was thus comfortably rebuilt. ANAP‘s 
coalition partners, now the Deputy PM Ecevit and FM Cem, simply subscribed to this view. 
So did the military. Demirel kept acting as a force of republican continuity. All joined forces to 
push for the EU membership agenda. Yet the Turkish elite got frustrated by the rejection in 
the EU‘s Luxemburg Summit in December 1997. Then the attempt to keep Ankara‘s western 
credentials intact was sought through bilateral ties with the US and Israel. In this context, the 
Israeli Defence Minister paid an official visit to Ankara in December 1997, around the same 
time President Demirel attended the OIC Summit in Tehran. When Syria tabled a resolution 
in the Summit condemning Ankara‘s military ties with Israel, Demirel walked prematurely out 
of the meeting.905 Turks once again felt singled out, isolated and entrapped in a worrisome 
neighbourhood.  
 
Turkish government and the military were at odds with each other on regional policy. The 
military‘s perception of the Middle East was still embroiled with a mirror image of domestic 
threat perceptions. A firm dismissal of political Islam and concerns over the PKK caused the 
military brass to perceive a merely troublesome geography to the south. Deputy PM Ecevit 
and FM Cem on the other hand906 were at much greater ease in interacting with the countries 
in this geography. Whereas the latter chose conflict avoidance and a softened enmity as a 
means to operationalize the prevalent geopolitical code, the military preferred a highly 
bellicose strategy. Initially the government got the upper hand. Its position was emboldened 
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by the utter isolation Ankara had to suffer in Europe thanks to its human rights record related 
to the PKK, and the alienation in the Middle East following the heavy psychological toll of the 
soft coup.  
 
Thus, the first year of the coalition government ushered in a series of peaceful diplomatic 
overtures. FM Cem was in Baghdad in February 1998 with an attempt to ease Iraq‘s growing 
isolation and waning authority in the Kurdish dominated north. Ecevit publicly blamed 
Washington for trying to partition Iraq on the way towards an independent Kurdish state.907 In 
March, a Middle East department head from the Turkish MFA visited Damascus after which 
Cem met Syrian and Iranian Foreign Ministers.908 None of this boded well with the Turkish 
Armed Forces. They still were deeply enchanted by a growing unease about the 
fundamentalist reactionary current and Kurdish separatist threat associated with the Middle 
East.   
 
Seeing no concrete outcome from these diplomatic engagements, the locus of Ankara‘s 
entanglements in the Middle East quickly swayed towards the military‘s antagonistic 
geopolitical code and thus turned belligerent once again. Syria whose power base had 
significantly deteriorated after the fall of its chief ally, the Soviet Union, was the top target. 
Ankara was now ready to show its teeth against Damascus. The honeymoon in Turkish-
Israeli relations was a big asset to corner Syria which had territorial disputes with both 
countries. With Israeli PM Netanyahu for the first time sharply criticizing the PKK and 
condemning the prospects for an independent Kurdish state in May 1997909, the Turkish 
security elite were confident that they had well offset the regional balances impaired after the 
Greek-Syrian accord. Turkey was now ready for coercive action. 
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It was no surprise under these circumstances that the initiator of the new strategy was the 
Turkish military. A proposal to exercise coercive diplomacy and limited use of force against 
Syria was tabled during a National Security Council meeting in July.910 The new Commander 
of the Turkish Land Forces, General Atilla AteĢ, explicitly threatened Syria during a 
meticulously planned visit to the border town of Hatay (Alexandretta) in September. 911 
President Demirel reiterated this position with a harshened tone during his inaugural speech 
to the Turkish Parliament on October 1. The same day, the Chief of General Staff, General 
Kıvrıkoğlu stated an ―undeclared war between Turkey and Syria‖. PM Yılmaz followed suit by 
announcing that the military was waiting for the order 912  whilst Ecevit and Cem 
bandwagoned.  Ankara justified its position with reference to Article 51 of the UN Charter 
regarding self-defence. Neither militarily prepared nor willing for armed confrontation, 
Damascus finally caved in. Öcalan was deported on October 8, first to Moscow. Then 
hopping from Italy to Greece and Kenya, he was lastly handed over to Turkey. In the 
aftermath, Ankara and Damascus signed the Adana Accord on October 21 on security 
cooperation which indeed heralded a new era in relations.            
 
d) Turkey the World State, the Bridge and Region-Based Foreign Policy (1999-2002) 
 
Once Mesut Yılmaz‘s shaky coalition government was overthrown by a vote of no-confidence 
in November 25 due to corruption charges, Ecevit formed a minority government in January 
1999. Abdullah Öcalan‘s final delivery to Turkey in February 1999 boosted ratings of Ecevit 
greatly, giving him a neat majority in the parliament after the elections in May. Having formed 
a coalition government with the Nationalist Party, Ecevit and his old time foreign policy aide 
Cem thus got a second chance to leave a mark on Turkey‘s geopolitical practices.  
 
                                                          
910ARAS, D. (2009). p. 216. 
911 Suriye’ye Uyarı (Warning against Syria), Milliyet (Turkish daily), September 18, 1998.  
912 OZKEK, E. (1998). Asker Emir Bekliyor (The Military is Awating Orders). Hurriyet (Turkish daily). October 3. 
268 
 
 
It was under these circumstances that few notions were widely circulated as meta-
descriptions to guide Turkish foreign policy, i.e. Cem‘s ―world state‖ and ―civilizational bridge‖ 
discourse and Ecevit‘s ―region-based foreign policy‖ doctrine. Through these, Turkish leaders 
on the one hand tried to reconfirm Turkey‘s placement in the European state system while on 
the other to prove that keeping the westernist imagination did not impede having a more 
forthcoming position towards the Middle East. The latter was justified by making a nostalgic 
inference to the regional policies of Atatürk era.  
 
In an atmosphere of utmost disappointment and confusion (with the relations between 
Ankara and Brussels on hold, and questions raised as to the strategic utility of Turkey for 
western interests), Ecevit and Cem were striving to re-position Turkey as an exceptional 
country, a ‗world state‘, ―among major centres of the world and representing a unique blend 
of civilizational assets, historical experiences and strategic assets‖.913 This is why Cem boldly 
emphasized that ―all of the civilizations that have been part of Turkish history and geography 
need to be reconciled with one another in modern Turkey‖.914 Ridding Turkey of the need to 
choose between what he called forced alternatives, in other words, the East and the West, 
Europe and Asia, Islam and secularism was what Cem had in mind.915 But this was an 
exercise about building a richer and more diversified cultural identity at home rather than 
questioning in any ways Turkey‘s firm positioning in the west and a strong sense of 
European belonging. After all, Turkey was eternally deemed European in terms of geography 
and culture, as well as norms and values.916 
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In this vein, Turkey was projected as an extension of the west in the Middle East.917The 
rigidly allergic republican perception of the region was thus dropped. Ankara subscribed to a 
more relaxed perception towards the Middle East in a similar fashion to Özal era. The region 
was once again more visibly associated with opportunities rather than risks and dangers. In 
this context, Ecevit championed his famous ―region-based foreign policy‖ doctrine in which it 
was stressed that Turkey would derive its power and a more influential position in the 
international arena from a web of correct regional relations it would establish in its 
geographical surrounding.918 Through such a functionalist argument, Ecevit and Cem hoped 
they would re-prove Turkey‘s continued relevance to and prospects for greater acceptance in 
the west.  
 
The justification was through a geopolitical discourse. The bridge metaphor by portraying 
Turkey as a distinct space in between continents, cultures and civilizations was used as a 
means of policy legitimization. But it was instrumentalized differently. Whilst the term for Özal 
represented a strong sense of belonging to and identification with the Muslim world, Turkish 
leaders this time did not give up the Kemalist sense of superiority over the people and 
countries in the region.919 Turkey was thus conceptualized as a bridge at the crossroads of 
civilizations, a neutral ground where the two geographies, cultures and civilizations met. In 
other words, Turkey was neither on this nor on that side of the bridge but right at the distinct 
intersection of the two. Some scholars labelled this exercise liminality.920 
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are in the process of becoming a part of such communities. Turkey, as a country in possession of a dual Eastern and 
Western, or European and Asian identity on the way towards EU membership is sometimes prescribed as a liminal state. 
For a detailed analysis of liminality and Turkey’s liminal geopolitical positioning see YANIK, L. (2011). Constructing 
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The period these geopolitical discourses were employed was a time PKK-led violence in 
Turkey tended to die down and the threat of religious fundamentalism, for real or imaginary, 
practically expunged. There was almost no rationale for the military-mindedness to continue 
in Ankara as the two main objects of securitization lost their credibility. The military had thus 
lost two key backbones to justify its influence in Turkish politics and heavy-handedness in 
foreign affairs. Ecevit and Cem had every prospect to reinvigorate Turkey‘s quest to join the 
EU and establish normalized relations with the Middle East. With regards to the latter, the 
atmosphere was ripe thanks to steps taken from 1997 onwards. As noted by Bilgin and 
Bilgiç, Bahrain had for the first time appointed an Ambassador to Turkey in 1998. Relations 
with Qatar and Oman were upgraded substantively, The Neighbourhood Forum Initiative was 
established in 1998 to introduce confidence building measures, and a joint Turkish-Greek 
Mideast Initiative was formed to mediate between Israel and Palestine.921 
 
The voyage to reposition Turkey in global affairs thus started on a venture to revive Ankara‘s 
membership bid to the EU. These efforts paid off as Turkey was officially recognized as a 
candidate for full membership in December 1999. Cem was highly credited for the outcome 
in Helsinki Summit. With the official candidature status granted, Turkish leaders were 
convinced that their country‘s western credentials were consolidated.  
 
Now they could embark upon the path of region-based foreign policy.  In this context, 
relations with Israel kept flourishing. Participation of Israeli firms in military tenders and joint 
military exercises were routinized. Trade relations were boosted. Tourism was on the rise, 
and the two sides were exploring the possibility of building pipelines to carry water, gas and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Geography. 30, p. 80-89, RUMELILI, B. (2007). Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast 
Asia. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.  
921BILGIN, P., & BILGIÇ, A. (2011). Turkey's "New" Foreign Policy toward Eurasia. Eurasian Geography and Economics. 
52, p.185. 
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oil between.922Turkish-Israeli relations went through a period of honeymoon. At the turn of 
the millennium, the two sides described it as strategic partnership.923 Yet this partnership 
remained precarious as it needed to be underpinned by solid improvement in the Israeli-
Palestinian track. It was why Ankara was extremely uncomfortable with the developments 
after the collapse of Camp David II which led to the outbreak of the second intifada in 
September 2000. Mistreatment of Yasser Arafat by Israel in 2001 and Israel‘s occupation of 
territories in the West Bank in the spring of 2002 made Turkish leaders very much weary. 
Ecevit dubbed the latter act tantamount to ―genocide‖, a phrase which he later publicly 
declared as taken back.924 
 
In accordance with the Adana Accord, there was fertile ground to move Turco-Syrian 
relations to the next level. In this context, a delegation from the Syrian PM‘s office arrived in 
Ankara in 1999 to reactivate the Joint Economic Commission,925 which was dormant since 
1988. Sezer‘s unanticipated visit to Damascus to attend Hafez Assad‘s funeral in June 2000 
signalled a new chapter in relations. He was the first Turkish President to set foot in Syria. In 
November, Syria‘s Vice-President Khaddam was in Ankara bringing in a letter of intent from 
President Bashar Assad proposing realignment in bilateral relations.926The Syrian proposal 
on Declaration of Principles aimed to address the two remaining issues, water and Hatay. 
Assad‘s approach was based on developing economic ties as a prelude to address the two 
remaining problems. That boded well with Ankara‘s eagerness to develop good neighbourly 
relations. By 2000, Turkey became Syria‘s fourth largest trading partner with a trade volume 
of $ 724,7 million, up from $539.2 million in 1999.927  A step further was taken when Syria‘s 
                                                          
922BISHKU, M. (2006). How Has Turkey Viewed Israel? Israel Affairs. 12, p. 177-194.  
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Chief of Staff Turkmani visited Turkey in June 2002 to sign a security agreement.928 Military 
training and transfer of military technology, visits by military academies and joint military 
manoeuvres were envisaged in this context. In a very short span of time, Turkish-Syrian 
relations sailed towards new horizons, setting the stage for an enhanced spirit of 
cooperation.  
 
While Syria‘s links with the PKK were severed, Ankara suspected that the terrorist 
organization had found refuge in Iran. Based on such worries, cross border skirmishes 
between the two sides in July-August 1999 caused extreme uneasiness. Turkish war planes 
bombed border towns. Iranians in return arrested two Turkish soldiers in the border 
region.929To avoid similar controversies, Turkey and Iran signed a security agreement on 
August 13 whereby they committed themselves to carry out simultaneous operations against 
the bases of terrorist groups (PKK and Mojahedin el Halq) in their respective countries.930 
Economic incentives were equally crucial. In May 2000, the Turkish Undersecretary of 
Foreign Trade arrived in Iran with a large business delegation. Capitalizing on the 
deliberations during this visit, the Turkish-Iranian Business Council was established in 
November 2001.931  By December, Iran began pumping natural gas to Turkey in line with the 
agreement signed during Erbakan‘s visit to Tehran in 1996. President Sezer‘s landmark visit 
to Iran in June 2002 stood witness to the first meeting of the Business Council and a number 
of contracts for Turkish businessmen were awarded. Despite their ideological differences, 
and Sezer‘s lecturing of Iranians in Tehran on Kemalism, the new foreign policy patrons in 
Ankara achieved a relative thaw in Turco-Persian relations.   
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The collapse of PKK terrorism prepared a new atmosphere to normalize relations with Iraq 
as well. Ankara‘s hand now was freed to interact freely with Baghdad to help restore its 
authority in northern Iraq. Besides, Turkey had already endured a considerable amount of 
losses due to American policies of isolating Iraq and the US-led UN sanctions.  A frustrated 
Ankara thus began voicing calls to lift sanctions against Iraq more vocally. In this context, FM 
Cem met UNSC Annan while Ecevit pursued a similar end during the OSCE Istanbul Summit 
in November 1999.932 In May 2001, it was MFA Undersecretary Loğoğlu in Baghdad who 
took up the same matter. These efforts resulted in the relative easing of the sanctions 
regime. Trade relations flourished as a result, reaching almost pre-1991 Gulf War levels in 
April 2000.933 In this vein, Ankara decided to appoint an Ambassador in Baghdad in January 
2001, which was run by a Charge d‘Affairs since 1993. 934  In September 2001, 
Undersecretary for Foreign TradeTuzmen arrived in Iraq with a business delegation to attract 
new contracts for Turkish companies. The first cargo train in 20 years from Turkey to 
Baghdad shortly followed bearing 450 tons of goods under the UN‘s ‗oil-for-food‘ program. All 
signs indicated that Turkish-Iraqi relations began to steadily take off. But the attacks of 
September 11 in the US poisoned this cooperative atmosphere. While Washington made 
plans to launch a war against Baghdad with Iraqi Kurds as its chief ally, Ankara had every 
reason to avoid armed conflict. A fear of resurgent refugee spill, negative repercussions on 
Turkey‘s ailing economy and fears of an independent Kurdish state once again came to the 
fore.   
 
Capitalizing on the relative entente achieved in the Middle Eastern neighbourhood, the 
bridging act in Turkey‘s region-based foreign policy came with a historic meeting of EU-OIC 
Joint Forum on Civilization and Harmony in February 2002. Convened in the aftermath of 
September 11 in Istanbul, a series of panels on civilizational dialogue and on global political 
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outlook were held with Foreign Ministers from OIC and EU memberspresent. The initiative 
was crucial in demonstrating Turkey‘s bridging qualities between civilizational divides and the 
issues pertaining to the two meta geo-cultural spaces.  
 
As general elections approached by the end of 2002, Ankara was undertaking extensive 
reforms to match the EU criteria to start membership negotiations. Its relations with Syria and 
Iran were significantly improved. Turkish leaders were trying to avoid, or at best minimize, 
the repercussions of a possible military operation against Iraq. Relations with Israel were 
based on solid foundations but timid. Sympathies toward the Palestinians forced Ankara to 
have balanced relations with both Israel and Palestine. While the drums of war echoed 
strongly across the Atlantic, Ankara seemed to be doing relatively fine in its Middle Eastern 
neighbourhood. Yet an aged Ecevit with an ever deteriorating health and a plummeting 
economy was eroding the popularity of coalition government at home.    
 
IV. TURKEY THE CENTRE: A THREE-LEGGED GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATION (2002-2010) 
 
In this atmosphere, the AK Party, which was founded by the reformist wing that parted ways 
with Erbakan‘s National View movement, won the elections in 2002. The leaders of the AK 
Party operated within the conservative mentality. Despite a vocal criticism of Huntington‘s 
clashing civilizations thesis, Turkey‘s new leaders keep acknowledging civilizations as self-
enclosed separate entities with sui generis characteristics.935 Hence they associated state 
identities with civilizational clusters centred around geographical divisions of the globe. Such 
perceptions were preordained by primordial conceits. A shared sense of common history and 
Islamic faith culminated in belonging to the Muslim cultural constellation was a key factor.  
 
This is where the novelty in colouring civilizational geopolitics with classical (naturalized) 
geopolitical analysis was brought about. In this effort, the intellectual work of Ahmet 
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Davutoğlu 936  takes a prominent position. He is widely recognized as the academic 
mastermind behind the new geopolitical reasoning that drives Turkey‘s more recent foreign 
policy activism.937 The new exercise put forward under Davutoğlu‘s intellectual courtship is 
conditioned on a civilizational discourse coloured with naturalized geopolitical claims in trying 
to ―re-position Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the centre‖. 938 He 
authoritatively asserts that ―Turkey has no chance to be peripheral, it is not a side line 
country of the EU, NATO or Asia‖.939 
 
In an attempt to redecorate civilizational imbroglios, his understanding of geopolitics strives 
to produce supposedly objective, ―God‘s eye‖, irrefutable and solid geopolitical knowledge to 
aid the practice of statecraft. The ultimate goal is to help enhance the power base of the 
Turkish state. This is why the conceptual framework of ―Strategic Depth‖, his famous book, is 
draws heavily upon the writings of classical geopolitical scholars.940  With an essentialist 
approach, the world is visualized in this perspective as comprising of a Heartland and a 
Rimland, the meanings of which are constructed with reference to Mackinder‘s and 
Spykman‘s theories.  
 
The account offered by Davutoğlu is intriguing in two aspects both of which feed into a sense 
of geopolitical and geographical distinctiveness. As he strives to re-establish Turkey as a 
central country, his declared goal is to reinterpret Turkey‘s geography (read as ―naturalized 
                                                          
936 Ahmet Davutoğlu is an international relations professor born in the conservative Turkish town of Konya who was 
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939 DAVUTOĞLU, A  (2011). Turkey's Foreign Policy Vision: An Assessment of 2007 the EU in 2010. Insight Turkey. 
Vol.10, No.1. p.77-96  
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(classical) geopolitics‖) and history (read as ―civilizational geopolitics‖). Naturalized 
geopolitics is instrumentalized in this reasoning to prioritize the geographical and strategic 
advantages enjoyed by the Muslim world. Davutoğlu asserts that ―the Muslim world, which 
turned into the intersectional arena of civilizational revival and strategic competition, 
becomes the focal point in international relations.‘941 Inspired by Mahan, he draws attention 
to the significance of chokepoints in the Rimland by claiming that ―this geographical location 
brings about a great advantage to the Muslim world enabling it to control the choke points 
which divide the warm seas of the worldwhile also bringing an extensive risk of attracting 
intra-systemic competition‖.942 He also states that ―almost all choke points in Eurasia as the 
keys of the Rimland are under the control of Muslim countries. The rest—the Cape of Good 
Hope, the Torres and Tasmanian Straits, the Strait of Magellan, the Panama Canal, and the 
exits from the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean—are located too far from the Heartland and 
the Rimland to play a decisive role in ultimate geopolitical supremacy in the Eurasian 
mainland.‖943 To substantiate such claims, Davutoğlu evidences the geopolitical advantages 
enjoyed by the Muslim world thanks to control over two-thirds of global oil reserves, the core 
and southern part of the Heartland (Central Asia) consisting of Muslim majority states, the 
control and influence of the Muslims over the passes from the Heartland to the coasts of the 
Rimland, the geographical link of Muslim communities in the Balkans (Bosnia-Albania-
Kosovo-Macedonia-Western Thrace) and having an independent Muslim country 
(Kazakhstan) with nuclear capacity.944 
 
Turkey the Geographical Pivot of History 
 
The next step is to ascribe a new place to Turkey within these grand geopolitical schemes. 
The question posed is ―where Turkey is with regards to the on-going efforts towards a new 
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world order and what does its geography stand for?‖ 945  In answering this question, 
naturalized civilizational geopolitics constitutes the core of the argument. First, it is, as 
emphasized by earlier Turkish conservatives, recognized that Turkey has inheritedthe legacy 
of the Ottoman Empire in between the East and the West. Second, Turkey is portrayed as 
the only country where Mackinder‘s heartland and Spykman‘s Rimland depictions intersect.  
 
In Davutoğlu‘s account, the world is divided into core and peripheral areas in terms of 
strategic significance. The heartland in the Mackinderian sense is constitutively claimed to 
include not only Eastern Europe and Russian inland territories stretching to the North Pole 
but also Turkey (Anatolia). Following Spykman‘s articulation, the strategic belt lying across 
the Western Europe-Turkey-Iraq-Pakistan-Afghanistan-India-China-Korea-East Siberia is 
pictured as the Rimland, control over which is thought to hold the key to the destinies of the 
world.946 
 
Based on this premise, Turkey‘s geopolitical location is ascribed central strategic 
significance, which is epitomized in the following constitutive statement by Mr. Davutoğlu.  
 
"Turkey is a country with a close land basin, the epicentre of the Balkans, the Middle 
East and the Caucasus, the centre of Eurasia in general and is in the middle of the 
Rimland belt cutting across the Mediterranean to the Pacific [Emphasis added]"947 
 
Davutoğlu thus invokes geographical centrality thesis to the point of distinctiveness thanks to 
being located at the exact point where Mackinder's Heartland and Spykman's Rimland 
intersect. There are two elements of distinctiveness in this. First is geographical. With a little 
twist to make two prominent classical concepts that historically and intellectually never 
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overlap, intersect, Turkey is elevated to the status of the only country occupying such a 
distinct geographical location. In a way it is implied that the geography of Turkey is distinct as 
it is at the core of both the Heartland and Rimland having access to three continents 
(Europe, Africa and Asia). The second element of distinctiveness relates to Turkey‘s position 
as a civilizational centre/hub between two distinct cultures, Western and Muslim. This is in a 
way depicting Turkey at the geographical pivot of a vast space ranging from the Middle East 
to the Balkans, from the Caucasus to the East Mediterranean and Black Sea to Central 
Asia.948 To rephrase, ―Turkey is located right at the centre of Afro-Eurasian vast landmass‖, 
as Davutoğlu repetitively claims, which brings with it a multitude of identities as a Middle 
Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea 
country.949 
 
When assessed with the calls made in the prologue of this book where it is stated that the 
close land, sea and continental basins around Turkey constitute the heartland of the world 
island, it becomes clear that Turkey‘s place in the world is defined as a strategic 
geographical pivot, one that resembles Mackinder‘s heartland. With possibilities of access to 
such a vast space, Turkey's geographical situatedness is scripted as a major asset.  
 
Turkey as a Distinct Civilizational Centre/Hub 
 
Turkey in this naturalized version of civilizational geopolitics is thus established squarely at 
the core area of Islamic civilization yet at the intersection of many influences which makes it 
particularly distinct and unique. A further statement by Davutoğlu reads as ―Turkey holds an 
important place in East-West, North-South divisions. From the East it is seen as an 
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outgrowth of the West, while from the West it is an extension of the East‖.950 In the very same 
line, he argues that;  
 
“Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country. One important characteristic that 
distinguishes Turkey from say Romania or Greece is that Turkey is at the same time a 
Middle Eastern and a Caucasian country. Unlike Germany, Turkey is as much a 
European country as it is an Asian country. Indeed, Turkey is as much a Black Sea 
country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places Turkey right at 
the centre of many geopolitical influences” 
 
Davutoğlu thus rejects the perception of Turkey as a bridge between the Islamic and 
Western spaces since this would reduce Turkey to a mere instrument for the promotion of 
other states‘ interests. Instead, he reconstructs Turkey as a civilizational centre. With a 
sense of Turkish/Islamic/Ottoman distinctiveness, he envisages Turkey to assume the 
leadership of its own civilizational basin.951 In reaffirmation, Erdoğan stipulates that ―Turkey 
has to build its imagination for future based on the distinct culture and civilization it has 
inherited upon this geography‖.952 As a result, Turkey does no longer singlehandedly seek its 
strategic orientation towards the west but wishes to employ a diversified anchor in foreign 
policy by re-joining to ex-Ottoman geographies. This is an attempt to reconstruct Turkey as a 
power in its own right with a flavour of ―Turkish Gaullism‖.953 
 
In this context, inheriting the geopolitical legacy of the Ottoman Empire is reinterpreted 
deterministically. Greater involvement in regional affairs is justified by a sense of 
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geographical, cultural and historical continuity. Waves of migration that took place after the 
Cold War from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Kosovo, Bulgaria and Macedonia are presented as 
proof in this regard. The fact that inhabitants of these countries chose Turkey as their final 
destination is explained with resort to a dominant geographical imagination beyond Turkish 
territories that kept seeing Turkey as the civilizational centre through which such problems 
could be resolved.954 Turkey‘s new role to help address the problems in these regions is not 
presented as a political choice but a necessity in the view of its long-established historical, 
geographical, economic and cultural bonds.955 What happens in the Balkans, Caucasus and 
Middle East is thus perceived in Turkey‘s area of responsibility.956 The conclusion drawn is 
that Turkey cannot escape the consequences if a crisis hits its ex-territories. Besides, 
regional leadership ambitions are also naturalized and justified. The new way to deal with 
and even deter such crises is another novelty about the new geographical imagination.957 As 
the heir to the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is seen destined to re-engage and reintegrate with 
the neighbouring zones rather than alienate itself (apparently with the Middle East before all 
others). This is what Davutoğlu calls ―a historical responsibility‖ or ―a call of duty‖ for 
Turkey,958 which is reminiscent of geopolitical determinism. 
 
This dual effort aims to alter Turkey‘s spatially fixed western identity by extending geo-
cultural bonds to the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf and North 
Africa. Constructed as a central country, AK Party‘s Turkey identifies strongly with all these 
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regions based on a key common denominator, Islam and a most favourably remembered 
common Ottoman past. This calls for intra-civilizational solidarity and non-sectarian 
sympathy toward the Islamic world in guiding foreign policy. Turkey is thus constructed as 
the primus inter pares orthe spokespersonin representing the Islamic civilization. 959   As 
Erdoğan contemplates ―it is Turkey that first represents Islamic values and the great 
historical accumulation of (Muslim) civilization in the Western world‖.960 This is exemplified by 
Ankara‘s utter willingness to Co-Chair the Alliance of Civilizations initiative with Spain in 2005 
and get Mr. Ekmeleddin Ġhsanoğlu elected as the first ever Turkish Secretary General to the 
Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 2004. At the same time, Turkey is 
positioned as the melting pot where western/European and eastern/Muslim civilizations 
centrally interact.961 This is, as the argument goes, what provides Turkey with ―geographical 
and historical depth‖, the sum of which amounts to ―strategic depth‖. In the AK Party mantra, 
this accords Turkey a leading role for regional dominance. Such justification is grounded in 
the following words by Davutoğlu.  
 
―Turkey‘s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of manoeuvring in 
several regions simultaneously, in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its 
immediate environs‖.962 
 
The ultimate goal is to make Turkey a transregional power, a leader perhaps, in the Muslim 
world.963 This stems from the assumption that ―a country‘s value in international relations 
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depends on its geostrategic location.‖ 964  Turkey therefore wishes to capitalize on its 
exceptional geopolitical location as the epicentre of world politics as well as its position as a 
central civilizational hub just like its historical predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, which 
straddled the frontier between the East and the West.  
 
The Image of the Middle East 
 
AKP leaders‘ perception of the Middle East fundamentally differs from that of the Kemalists 
but is akin to Özal‘s. Classical naturalized geopolitics once again sifts through the lens 
through which this region is reconstructed and represented. The Middle East is seen as 
sitting at an interface between continents. Thanks to its historical role as a geographical 
centre, it holds the key to heartland Afro-Eurasia. Three considerations colour the 
significance of this region. First, it is located at the heart of the land basin of Turkey, one of 
the focal points for its regional policy. Second, the Middle East embodies interconnections to 
the outer frontiers of sea basins which Turkey is directly involved with. Third, it serves as a 
natural connection to Asia and Africa, i.e. a central geography for the policies Turkey 
envisions towards these continents. 965  Coupled with the rich hydrocarbon deposits and 
commercial and transportation lines this region sits upon as well as thanks to civilizational 
affinity, Turkey, under Mr. Davutoğlu‘s courtship, performatively perceives the Middle East as 
―the key to global political economy and strategic balances‖966 and ―an unavoidable natural 
hinterland for Turkey‖.967 
 
It must be noted that the legal boundaries among Middle Eastern states are approached with 
extreme scepticism. Seen as mere identifications to mark territorialisation of new nation 
states, all borders, except for the Turkish-Iranian border which was demarcated by the 
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965 DAVUTOĞLU, A. (2001). p.216-218. 
966Ibid. p. 323. 
967Ibid. p.129. 
283 
 
Agreement of Kasr-ı Shirin in 1639, are deemed unnatural.968 Historically interconnected 
communities, cities and geographies are thereby believed to have been separated and 
alienated from each other through borders by the turn of the 19th century.969 Turkish leaders 
liken these borders to badly knitted artificial walls and thus subject to exploitation for major 
power rivalry.970 It is claimed that de jure boundaries among the states in the Middle East are 
drawn in such a manner to ensure that no single power could exploit the rich oil and water 
resources alone.971 The borders in this understanding are only created to reflect the interests 
and agendas of colonial and imperial powers after World War I, which were further stiffened 
during the Cold War by planting land mines.972 Legal borders per se therefore, by means of 
widening the cognitive divide between Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours, represent 
barriers to cooperation, integration and human contact. They are seen in service of simply 
creating competitive national identities, political consciences and rival areas for 
sovereignty.973 It is propagated that there is a discrepancy between the political geography 
(shaped by post-colonial state structures) and geopolitical frontiers (dictated by physical 
geography).974 This is seen as the underlying reason for inter-regional conflictsa source of 
instability.975 The new vision is to elucidate legal borders and turn them into simple political 
identifications by allowing greater flexibility in terms of transport, tourism, social and 
economic transaction as well as political dialogue. 976  The famous ―zero-problem with 
neighbours‖ doctrine with a growing emphasis on soft power and economic interdependence 
fits well to this goal.  
 
                                                          
968 DAVUTOĞLU, A (2010). Turkish Policies and Peace in the Middle East, Lecture at the School of Global Affairs 
and Policy' –The American University in Cairo, (March 2), 
969Ibid. 
970DAVUTOGLU, A. (2001).p.323. 
971Ibid. p.335 
972Ibid. 
973DAVUTOGLU, A. (2001). p.329. 
974Ibid.p.141. 
975Ibid. 
976 DAVUTOĞLU, A (2010). Turkish Policies and Peace in the Middle East, Lecture at the School of Global Affairs 
and Policy' –The American University in Cairo.  
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AK Party‘s multipartite geographical imagination was developed at an atmosphere of utmost 
global transformation and influx. The attacks of September 11 radically changed the global 
scene by a revived reference to civilizational geopolitics in construing old geographies (the 
Orient, the Occident) and countries through a new glance, ―the war on terror‖. The vivid 
construction of meta-spaces in accordance with cultural differences as prescribed in the 
―clash of civilizations‖ thesis coloured general modes of representation and understanding.977 
Whilst a global war (crusade) was contemplated against terror with preparations underway 
for military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and grand transformative visions framed for 
the so-called Greater Middle East, new allies were sought or old affinities rediscovered. 
Attempts by the Bush administration to cast Turkey as a moderately Islamic yet democratic 
model in the framework of the Greater Middle East Project978 was instrumental for the AK 
Party elite. Thus, AK Party‘s Turkey with a self-ascribed geopolitically distinctive global 
positioning amidst contending civilizations and geographies was seen a feasible partner. As 
such, Turkey became a co-chair of the Democracy Assistance Dialogue Programme of the 
Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative. The trend somewhat continued afterwards as 
President Obama reaffirmed this perception by saying; ―Turkey‟s greatness lies in its ability 
to be at the centre of things. This is not where East and West divide – this is where they 
come together”.979 
 
The AK Party Way: The General Contours of Foreign Policy (2002-2010) 
 
Just as the geographical imagination(s) with regards to Turkey‘s global positioning changed, 
so did the operational geopolitical code under the AK Party. The leitmotif ―zero problems with 
neighbours‖ hinted at the general tenets of the new strategy. With an attempt to reverse the 
                                                          
977 See et. al. ÇELİK, S. (2010). Imagining Turkey In a Re(De)Territorialized World: Turkey, the Orient and the Occident, 
(unpublished dissertation), Middle East Technical University&GUNEY, A., & GOKCAN, F. (2010). The 'Greater Middle 
East' as a 'Modern' Geopolitical Imagination in American Foreign Policy. Geopolitics. 15, p. 22-38. 
978 ONAR, N. F. (2009). p.234. 
979 OBAMA, B. (2009). Remarks by President Obama to Turkish Parliament. Turkish Grand National Assembly Complex, 
Ankara, April 6.  
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largely defensive posture of the 1990s, AK leaders initially identified enhanced engagement 
with neighbours and developing positive relationships as the best way to improve Turkey‘s 
regional standing. They prioritized at first dialogue and cooperation over confrontation and 
coercion. Consequently, closer political and economic ties with neighbours were sought, new 
initiatives developed and some problematic chapters such as settlement of the Cyprus issue 
and relations with Armenia were addressed with positive stimuli.  Ankara developed an 
interest, as never before, in playing regional roles as a facilitator, mediator, conciliator and 
arbitrator. A growing interest in playing similar roles in order to help ease intra-national 
tensions such as in Iraq and Lebanon was also quite new. The volume and intensity of such 
efforts made one analyst to conclude that ―a sense of hyperactivity appeared in Turkish 
foreign policy, as if driven by a need to make up for the time lost‖.980 Likewise, KiriĢçi et. al. 
noted that ―Turkish foreign policy became undoubtedly far more proactive and 
multidimensional than at any period in Turkey‘s republican history‖.981 Playing an enhanced 
role in various regions was hoped would give Turkey ―global strategic significance‖.982 To this 
end, a strong emphasis on Turkey‘s soft power with its vibrant economy, EU accession 
process, improved democratic standards, culture and diplomacy was deployed.  
 
Enabled by Turkey‘s centrally constructed geopolitical re-positioning, engaging with the 
Middle East and the Muslim world was a privileged pillar in Ankara‘s strategy. In this vein, 
Turkey‘s renewed interest in deepening regional cooperation rested on three key tenets; 
continuous political dialogue, enhanced economic interdependence, and increased social 
and cultural exchange. 983  Hence new mechanisms and tools were introduced to award 
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Turkey an enhanced regional role. High Level Cooperation Councils (HLCP)984, visa free 
travel985 and free trade agreements986, Yunus Emre Cultural Centres and TĠKA (Turkish 
Cooperation and Development Agency) were all instrumental.   
 
In light of the perception by Turkey‘s new conservative elite about the Middle East, and their 
attempt to relocate Turkey in the midst of three continents and two civilizations, prescriptions 
for the new Turkish foreign policy are characterized by a multi-layered, multidirectional and 
multidimensional outlook. This exercise aims to redefine Turkey‘s relations with major 
international power hubs as an increasingly self-confident and independent player while at 
the same time creating a hinterland of its own that will be facilitated by closely knit cultural, 
economic and political interconnectedness.  
 
In more specific terms, the path Ankara embarked upon entailed closer political and 
economic ties with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Kurds, North African, and Gulf states. Playing an 
intermediary role in the settlement of the Israeli-Syrian track of the Middle East Peace 
Process was also quite new to Turkish foreign policy. This was followed by a growing interest 
in the Israeli-Palestinian and intra-Palestinian dimensions (engaging with Hamas in 
particular), and a facilitation role on the dispute arising from Iran‘s nuclear programme. Intra-
civilizational solidarity and a quest to help address the outstanding problems of the Muslim 
world appeared as a major motive for Ankara. This is what led some observers to conclude 
that Turkey moved away from Western-oriented diplomacy to expanding its role and 
                                                          
984  Practically, a mechanism that envisages convening regular joint cabinet meetings lead by Heads of 
State/Government and attended by relevant Ministers to address different aspects of bilateral relations such as security, 
commerce, energy, transport,  agriculture, etc. As of 2014, Turkey has established HLCP’s with Iraq, Syria, Iran, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Libya and Tunisia in the Middle East (negotiations with Jordan are under way since 2011). The 
overall total is 18 countries.        
985 Reciprocal abondonment of visa requirements for Syria, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan and the Gulf states are in place. 
Negotiations continue for a similar agreement with Iraq.  
986 Turkey concluded 20 STAs so far to include Morocco, Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Israel, Malaysia and 
Jordan.  
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influence among the Muslim and the Middle Eastern nations. 987  As much as aiming at 
elevating Turkey‘s regional and global stature, Ankara‘s regional engagement was also 
closely associated with expanding economic interests.988 
 
The First Era (2002-2010): Euphoria of Zero-Problems with Neighbours 
 
The turn of a new page in Turkey‘s dealings with the Middle East ushered on the positive 
vestiges of Ecevit-Cem era. But with a view to establish Turkey as a central actor, AK Party 
leadership embarked on a path to assertively incorporate Turkey into regional politics. Unlike 
the previous era, Turkey this time had less interest in proving its value to the west. Instead by 
seeking an enhanced regional role, Ankara wished to improve bilateral relations to the point 
of ―zero-problems‖ and throw its weight behind efforts to resolve regional problems or ease 
tensions. The expected yield was to transform Turkey into an indispensable regional player.    
 
Turkey's assertive involvement in Middle Eastern Affairs, ironically, started with non-
engagement. Ankara‘s non-hinted refusal to let American troops use its territory as a base to 
stage a military incursion to Iraq in 2003 helped portray Turkey as a welcome player in 
Middle Eastern politics. This move freed Ankara from the image of Western ―pawn‖ and 
opened greater space for manoeuvring. At the expense of souring relations with Washington, 
Ankara thus gained prestige not only in Iraq but also the Arab world. Turkish FM Abdullah 
Gül used this leverage in 2005 in convincing Sunni parties to participate in Iraq‘s second 
round of elections which they originally planned to boycott.989 On the downside, Ankara 
(foreign policy establishment in particular) grew extremely weary that it was losing ground in 
post-intervention Iraq. With no Turkish troops on the ground, old fears about an independent 
Kurdistan were resurrected as the US took Iraqi Kurds as its chief ally. Under such 
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circumstances, preserving Iraq‘s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity remained the 
touchstone of Ankara‘s Iraq strategy. To ensure that, Turkey took the lead in the 
establishment of Iraq‘s Neighbours Initiative on January 23, 2003.990 
 
While this initiative proved of some value, Turkish-Iraqi relations were increasingly clouded 
by two factors. First the new constitution introduced in 2005 transformed Iraq into a federal 
state between Arabs and Kurds. In the new structure, Kurds basically legalized their 
autonomous self-rule. Kurds‘ prospects of seizing control over the oil-rich city of Kirkuk 
simply exacerbated Ankara‘s worries. Second, the increasing number of attacks in Turkey by 
PKK militants after the end of unilateral ceasefire in 2004 agitated Ankara. Under the 
military‘s guidance, cross-border operations in northern Iraq thus became a regular policy 
tool.991 The tensions were, however, eased by the promise of the Bush administration to 
provide Turkey with real time intelligence on PKK movements in Iraq, and the establishment 
of a trilateral security cooperation mechanism between Iraq, Turkey and the US.  
 
Whilst the place of the PKK on the common agenda waned, relations between Ankara, 
Baghdad and Erbil flourished with reciprocal high level visits. In March 2008, Iraq‘s President 
Jalal Talabani paid a working visit to Turkey upon the invitation of President Abdullah Gül. 
This was significant because the arch-Kemalist previous President Sezer did not invite 
Talabani due to his Kurdish background since 2005. In July 2008, PM Erdoğan was in 
Baghdad for the establishment of the High Level Strategic Council. With the accord, the two 
countries hailed each other as ―strategic partners‖. In this spirit, Iraqi PM Maliki returned the 
favour in December pledging his government‘s support to Turkey‘s fight against the PKK.992 
By March 2009, it was President Gül‘s term to visit Baghdad during which 48 MoUs were 
                                                          
990 The initiative included Iran, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait which was later joined by Iraq itself.  
Foreign Ministers came together 9 times formally, 3 times unofficially and 3 times in extended format to help forge a 
common understanding until the initiative waned from 2008 onwards.   
991 The biggest of such incursions was named “Operation the Sun”. Between February 21 and 27, 2008, ten thousand 
Turkish troops marched to crash PKK outposts with heavy aerial bombardment.  
992 “Irak’la “Eve Dönüş Pazarlığı” (A Return Home Bargain with Iraq). (2008). Radikal. 25 December. 
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signed on security, energy, education, transport, health, etc. In August, Turkey mediated 
between Iraq and Syria over an accusation that Damascus was behind the brutal bombings 
in Baghdad.  
 
Equally striking was a change in Ankara‘s attitude towards Iraqi Kurds. In October 2008, 
Turkey‘s Special Representative for Iraq, Ambassador Murat Özçelik, for the first time met 
Mesut Barzani who now carried the title ―President of Kurdish Regional Government‖. Direct 
dialogue was established with Davutoğlu‘s first ever visit to Erbil in October 2009. By March 
next year, Turkey opened a Consulate-General in Erbil. Shortly after Barzani was in Ankara 
in June 2010.  
 
Three motives seemed crucial in this new-found rapprochement; to ensure cooperation 
against the PKK, benefit from the booming economic activity in the Kurdish region and 
prospects for energy cooperation. As a result, bilateral economic relations boomed. Turkish 
companies tapped into the Iraqi market in unprecedented numbers and volume. Turkish 
airlines established direct flights to Baghdad, Erbil and Basra. Likewise Turkish banks 
opened branches in Iraq. Trade volume eventually took off from a sheer $ 840 million in 
2003993  to a solid $ 11,9 billion.994  Likewise, 3,200 Turkish companies operating in Iraq 
undertook $ 11.3 billion worth of infrastructure contracts until 2010.995 Much of this activity 
was largely with the Kurdish dominated northern Iraq. Furthermore,Turkey‘s national oil 
company (TAPO) was in the winning consortiums in the tenders for Siba and Mansuriyah gas 
fields in 2010.  Towards the end of the period, Turkey seemed to have achieved a great deal 
of normalization in relations with both Baghdad and Erbil.  
 
                                                          
993  MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ, M.  (2010). “Changing Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Iraq: New Tools of Engagement.” 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs. s.4. 
994 Turkey-Iraq Political Relations. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. available at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-irak-
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Whilstthe AK Party took over government, the Assad regime was already in a cooperative 
mood on security matters. Hence, when dual terrorist bombings hit Istanbul in November 
2003, Syria handed over 22 people allegedly connected people with the attacks.996 For the 
Syrian regime was increasingly isolated under the pressure of an antagonistic US 
administration, Turkey offered an opportunity to widen strategic options. Such isolation 
accentuated following the assassination of Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri. A former official 
astutely described the mood by saying ―when the Syrians think of threats, they look at Iran. 
When they think of opportunities, they look towards Turkey‖.997 
 
Ankara therefore grasped the opportunity to re-introduce itself as cooperative regional actor 
by actively engaging with the Syrian regime. In this context, amidst American fury, Bashar 
Assad was invited in January 2004 to become the first ever Syrian President to set foot in 
Turkey. In December, PM Erdoğan was in Damascus to sign a free trade agreement. In April 
2005, President Sezer landed in Damascus despite vocal criticism by the US administration. 
As a staunch Kemalist, Sezer was not moved by the AK Party‘s grand ambition to re-position 
Turkey as a central regional actor. A rather simple concern over a tumultuous Iraq under 
American occupation guided Sezer‘s behaviour, as he opined that ―Syria and Turkey share 
the same views on the protection of Iraq‘s territorial integrity and of its national unity‖998.  
 
The AK Party government, on the other hand, was keen on intensifying economic 
cooperation and move along its vision to practically invalidate borders on. By October 2009, 
the High Level Strategic Council (HLSC) was established and a visa free travel agreement 
concluded. In the first HLSC meeting the next year, the establishment of a joint bank, fast rail 
connection between Aleppo and Damascus, interconnectedness between Turkish and Syrian 
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natural gas grids and joint customs gates were decided.999 Ankara even inculcated the idea 
of de-mining the Turkish-Syrian border for agricultural cultivation.1000 These efforts paid off as 
trade volume rose from $ 729 million in 2000 to $ 2.27 billion in 2010.1001 Both the historical 
controversy about Hatay (Alexandretta) and the water issue were hardly pronounced. So 
much so that the foundation stone of a joint ―friendship dam‖ on Orontes (Asi) river 
(constituting the border between the two riparian countries) was laid by the Turkish and 
Syrian Prime Ministers.1002 
 
As one analyst put it, ―Ankara hoped improved relations with Syria would play a special role 
as its conduit to the Arab world where Turkey would like to expand its clout.‖1003 This was 
exemplified in August 2010 by the establishment of a quadripartite High Level Cooperation 
Council among Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon which was envisioned to evolve into a 
regional free-trade area encompassing free passage of goods, services, and people by 
focusing on trade, cross-border investment and visa exemptions.1004 This was an integration 
scheme modelled after the EU via which Ankara hoped to eventually transform the 
authoritarian regimes in the region after its own example by proactively engaging.1005 
 
Similar overtures were undertaken towards the Gulf. Both PM Erdoğan and FM (later 
President) Gül visited and hosted many times their monarchic counterparts. For instance, 
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King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia paid a visit to Turkey in August 2006, which was the first visit 
by a Saudi king in 40 years. On the other hand, a Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was signed in 2005 as a prelude for a 
Free Trade Agreement. In 2008, strategic dialogue was established with the GCC. 1006 
Despite some explicit security underpinnings, the chief rationale remained economic.1007 As a 
result, investments in Turkey from the Gulf reached $8 billion from ground zero over ten 
years, Turkish companies were awarded $43,3 billion worth of contracts and invested $1,6 
billion in the Gulf.1008 Trade volume peaked at $12,2 billion in 2008.1009 Ankara‘s influence as 
a role model for democracy promotion, liberalization, reform, and structural transformation, 
however, remained extremely limited.   
 
The relations with Iran were, too, grounded on the positive atmosphere of Ecevit-Cem era. In 
addition to cooperation against the PKK and PJAK (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan), 
economic incentives were strong. Ankara‘s decision to stay out of the war in Iraq also led to 
some degree of convergence. Both countries were alarmed by a possible Kurdish state next 
door and disintegration of Iraq. Once the AK Party came to power, the thaw in relations was 
re-energized. Presidential/PM level visits were exchanged in unprecedented numbers 
resulting in a mood of solidified collaboration.1010 When Erdoğan visited Tehran as Turkish 
PM for the first time in 2004, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security 
cooperation, with the PKK/PJAK as its main target, was signed. 1011  Iranian forces 
occasionally bombed PKK/PJAK camps in northern Iraq the next year. Economic relations 
also flourished. A Memorandum of Understanding to transport 30 billion cubic metres of 
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Iranian and Turkmen natural gas to Europe was signed in 2007.1012 Preparations to conclude 
a Preferential Trade Agreement continued.1013 With Iran becoming the second biggest gas 
supplier and an important source of crude oil to Turkey, trade volume reached $ 10.7 billion 
in 2010 from a sheer $ 1,1 billion in 1996.1014However, due to the high price of energy 
purchase,Ankara ran a chronic deficit of one-to-three or four in commercial ties with Tehran.  
 
The bigger difference of the AK Party era pertained to Iran‘s nuclear programme. Although 
the new government opposed Iran‘s nuclear ambitions, intra-civilizational sympathies and 
Muslim solidarity lend extra motive not to share the West‘s sense of urgency of the threat. 
Instead this was related to the wider perspective of a nuclear weapons-free Middle East, 
implying disarming Israel of such weapons. Therefore, when a new Strategic Concept was 
tabled in 2010, Ankara strongly opposed citing Iran as a threat for NATO‘s ballistic missile 
defence architecture. Ankara did not favour sanctions against Iran either since this infringed 
Turkey‘s economic interests. Ankara‘s position aimed at avoiding a double catastrophe 
scenario. First, if Tehran developed nuclear weapons despite all efforts to the contrary, this 
would unequivocally impair the order in the Middle East. The new regional setting in all 
likelihood would favour Iran at the expense of Turkey. Likewise, a nuclear deal on Iran‘s 
programme without Ankara would prove of similar effect. Second, a possible scenario of 
nuclear confrontation between Israel and Iran would be tantamount to disasterin destabilizing 
the region. 1015  Turkey‘s regional interests would therefore be gravely harmed. 
Notwithstanding the success rate, Turkey by engaging in the resolution of this problem, not 
only aimed at avoiding such double jeopardy scenarios but also to enhance its prestige as a 
central regional actor. As argued by Jenkins, Ankara‘s chief motivation in mediating was self-
aggrandizement, ―a desire to prove that when it came to the Middle East, it was Turkey, not 
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the West, that possessed the necessary contacts, expertise and credibility to secure 
results.‖1016It was in this context, Turkey and Brazil brokered a deal in 2010 in order to 
provide a basis for negotiations between P-5+1 and Iran. The initiative was with no avail. 
Frustrated that an opportunity was missed, Ankara registered a ―no‖ vote in the UN Security 
Council on further sanctions.  
 
Another test case for the AK Party government was relations with Israel. On the one hand, 
AK leaders were moved deeply by sympathies towards the Palestinians while on the other 
couching Israel constituted an important pillar in the new vision to translate Turkey into a 
regional arbiter and power centre. To this end, Turkey was projected as an exceptional actor 
that can constructively engage both with Israeli and Palestinian. In this atmosphere, Ankara 
initially did not wish to jeopardize ties with Israel. Bilateral defence/industry cooperation, 
trade and tourism were solid assets for good relations. Therefore,cooperation between Israeli 
and Turkish militaries continued. Trade volume reached $2 billion Dollars in 2004 and further 
expanding to $4 billion Dollars in 2012. Similarly, Jewish lobbies vigorously worked for 
projecting a positive AK Party image in Washington.1017 
 
But this was not a trouble-free relationship. Tensions rose high when PM Erdoğan criticized 
the Israeli government in April 2004 by calling the assassination of Hamas leaders ―state 
terrorism‖.1018  He even declined PM Sharon‘s request to visit Turkey. Sharon, in return, 
turned down Turkey‘s offer to mediate between the Israelis and Palestinians in the case of 
Sharon government‘s withdrawal from Gaza.1019 Tensions were somewhat eased when FM 
Gül visited Israel in January 2005. Furthermore, PM Erdoğan was in Tel Aviv and Palestine 
in May to mend fences, becoming the first Turkish PM since Çiller to pay such a visit. 
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Erdoğan‘s extension of congratulations to Hamas, a terrorist organization in Israeli accounts, 
upon its election victory in January 2006 once again strained Turkish-Israeli relations. 
Sentiments soured further when FM Gül greeted Hamas leader Khaled al Meshal in Ankara 
next month.1020 Ankara defended the move by claiming that Hamas was urged to renounce 
violence and recognize Israel‘s right to exist. Israeli government spokesman Raanan Gissin 
responded with the question ―how would you feel if we got together with Abdullah 
Öcalan?‖1021 
 
Nevertheless, both parties at the time valued Turco-Israeli relations and did not allow things 
to go from bad to worse. It was under these circumstances that Turkey offered to mediate 
between Hamas and Israel upon the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006. 
Although unsuccessful, it was enough to prove a gesture of good will on the part of Ankara. 
Presidents Peres and Abbas visited Ankara in November the next year addressing the 
Turkish Parliament one after the other for the first time.1022 The two presidents even signed a 
framework agreement to build an industrial zone in the West Bank with Turkey.1023 It was in 
this atmosphere of relative thaw that Tel Aviv was receptive to Turkey‘s offer to mediate in 
the track two with Syria. Seeing its vulnerabilities in the 2006 Lebanon War has also to be 
factored in. PM Erdoğan‘s then foreign policy advisor Davutoğlu travelled back and forth 
behind the scenes for indirect talks between Syria and Israel between May and December 
2008. Erdoğan and Israeli PM Olmert agreed in Ankara in December 23 that sufficient 
ground was covered for the start of direct negotiations. With the outbreak of Operation Cast 
Lead five days later, the process broke down. Even afterwards, Davutoğlu met Hamas leader 
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Meshal twice to broker a ceasefire.1024 This initiative failed to yield a breakthrough since 
Israel refused to lift the Gaza blockade.  
 
An infuriated Erdoğan took the whole saga as an ultimate betrayal by the Israeli PM, and 
began hinging on a harsh rhetoric against Israel. During the 2009 World Economic Forum, 
the famous ―one minute‖ incident further strained relations. Erdoğan lambasted President 
Peres by stating that ―Israelis know how to kill (innocent people)‖, and stormed out of the 
meeting. The Davos debacle increased Erdoğan‘s popularity in the Arab world but 
significantly breached Tel Aviv‘s confidence in his government. Relations hit an all-time low 
after the flotilla incident. In May 2010, Israeli commandos boarded a small boat named Mavi 
Marmara en route breaking the Gaza blockade and killed nine Turkish citizens. Causing a 
huge backlash in Turkey, Ankara withdrew its Ambassador from Tel Aviv, cut all military and 
economic ties, and asked for a formal apology and compensation for the families of those 
killed. Diplomatic relations are yet to be fully normalized.  
 
Until the fuse of the Arab Spring was lit in Tunisia by November 2010, Turkey seemed to 
have been doing relatively fine in its zealous Middle Eastern engagement. Despite certain 
setbacks in the EU accession process and imperfections around its model as a western-style 
Muslim democracy, Turkey overall was viewed positively across the Arab world. The AK 
Party government was popular. That is how economic and trade relations took off. Ankara‘s 
efforts in mediating micro conflicts fared mildly successful too. Many in the west were 
surprised by Ankara‘s expanding role in the Middle East but not yet with an alarmist tone. 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, fearing a loss of primacy in certain areas, have been less 
enthusiastic about Turkey‘s role in Palestine and intra-Arab affairs.1025 Iran, which harboured 
its own ambitions for regional leadership did not welcome Turkey‘s quest for regional 
dominance. Based on strong nationalist tendencies; sectarian antipathy and regional rivalry 
                                                          
1024 KIRIŞCI, K., TOCCI, N. & WALKER, J. (2010). p.10. 
1025 KIRIŞCI, K., TOCCI, N. & WALKER, J. (2010). p.18. 
297 
 
were defining features of Iranian position vis-à-vis Turkey 1026  whereby pragmatic 
engagement was not the rule but the exception. Overall, a centrally located Turkey with the 
single exception of relations with Israel left a positive imprint until the Arab Spring.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The last thirty years of Turkish foreign policy is characterized by relentless efforts to break 
away with singlehanded westernist placement and move beyond what might be called 
geopolitical ‗locked-in‘ syndrome. In discourses employed during the era, various Turkish 
leaders tried to open Turkey up to spaces which were traditionally approached with caution 
and aloofness. These efforts and the contending discourses developed were motivated by 
Turkish leaders' own geo-cultural embeddedness. Their quest to refine, define or redefine 
Turkey's global position between two culturally constructed meta spaces, the East and the 
West, were shaped by a strict adherence to civilizational geopolitics.  
 
Özal  The Military/Kemalist  Erbakan Ecevit/Cem  Davutoğlu/Erdoğan 
Synthesis          West (Europe)  East  West/Bridge    Centre 
Table 4. Contending Geopolitical Placements of Turkey  
 
As indicated in the table above, the old -and new generation of conservative leaders tried to 
discursively redefine Turkey's position in global affairs with a clear tilt towards the Muslim 
East. The way they constructed Turkey‘s place and identity significantly varied. So did the 
geopolitical discourses they employed. In the act, they constructed a distinctively different 
and positive geographical imagination around the Middle East. Such endeavours were 
usually accompanied by a growing tendency to act more actively and assertively in foreign 
policy. They interpreted Turkey's geopolitical situatedness and Ottoman legacy as central 
                                                          
1026JENKINS, G. (2012) p.29. 
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assets to build bolder strategies. If not totally altered Turkey‘s strategic orientation, they 
achieved some degree of autonomy and diversification in external relations.  
 
Political actors subscribing to Kemalist dispositions on the other hand wished to jealously 
guard Ataturk's westernist legacy. When trying to advance on a westernist path, hard core 
Kemalists adopted pathologic positions with high suspicions on the true intentions of western 
powers. These actors mostly approached the Middle East through an antagonistic, extremely 
weary and even allergic geographical imagery. At times the military's shadow clouded the 
overall judgement in Ankara, such suspicions caused Turkey to keep itself alienated from its 
immediate neighbourhood and act with excess prudence. More liberal minded Kemalists kept 
identifying Turkey‘s geopolitical situatedness in the West but approached the Muslim 
geographies in a more forthcoming manner. They changed the operational geographical 
code towards the Middle East but not the Kemalist sense of superiority over the region. 
Nevertheless, they too were successful to some extent in opening Turkey up to its immediate 
neighbourhood.   
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RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the complex links between geography and 
Turkish foreign policy. The main question is how Turkey‘s geographical situatedness, as 
couched up in constitutive discursive formations, impacts its external behaviour.  To this end, 
a non-traditional heuristic model is developed. It is hoped that this would help emancipate 
research on Turkish foreign policy from rationalist and neo-realist explanations fixated on 
security. By injecting ―geography‖ in critical scholarship as a key referent of analysis and 
through a post-structuralist agenda, this research hopes to enrich perspectives on Turkey‘s 
external affairs. The first part of this final chapter will assess how critical geopolitics 
contributed to a better understanding of Turkey‗s foreign policy which will be followed by 
main highlights and research findings in each chapter. 
 
The central theoretical claim in this study is that foreign policy decisions are made within a 
culture of geopolitics whereby different societal actors first divide and give meaning to meta-
spaces on a global map. This is followed by an exercise to make sense of a country‘s 
territorial situatedness, spatial belonging, geo-cultural positioning, and representations 
around the surrounding spaces. From these spring identities, borders, national roles-
missions, friends, allies, enemies, security threats, dangers and hence national interests. 
Geopolitical knowledge produced in this practice through discursive representations of space 
(images, imageries, imaginations, visions, etc.) interact interdependently in the formulation of 
foreign policy, identity and interest. Geopolitical culture thus determines the limits of bounded 
possibility and meaning as a crucial factor in the contours of foreign policy.  
 
But home-grown spatial representations and discourses alone do not automatically produce 
foreign policy practice. First, those articulating such discourses need to hang onto influential 
power positions in a state‘s decision-making apparatus. Socio-cultural and politico-economic 
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evolution of Turkey in a broad historical framework gives credence to this proposition. 
Secondly, albeit geopolitical positioning of a state can be determined within, its actual 
positioning in the international system is mostly determined by discursive practices of other 
states in the system. From a geopolitical perspective, therefore, foreign policy is not a one-
way flow. To the contrary, the practice of grand strategy and statecraft takes into 
consideration geopolitical representations and practices of other state actors towards whom 
one‘s foreign policy discourses and practices are directed at.  
 
The crucial point here is that critical scholarship goes beyond rationalist perspectives in 
seeing interests of states as exogenous, given and fixed in accordance with the shape of the 
anarchic international system. Instead critical geopolitics recognizes the transformative 
power of collective action by human-beings over the international system. This area of 
scholarship first draws attention to indigenous factors and processes (in state-society 
complexes) in understanding the world, one‘s own spatial self and others which do give 
meaning to the shape of global affairs. National interests in this approach are subjectively 
and discursively constructed in a culture of geopolitics which provides the key tools, images, 
labels and storylines in making international politics meaningful. The shape of the 
international system is then not taken-for-granted but rather determined by the sum total of 
the interaction amongst different state-society complexes through each other‘s foreign 
policies.  
 
In line with the theoretical model in Chapter 1, the point of departure here is not confined to 
physical characteristics of space but rather how geography is made meaningful in a culture 
of geopolitics through discourse. In other words, it reflects people‘s core discursive 
interaction with their geography by taking into consideration the historical socio-cultural 
context upon which geopolitical representations and storylines are developed in relation to 
that country‘s place in the international theatre of states. This exercise is inevitably linked to 
spatial perceptions of danger, threats, (in)security, identity, drawing (mental/physical) 
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boundaries, mission and role perceptions in the constitution or reconstruction of both the 
geopolitical self as well as others and other spaces.  
 
That the Turkish elite and people drew different conclusions as to the repercussions of the 
shape of international political space, made sense of their country‘s geographical 
situatedness, identities of geo-cultural belonging, interpretations/constructions of spaces 
around Turkey, and hence articulation of geopolitical storylines to support external action 
demonstrates that there are two permanent geopolitical mentalities in Turkey, i.e. Kemalist 
and Conservative. As addressed in more detail in Chapter 2, they can be categorized as the 
longest lasting geopolitical traditions dating back to the early stages of state formation. Both 
are mostly united in subscribing to European civilizational geopolitics which sees the world 
through opposing binaries. In this vein, both Kemalists and Conservatives have a bipolar 
image of the world in such a way to see a temporal separation between the West and the 
East as if they eternally live in different developmental stages. The former (Europe and 
Anglo-Saxon America) represents the ultimate beacon of economic development, scientific 
and civilizational superiority, modernity, and progress. The latter (Muslim world in particular) 
symbolizes everything the West is not, i.e. backward, underdeveloped, inefficient and 
traditional.  
 
Analysing Turkish foreign policy in this context is in a way writing a history of Turkish 
geopolitical thought and action where Kemalists and Conservatives competitively strive to 
answer questions like ―where in the world Turkey belongs to?‖, ―what identity should Turkey 
have?‖ and ―what does Turkey‘s geopolitical location and its geographical surroundings 
stand for?‖. In seeking answers to these questions, both traditions try to discursively ascribe 
Turkey a global position, identity, orientation and future in international politics between the 
West and the East. The constitutive answers they come up with usually stand in contrast to 
each other.  
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Conservatives lean towards an understanding of a post-imperial state which owns up to the 
geo-cultural and geopolitical legacy of the Ottoman Empire. As such, they imagine Turkey at 
the territorial core of the Muslim East as the leader of the Islamic (Turkic) world. Geo-cultural 
continuities are perceived towards the east which is cherished with positive images. Turkey‘s 
borders are deemed elusive and porous in enabling post-imperial contact and continuity.  
Conservatives are thus much more perceptive to umma type religious and pan-Turkic 
solidarity. The Middle East, as the topography dominated by Muslims, is represented as a 
space of brotherly akin and a natural turf for Turkey. Re-instituting peace and order in ex-
Ottoman territories therefore becomes a naturalized notion in this tradition. Opportunities and 
historical responsibilities are prioritized rather that risks and dangers in engaging with these 
territories. Consequently, the style of diplomacy envisioned for Turkey in the conservative 
tradition is more self-confident, bold and daring which is hoped would eventually unleash a 
resurgent great Turkey.  
 
Kemalists on the other hand imagine Turkey as a nation-state squarely located in the West in 
geo-cultural and civilizational terms. Such a revolutionary relocation of the country calls for 
separation of the links with the Muslim world and Ottoman legacy. Turkey‘s historical 
connections and experiences with the Muslim East is remembered negatively in a mood of 
utmost disdain and undesirability. Thus Turkey‘s southern neighbourhood is perceived 
eternally in trouble (instable, in turmoil, marred with secessionist, irredentist and 
fundamentalist ideologies) and unattractive. ―Bog‖, ―swamp‖ or ―mudland‖ metaphors iconize 
representations around this region. Kemalists instead index Turkey firmly westwards but 
equally suspect true intentions of western powers thanks to the experience of Sevres-phobia. 
A strong attachment to Turkey‘s territorial core (Anatolia and Eastern Thrace), extreme 
sensitivity about independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty loom large in the Kemalist 
mantra. A rigid understanding in protection of the homeland and Turkey‘s borders becomes 
the naturalized normal. Adherents of this tradition therefore are more cautious, risk-averse, 
timid, insular and caring in handling the external affairs portfolio.  
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It is these two broad imaginations that help shape the cognitive map of the world in Turkish 
people‘s and elite‘s mind, and call for two competing sets of assumptive worlds which 
provide simplification and clarity about goals and ends-means relationships in devising 
foreign policy strategies. It is in such a culture of geopolitics that meaning is given to Turkey‘s 
spatial location, geopolitical positioning, and neighbourhood. Turkey‘s foreign policy, security, 
identity, borders and grand strategies are endlessly debated under such a spatially carved 
framework.  
 
As covered in detail in Chapter 3, each geopolitical tradition strives to acquire strong power 
positions in decision-making mechanisms and establish broad networks of social power 
amongst political, military, economic and ideological spheres of life with a view to translate its 
imagination(s) into practice. In this context, it must be noted that modern Turkey started its 
life with a western positioning in a deliberate attempt by the congealment of politico-military 
power. Kemalist ideology was the chief legitimizing tool which brought together a core 
establishment from political, military, economic and ideological walks of life. The military 
stood the ultimate guardian of the regime and did not hesitate to intervene in the political 
process to keep Turkey‘s western march and secular system intact. As a relatively 
autonomous organization with area expertise, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did also act as a 
force of republican continuity. Against this backdrop, conservative-minded governments 
could not effectively challenge the supremacy of the Kemalist regime or alter Turkey‘s 
western positioning in global affairs until the 1980s. It was in the neo-liberal mood of the 
Turgut Özal years that conservatives started to flourish more effectively not only in the 
political sphere but also in terms of economic and ideological activity. Özal‘s self-styled 
handling of foreign affairs with novel geopolitical narratives helped side-line the foreign policy 
establishment and provided leeway to more colours from the conservative tradition in foreign 
policy. His death, however, resuscitated a Kemalist backlash during the 1990‘s. As the 
competition went along, Turkey witnessed once again the revival of conservative impulses in 
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the 2000s under a strongly pious government under the AK Party with renewed zeal in style, 
rhetoric and practice. This was also a period of empowerment for conservatives in business, 
academia, media and religious walks of life which was accompanied by a relative weakening 
of the Kemalist establishment.   
 
The clash between these two traditions thus gives an image that they are ―locked in a 
tempestuous tango of engagement and opposition‖1027 in giving shape to Turkey‘s character 
and foreign relations. This is where debates on a paradigm crisis, 1028  a double gravity 
state, 1029  tensions between a Kemalist state and political government, 1030  identity 
insecurity,1031 torn identity1032 and liminality1033 come to the fore. Nowhere else is the practical 
implications of this picture more evident than Turkey‘s mood swings on the Middle Eastern 
pendulum. That in nine decades of Turkey‘s existence, Ankara showed five waves of 
activism and retreat stands testimony to this claim. The Middle East is like a litmus test to 
read through the dominant geopolitical mentality in each period shaping decisions in Ankara. 
That is why it is arguably the most important spatial terrain in attempting to provide a 
geopolitical analysis of Turkey‘s foreign policy behaviour.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Ankara‘s first ever wave of activism in the Middle East came 
under Atatürk‘s leadership with two major leitmotifs. First, as epitomized in his dictum ―peace 
at home, peace in the world‖, Turkey aimed at consolidating its western positioning, territorial 
integrity, control over borders and curb possible inter-boundary threats to its western-
modelled, and secular domestic order. Ankara therefore relied on active pursuit of peaceful 
diplomacy to resolve the outstanding status of Alexandretta and Mosul/Kirkuk during the 
                                                          
1027 MUFTI, M. (2009). p.173. 
1028 MUFTI, M. (2009). p. 149-172. 
1029ROBINS, P. (2006). The BRISMES Lecture.  
1030ROBINS, P. (2007). p.289-304 
1031 GULSEVEN, E. (2010).  
1032HUNTINGTON, S. (1993). p.42. 
1033 YANIK, L. (2011).p.80-89.  
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1920s and 1930s. Secondly, whilst republican reforms helped transform Turkey‘s domestic 
landscape, a feeling of accomplishment and pride led Ankara to embark on the role of 
regional saviour with the Saidabad Pact of 1937 in the face of an imminent war. Prescribing 
the Atatürk solution i.e. western-centric modernization, secularization and collaboration with 
the west to the troubled Middle East, Turkey‘s reluctant salvos amounted visibly to regional 
activism. Ankara‘s strategy during World War II, however, was characterized by impartiality, 
non-involvement, and risk averseness as Turkey did not show any particular interest in 
regional affairs. The same continued until the 1950s as Ankara did not engage in Middle 
Eastern politics aside from manoeuvring around the hot topic of recognizing Israel‘s 
independence.  
 
Albeit subscribing to bipartisan consensus on Turkey‘s western positioning, the first 
conservative-leaning Turkish government under the Democrat Party of Adnan Menderes did 
not have an uneasy imagination with regards to the Middle East. By contrast acting on 
conservative impulses, DP leaders saw a neighbourhood of brothers under an overt atheist 
and communist threat. In this second wave of regional activism, Ankara boldly asserted itself 
in Middle Eastern affairs in order to create the Baghdad Pact which was enabled by 
Washington‘s position to contain Soviet expansionism. In trying to help bring order to ex-
Ottoman territories, Turkey proved to be a non-complacent ally many times falling at odds 
with the preferences of the western camp. In pursuit of power and prestige in its own right, 
Menderes did not even hesitate to flirt with a near bellicose discourse against Arab 
neighbours. That proved to be problematic as both American and Arab (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq, Yemen and Syria) perceptions of Turkey did not bode well with such an ambitious 
agenda which eventually widened the gap between Turkey and the Middle East.  
 
The 1960 military coup uprooting DP elevated westernism to the status of the prevalent 
practical norm in Turkey. Besides a reversion to the Kemalist psyche of seeing the Middle 
East as troublesome was also established. Dissenting voices were present across the 
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political spectrum such as the communists and pro-Islamists in hoping to relocate Turkey or 
change the fouled image of the Middle East but none were powerful enough to do so. To the 
contrary, a notion of ―barrier‖, which was mutually constituted by the republican elite‘s 
predispositions and the Cold War logic of ideological geopolitics, entrenched western 
positioning of Turkey. For the first five years after the coup, Turkey thus acted as a faithful 
western ally in the Middle East. But the trauma of the Jupiter missile crisis (1962), Johnson 
letter saga (1964) and Turkey‘s later military intervention in Cyprus (1974) shook Turks‘ 
confidence in the west. Therefore, Ankara saw measured westernism until the 1980s as the 
proper tactical response in its Middle Eastern overtures. The need for alternative sources of 
finance, commerce, hydrocarbon resources, and inclusion of Erbakan‘s MSP in coalition 
governments were extra motives pushing Turkey to diversify away from pro-western choices.   
 
The path towards socio-economic and political transformation undertaken after the military 
coup in 1980, however, enabled new variations in the course of geopolitical thinking in 
Turkey. After winning the first post-coup election, Turgut Özal himself took the lead in trying 
to go beyond simplistic conceptions of geo-cultural typology (East-West) as spaces of 
difference, temporal separation and inequality towards an understanding of a common space 
of hybridity and entwined partnership. Against this structure, he did not shy away from 
promulgating synthetic geo-cultural representations around Turkey. In this context, Turkey 
was presented as a living example of hybridity of space. In Özal‘s words, Turkey was re-
constructed as a land of synthesis that combines in itself two places and many cultures that 
predate and permeate over binary oppositions in the construction of the Eastern and the 
Western geographies.1034 Turkey was thus deemed Asiatic and European, Easterner not less 
than Western, oriental as well as occidental. Reconceptualising Turkey‘s synthesized 
placement was associated with the ―bridge‖ metaphor in the post-Cold War period. Whilst 
gently challenging Ankara‘s singlehandedly westwards positioning, Ozal was equally vocal in 
                                                          
1034 ÖZAL, T. (1991). p. 296-297. 
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emphasizing Turkey's placement in and sense of belonging to the Middle East. It was 
perceived as the land of people with whom Turks shared a common geography, history, 
religion, and culture as well as a zone of strategic significance. Ankara therefore kept Middle 
Eastern engagement as the chief touchstone of Turkey‘s hybridist geo-cultural image.  
 
In this sense, the Özalian epoch stands testimony to Ankara‘s third wave of energetic 
activism in the Middle East. Restructuring Turkish economy after the neo-liberal model and 
emergence of PKK-led violent crackdown in Turkey provided further grounds to identify more 
intensively with regional affairs. This manifested itself in four ways. First, Turkey gradually 
returned to the centre stage of Organization of Islamic Conference by attending at highest 
levels in its meetings and hosting subsidiary organs such as COMSEC, IRCICA, SESRIC, 
etc. Secondly, Ankara tried to act in a mood of cooperation and dialogue in regional affairs 
with a view to enable greater commercial, financial, touristic and natural resource flows. 
Countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Libya thus became Turkey‘s key economic 
partners. Thirdly, Ankara vigorously took the lead in establishment of ambitious regional 
schemes in a way similar to the DP era. In this context, the Economic Cooperation 
Organization was inaugurated in 1986. Two other major schemes of regional cooperation, 
namely Peace Pipeline (1986) and GAP (1983), were also initiated albeit with limited 
success. Fourthly, Turkey tried to capitalize on its hybridist qualities in a critical geographical 
location during the First Gulf War in 1991 for greater strategic gain.  
 
Özal‘s death in 1993 ushered in an era of weak coalition governments led by a new 
generation of politicians. Their ineffectiveness to provide economic stability, cool down PKK-
led violence and reluctance to own up to Özal‘s legacy re-brought the military to pre-
eminence. The military was thus able to steer a reversion away from Özalian geopolitical 
thinking and practice towards republican dispositions around the westernist imagery. But 
there was still a mood of uncertainty externally at the time about Turkey‘s post-Cold War 
geopolitical placement. Hence the security-minded Turkish elite‘s feelings of abandonment 
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by the west and entrapment in a turbulent geography fed into stronger sensitivities around 
Turkey‘s territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty. With an unattractive imagination vis-à-vis 
the Middle East, what followed was a militarized notion of Turkish foreign policy which 
reduced external affairs exclusively to an outpost of Ankara‘s national security posture. 
Concerned with emergence of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq, Turkey was 
antagonistic, coercive, belligerent and interventionist towards its Middle Eastern neighbours. 
The only exception, which was perceived in ways similar to Turkey as a western modelled 
state in a tough geography was Israel. With military-strategic considerations lying at the core, 
that is why Turkish-Israeli relations went through a period of honeymoon in the 1990s.   
 
Within this broad picture, there was one exception and an anomaly. The exception was the 
short lived RP-DYP coalition government. Pursuing a purely easternist imagery, Erbakan‘s 
government tried to relocate Turkey as the leader of the Islamic world and hence followed 
hard core conservative reflexes. Foreign policy was used as means of consolidating such an 
anti-occidentalist vision. In the two big trips Erbakan took to the Islamic world, an idea of 
establishing a D-8 group mirroring the G-8 was proposed. Energy deals were made. 
Financial and economic cooperation was envisioned. However, this attempt to reorient 
Turkey and its foreign policy was not risk free. Erbakan first found himself obliged to cut 
deals with the US and Israel and then resign under pressure by the military. The anomaly 
was the efforts by the coalition government led by Ecevit and his foreign policy guru Cem. 
Both subscribed to republican westernist imagery but not to an uneasy association with the 
Middle East. Whilst confessing to an uneasy neighbourhood, they did not necessarily see an 
unattractive Middle East. Picturing Turkey as a bridge instead between civilizations and its 
function as the outpost of European values in a difficult neighbourhood, Ecevit and Cem tried 
to cash in their country‘s geo-cultural situatedness to prove Turkey‘s value for the west. In 
other words, Turkey‘s geography and its relations with the Middle East were instrumentalized 
in a way to gain acceptance in the western community of nations in the post-Cold War 
period. The pace and vigour via which these two impulses were reflected into practice points 
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to an intensified engagement which stands testimony to Turkey‘s fourth wave of Middle 
Eastern activism.    
 
The AK Party era is when the last wave of Turkey‘s Middle Eastern activism is manifested 
albeit in a different geopolitical reasoning under the intellectual courtship of Ahmet 
Davutoğlu. Although subscribing to post-Cold War European civilizational geopolitics, the 
exercise put forward used classical geopolitical assumptions as an instrument to prioritize the 
geographical and strategic advantages enjoyed by the Muslim world with a view to envisage 
a greater room for the primacy and revival of Muslim culture and civilization. Thus a 
civilizational discourse coloured with naturalized geopolitical claims in trying to ―re-position 
Turkey from the periphery of international relations to the centre‖ was visibly called for 
towards a three-legged re-imagination of/around Turkey. In the first leg, Turkey is re-
imagined as the geographical pivot of history by being centrally located at the exact point 
where Mackinder's Heartland and Spykman's Rimland intersect. Secondly, Turkey is 
portrayed as a central civilizational hub thanks to its situation at the intersection of Europe 
and Asia, eastern and western civilizations and thus subscribing to a multitude of identities all 
at the same time. As the heir of Ottoman Empire which served as the chief frontrunner of the 
Islamic world, Turkey‘s assumption of the leadership of its own civilizational basin is hence 
normalized and justified. The last leg of re-imagination pertains to the Middle Eastern 
neighbourhood. By sitting at an interface between continents, this region is discursively 
reconstructed as the key area to heartland Afro-Eurasia and hence a natural hinterland for 
Turkey.  
 
Such reconstructions of Turkey‘s image and location in global affairs as well as that of the 
Middle East feed into a sense of geo-cultural and geo-political distinctiveness to legitimize 
Ankara‘s active pursuit of diplomacy and national interest towards greater influence, stature, 
weight and prestige in international politics. That such an exercise took hold in the psyche of 
the post-September 11 era, which paved the way to a revival of civilizational geopolitics, 
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lendsa re-constitutive motive to AK Party leaders‘ self-imagined discursive constructions. It is 
under these circumstances that Turkey in the 21st century embarked on a path towards re-
energized Middle Eastern engagement on the basis of the infamous dictum, ―zero-problems 
with neighbours‖. The new strategy rested on three pillars; continuous political dialogue, 
enhanced economic interdependence, and increased social and cultural exchange. These 
were supported by new tools such as the High Level Cooperation Councils (HLCP), visa free 
travel and free trade agreements, Yunus Emre Cultural Centres and TĠKA (Turkish 
Cooperation and Development Agency) activities. Lastly, Ankara was eager to act as an 
intermediary in the resolution of regional disputes either between inter or intra-state parties 
as exemplified in back channel diplomacy in the Syria-Israel track, Iran‘s nuclear programme, 
stabilization of Lebanon after the war with Israel in 2006, Iraq-Syria reconciliation and 
persuasion of Iraqi Sunnis in the political process, etc. That was the mentality and context 
which re-introduced Turkey to Middle Eastern politics once again in a cooperative mood 
through improved relations with Syria, Iran, Iraq, the Gulf and north African states in the first 
decade of the new millennium. The rather contrasting turn the AK Party took in its Middle 
Eastern dealings in the new decade requires a more nuanced understanding first on whether 
the three-legged imagination stands valid, second whether there is a change in the 
geopolitical code or a substantial change in the overall decision making mechanism.  
 
In conclusion, the findings of this research indicate that the search for locating Turkey 
between the East and the West continues to this day. The two broad geopolitical traditions in 
Turkey that engage in such activity also remain intact. Variants exist in both camps. How 
they imagine Turkey‘s geo-political and geo-cultural locatedness is also prone to variation in 
time. With each discursive spatial representation comes along a different conception of 
Turkey, its identity, and interests which is not purely material. In this exercise, at times 
compelling geopolitical narratives are produced; different sets of foreign policy possibilities, 
options and priorities are called for. The shift in the relative power and weight of diverse 
social groups in decision-making is what makes a difference in Turkish foreign policy. But 
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equally important is the mutually constitutive influence of external actors‘ global positioning, 
mission and role expectations of Turkey. A combination of all these factors gives an image of 
a zigzagging pattern in Ankara‘s Middle Eastern dealings. This cannot be deemed good or 
bad since Turkey is a country still in search for a proper place in global affairs. Nonetheless, 
the interdisciplinary and multi-causal model in critical geopolitics accurately explains 
discontinuity and change in Turkey‘s regional policy.  
 
On a last note, Turkey‘s location at the intersection of many influences in a geography sitting 
on both Asian and European continents keeps stirring intellectual debate at home and 
abroad.  Socio-political, and economic transformation in Turkey continues in parallel with 
geopolitical thinking in an attempt to giving proper meaning to its location. Shifts in the 
relative weight of social networks of power partake in the constitution, reconstitution and 
discursive representation of such an elusive geographical situatedness. Then 
perceptions/practices towards Turkey by other systemic actors in global affairs leave the 
door open for novel re-conceptualizations of Turkey‘s location and hence endless 
possibilities for the future direction of Turkish foreign policy.    
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FIRAT, M. (1997). 1960-71 Arasi Türk Diş Politikasi ve Kıbrıs Sorunu (1960-1971: Turkish 
Foreign Policy and the Cyprus Question). Cebeci, Ankara, Siyasal Kitabevi. 
329 
 
FIRAT, M. & KÜRKÇÜOĞLU, Ö. (2002). Ortadoğu‘yla ĠliĢkiler (Turkey‘s Relations with the 
Middle East) in ORAN, B. Turkish Foreign Policy. sp.794. 
FIRAT, M. Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Ġnönü (The Cyprus Question and Inonu). Available at 
http://www.ismetinonu.org.tr/index.php/27-mayis-ihtilali-ve-sonrasi/kibris-sorunu-ve-inonu 
(consulted on May 23, 2013). 
FIRESTONE, W. A. (1993). Alternative Arguments for Generalizing from Data as Applied to 
Qualitative Research. Educational Researcher. 22. 
FLINT, C. (2006). Introduction to Geopolitics. London, Routledge. 
FLINT, C., ADDUCI, M., CHEN, M., & CHI, S.-H. (2009). Mapping the Dynamism of the 
United States' Geopolitical Code: The Geography of the State of the Union Speeches, 1988–
2008. Geopolitics. 14. 
FLINT, C. (2012). Interview for Exploring Geopolitics website, available at 
http://www.exploringgeopolitics.org/Interview_Flint_Colin_Structure_Agency_Identity_Peace
_Networks_Geopolitical_Codes_Visions_Agents_Actors_Representations_Practices_Spaces
_Powers_Environmental_Geopolitics.html. (consulted on September 30, 2012). 
FOUCAULT, M. (1986). Of Other Spaces. Diacritics 16. 
FRANK, MICHAEL C. (2009). Imaginative Geography as a Travelling Concept: Foucault, 
Said and the Spatial Turn, European Journal of English Studies Vol. 13, No. 1 
FRIEDMAN, T. (1996). Who Lost Turkey? The New York Times (August 21). 
FUKUYAMA, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York, Free Press. 
FULLER, G. (1993). Turkey‘s New Eastern Orientation in FULLER, G. E., LESSER, I. O., 
HENZE, P. B., & BROWN, J. F. (1993). Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to 
Western China. Boulder, Westview Press.  
FULLER, G. (1997). Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the 
Old Soviet Union. Santa Monica. CA. RAND. 
FULLER, G. E. (2004). Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities. The Washington 
Quarterly. 27. 
FULLER, G. E. (2008). The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim 
World. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press. 
―GEOPOLITICS‖, EncyclopediaBritannica Online, (consulted on March 20, 2012)  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/229932/geopolitics 
GEORGEON, F., & BERKTAY, A. (2006). Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi, 1900-1930 
(Ottoman-Turkish Modernization: 1900-1930). Ġstanbul, Yapı Kredi Yayınları.  
GIRGIN, K. (1993). T.C. Hükümetleri Programlarında Dış Politikamız: 70 Yılın Panoraması, 
1923-1993. (Foreign Policy in the Programmes of Turkish Governments: An Overview of 70 
Years, 1923-1993).  Ankara, [s.n.]. 
GOLDSTEIN, J., & KEOHANE, R. O. (1993). Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, 
and Political Change. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.  
GOODALL, Dictionary of Human Geography. 
GÖKMEN, SEMRA. R. (2010). Geopolitics and the Study of International Relations, PHD 
Thesis, Middle East Technical University. 
330 
 
 
GÖKTEPE, C. (2005). Britain, NATO and Turkey (1959-1965). The Journal of Turkish 
Weekly, available at http://www.turkishweekly.net/article/59/ (consulted on May 23, 2013). 
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